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Foreword
The three organisations behind this book—AFD, IDS, and JICA—have different 
roles and responsibilities when it comes to global development, but each has 
long advocated for a more nuanced debate on growth, emphasising, for 
example, its distributional consequences, its human development impacts, and 
its environmental effects.  As we enter into the post 2015 development era, all of 
these features of growth are becoming ever more integrated, and gaining 
importance as decisive factors for realising sustainable development.
We are delighted that the authors of this book have come together, supported by 
our respective institutions, to make a significant contribution to inform our 
debate on this subject. In the 21st century our decisions and policies will 
perhaps be judged less on the quantity of growth they help to achieve, but on its 
quality—what it does for the things that we, as citizens of this planet, really care 
about. This book will offer some guidance on what we have come to know about 
the quality of growth, and it will help to identify the research gaps that most 
urgently need to be filled. 
Anne Paugam 
CEO
Agence 
Française 
de Développement 
(AFD)
  
Melissa Leach 
Director
Institute of 
Development Studies 
(IDS)
  
Akihiko Tanaka 
President
Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)
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Preface
This book was written because the editors felt that insufficient attention is being 
given to the quality of growth.  
As the signs of negative impact of global climate change are becoming evident, 
and especially in the aftermath of the global economic turndown, societies had a 
choice—either reframe their definition of growth, or try to pursue it— growth as 
we have known it for many decades—via business as usual routes, using metrics 
rooted in the 20th century. True, there are emerging signs of change. For example, 
the debate on the post-2015 development agenda is slowly moving towards a 
greater consensus on the need to focus on growth that generates jobs, reduces 
inequality, is consistent with a sustainable use of natural resources and generates 
manageable amounts of greenhouse gases. By and large, however, despite such 
debate in international arena, politicians both in developed and developing 
countries alike seem to be choosing the latter routes, pursuing growth as we have 
known it via business as usual approaches and metrics.  
What does the academic world have to say on these issues? Among the various 
academic disciplines, economists in particular seem to have focused 
insufficiently on these issues: What are the dimensions of growth quality we 
should most care about? How to measure such qualities? And what are the 
tradeoffs between them in the context of different policy regimes and governance 
structures?  And the list of such important research questions goes on. 
This collection of papers represents an effort of the researchers of the three 
institutions—AFD, IDS, and JICA—to contribute to the deepening and 
widening of international debate on such issues. We hope it provokes policy-
makers to think twice about the blind pursuit of “growth at all costs,” and our 
development community to think seriously about how their day-to-day 
decisions and activities can contribute, both positively and negatively, to 
realizing a higher quality of growth.  
For the JICA Team
Hiroshi Kato
For the AFD Team
Nicolas Meisel
For the IDS Team
Lawrence Haddad
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Introduction
Growth is Dead, Long Live Growth
The Quality of Economic Growth and Why It Matters
Lawrence Haddad, Hiroshi Kato and Nicolas Meisel 
“Speed is irrelevant if you are going in the wrong direction” 
(M� Gandhi)
Why the quality of growth? 
 
The way that economic growth is conceptualised and measured has been 
a topic of great debate for many years (Seers 1972).  How can equity 
considerations be incorporated?  How can environmental externalities be 
taken into account? And, ultimately, how can we improve the ability of 
economic growth to drive the development outcomes we most care about? 
Many now talk about degrowth (Demaria et al. 2013), the end of growth 
(Heinberg 2011), or the forthcoming secular stagnation (Teulings and 
Baldwin 2014) —about how growth is no longer desirable, useful, or even 
feasible.  This collection of papers prefers to frame the debate not as the 
end of growth, but as the end of growth as we know it.  The 20th century 
definition of growth must be left in the 20th century and 21st century 
formulations adopted for the times we live in.  
We are not the first to discuss the quality of growth. The debate on the 
quality of growth is primarily a debate about the quality of life. It is well 
known since the early works of Easterlin (1974) that the progress of GDP 
per capita in Western countries does not mean a parallel progress in 
perceived happiness. Since 1990, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) through both its Human Development Reports and 
the Human Development Index has brought the idea of the quality of 
growth into the mainstream policy discourse. An important piece of work 
on this issue by Thomas, et al. (2000) was also published by the World 
Bank at the turn of the millennium. It argued that while economic growth 
remains important among the factors that contribute to development, the 
quality of that growth is equally important.  The report contended that 
development is better served when quantity and quality of growth 
2
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intertwine and explicitly focus on an agenda that addresses the human, 
social, environmental, and governance dimensions of development.1  
In addition to the benefit of 15 more years of observation, 
conceptualization, data and studies, our work advances Thomas et al. 
(2000) in three important ways. First, the ramifications of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8 flow through many of the papers in this collection, 
generating greater insight about what we should be measuring. Second, 
the evidence on climate change is more organized and compelling, 
generating a new literature on the potential tradeoffs between economic 
growth, poverty reduction and environmental costs.  Finally, much more 
work has been done on the levels, drivers and consequences of inequality 
and we draw on and aim to contribute to this literature. 
Indeed, the trends and events of the last decade have moved these 
debates from largely academic exercises to urgent matters of public 
policy.  The dramatic increases forecast in greenhouse gas emissions, the 
persistence of chronic poverty despite the increasing wealth of nations, 
and an increasing recognition of the interplay between different types 
of growth and different types of fragilities have made the search for new 
ways of framing, measuring, analysing and assessing economic growth 
even more pressing.  If not all forms of growth are equally valuable and 
some are destructive of development, what growth do we need and how 
do we get it?  
Policy debates on the quality of growth have been very active around the 
world. In Asia, for example, the quality of growth has been hotly debated. 
This is understandable, for Asia is a region that has achieved remarkable 
economic development, but only with accompanying difficulties such as 
inequality within the region and within countries, insecurity in terms of 
the supply of food and energy, increased risk of infectious diseases, and 
the middle-income poverty trap problem (Sumner 2013). Thus the APEC’s 
growth strategy adopted in 2010 (Xia 2011) highlighted five pillars, that 
included (1) balanced growth, (2) inclusive growth, (3) sustainable growth, 
(4) innovative growth, and (5) secured growth. Even China seems to have 
clearly put an end to its policy orientation of “growth at all costs.” In 2011 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told a conference in Beijing2 that he believes 
1. World Bank Institute (2001).  
2. Annual Meeting of the New Champions (what is generally called “Summer Davos” 
conference) in 2011. 
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that “China’s economy can achieve longer term, better quality growth”. 
The participants of the said conference came up with an understanding 
that the following five elements constitute “quality growth:” 
sustainability, inclusion, fairness, balance, and innovation. 
In Africa we have heard the term “quality of growth” less frequently but 
the current heated debate on African development seems to be centred 
not simply on assuring the continent’s continued growth but more 
importantly on economic transformation, i.e., away from the excessive 
dependency on extractive mineral and energy sectors and toward more 
broad based economic development. It centres on “inclusive growth” or 
how to share the fruit of growth among the populace, and this is at the 
core of the quality of growth debate. In Latin America, too, where 
inequality has long been a major constraint to development, this is an 
agenda attracting attention from policy makers (Thorbecke 2013).
In Europe the debates have been around sustainable growth (Jackson 
2011), degrowth (Demaria et al. 2013), measurement issues (Stiglitz, Sen 
and Fitoussi 2013) and the connection between inequality and economic, 
social, and ecological challenges (Alvaredo et al. 2013, Haddad 2015). All 
of these refer to quality of growth issues. 
In this volume we do not offer a precise definition of the quality of 
growth.  More importantly we focus on expanding the knowledge base on 
three agreed key dimensions of quality: (1) growth that manages 
environmental tradeoffs, (2) growth that supports equity and 
inclusiveness, and (3) growth that is less susceptible to shocks. By 
bringing together these strands we aim to contribute to a unification of 
the field and to identify any common patterns and synergies. 
Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change
A few years earlier than the work of Easterlin (1974), the Meadows report 
(1972) on The Limits to growth drew the world’s attention to the 
contradiction between exponential growth trends in population and GDP 
and the finite resources and carrying capacities of our planet. The report 
was ignored or ridiculed by the bulk of the economic profession at the 
time of its publication. However, 35 years later Turner (2008) showed that 
the values predicted in 1972 by the ‘standard run’ (business as usual) 
scenario were disturbingly close to the observed data. In this scenario, 
4
Introduction
exponential growth is followed by a collapse of our economic system at 
some point in the 21st century due to soaring global emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG, such as methane, nitrates and carbon dioxide 
from various sources related to human activity). 
Likely climate change generated by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will 
have both short and long run effects. First, via temperature-induced 
changes in water stock availability climate change would progressively 
erode the natural capital base of our societies, hence adversely impacting 
agricultural output and food security. A recent study by MIT scholar John 
Reilly (2014), which was presented at the 11th AFD-Proparco-EUDN 
conference on Energy for Development, shows that policy efforts aiming 
to control climate change through (re)forestation for carbon sequestration, 
use of land for bioenergy production and increased energy costs, would 
ultimately affect prices of food, hence generating systemic pressure on the 
already fragile climate-agriculture link. Moreover, as a consequence of 
altered biophysical equilibria, life expectancy would shrink from current 
average, due to, among other factors, rising health costs, emerging 
pathologies and viruses, severe droughts, the destruction of 
infrastructure and conflicts.  In the longer run, and more indirectly, 
geophysical evolutions  such as changes in oceanic streams or releases of 
GHG trapped under the permafrost might entail a substantial and sudden 
rise in atmospheric temperature with dramatic ecological, economic and 
social consequences. 
Whatever the exact nature and timing of such events, their likelihood is 
rapidly increasing according to the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 2014) and the many research centres working on these 
issues. A famous paper by Anderson and Bows (2011) from the Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change Research in the UK states: “The analysis within 
this paper offers a stark and unremitting assessment of the climate change 
challenge facing the global community. There is now little to no chance of 
maintaining the rise in global mean surface temperature at below 2°C, despite 
repeated high-level statements to the contrary. Moreover, the impacts associated 
with 2°C have been revised upwards, sufficiently so that 2°C now more 
appropriately represents the threshold between dangerous and extremely 
dangerous climate change.”
Western Europe and Japan have been experiencing near-stagnant growth 
for some years now and the prospects remain moderate to say the least 
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while the centre of gravity of global growth has moved to Asia. Sharing the 
diagnosis of Jackson (2011) and many others, our societies face a dilemma 
to reconcile economic progress, social stability and the preservation of our 
ecosystems. The primary constraint pertains to the link between social 
stability and ‘growth as we know it’, and the dilemma has to do with the 
contradiction between the quest for ‘growth as we know it’ and the 
resulting GHG emissions within viable limits as suggested by the IPCC 
(2014). Let us shed some light on each of them in turn. 
How to reconcile an indefinitely growing global economy fuelled by a 
growing population (set to reach nine billion by 2050), always producing 
and consuming more goods and services with the preservation of a viable 
environment for humankind needed to ensure the reproducibility of our 
societies? CO2 emissions and global GDP have moved hand in hand for the 
last two centuries, following not an arithmetical, nor a geometrical, but an 
exponential growth trajectory. In the last decade according to the IPCC 
(2014), population growth and economic growth outpaced emission 
reductions from improvements in energy intensity. Increased use of coal 
relative to other energy sources reversed the long-standing trend of 
gradual decarbonisation of the world’s energy supply. The current share of 
fossil fuels in energy consumption will increase with about 1200 new coal-
fired plants in the world according to the World Resources Institute (Yang 
and Cui, 2012), two thirds of which are in China and India. Given this 
rising share of fossil fuels in the energy mix, keeping the extraction of non-
renewable materials (i.e. fuels and minerals), the production of waste and 
pollution, and the emission of GHG within ‘reasonable’ limits (i.e. avoid 
overshooting the 2°C target of global warming beyond which extreme 
events would become highly likely) would practically mean constraining 
the economic system to a global average ‘growth as we know it’ close to 0. 
Growth as we know it thus faces a physical impossibility that policy-
makers around the world do not seem to fully realize. In the words of 
Daly (2005), one of the first ecological economists at the World Bank: “the 
biosphere is finite, non-growing, closed (except for the constant input of 
solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any 
subsystem, such as the economy, must at some point cease growing and 
adapt itself to a dynamic equilibrium, something like a steady state.” 
Fully internalising the negative carbon externality over the short and long 
run is a challenge to the tools of economists because of the uncertainty over 
6
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the magnitude of future shocks. Current market signals do not allow us to 
identify the magnitude of the future market failures. Market signals would 
likely remain too small until too late, i.e. when irreversibility thresholds 
would have been crossed. The only way out of this massive “market failure” 
is to think of government regulations changing market signals and 
incentives at the local, national and global levels.  Examples would include 
carbon markets with a global quota system setting the volume of expected 
reductions in emissions, or a “carbon tax” setting a carbon price, with the 
risks that these mechanisms will be either insufficient or bypassed or, if 
effective, will have strong recessive consequences. 
Moreover there is little analysis of the politics of collective action required 
to prevent catastrophic outcomes in the future, let alone confront them. 
This refers the political difficulty of mobilising populations on abstract 
and remote threats where the costs of political inaction are diffuse and in 
the future, the benefits of inaction are concentrated in the hands of 
powerful sectors of the economy and the consequences of inaction impact 
the majority of the population, usually the poorest disproportionately. 
 
Job Creation, Equality and Inclusiveness 
In the presence of productivity gains, which are both the core engine and 
outcome of economic growth, net job creation in our current economic 
system depends on permanently increasing the size of the economy 
(Jackson 2011). Indeed, as soon as GDP growth stands below productivity 
gains, jobs are destroyed, all other things being equal (size of working age 
population, number of worked hours, and duration of working time). In 
many parts of the world, the same mechanism and the concentration of 
growth in capital-intensive enclaves can help explain “jobless growth” 
and the ineffective calls for making it more “inclusive.” Maintaining or 
improving the lot of the unemployed and of those who are not part of the 
labour force depends either on the ability to grow the economy and 
include them, or on the ability of states to tax a flow of incomes and 
redistribute them through social transfers, public goods and public 
services. Some put the emphasis on the first term (“Grow, dammit, grow!” 
urged The Economist in October 2010), some on the second (e.g. Paul 
Krugman pointing at Europe’s secret success, its welfare states). Social 
stability and progress in both cases fundamentally rest on “growth as we 
know it,” i.e. a growth in the production of goods and services. It is by 
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sustaining impressive levels of output growth over three decades that the 
Chinese regime managed to pull 400 million people out of poverty. 
Should growth stagnate or diminish, the whole social edifice is shaken as 
is now the case in many European countries, triggering a vicious circle of 
growing structural unemployment, lower consumer spending, lower 
investment, rising social transfers, diminishing tax revenues, and 
widening budget deficits that turn into rising debt and sooner or later 
justify slashes in social spending. Our current economic system seems to 
be doomed to indefinitely growing in size if it is to maintain stability. 
The concept of inclusive growth is an idea that encompasses the centrality 
of job creation at its core but also others such as the issues of inequality of 
access to social services and income inequality. One of the reasons that 
this notion came to be highlighted is that the MDG framework did not pay 
enough attention to the issue of inequality. World Bank President Zoellick 
adopted this concept as part of the organization’s vision in 2007, and the 
Asian Development Bank also adopted this concept as one of its main 
agendas in its Strategy 2020. 
Defined by the World Bank as a kind of growth that “allows people to 
contribute to and benefit from economic growth,”3 this concept is broader 
than “pro-poor growth” in that it emphasizes not only the benefits for 
those living in poverty but also for other excluded groups of society, such 
as the disabled, minorities, and those living in disadvantaged areas. In the 
current debate on the upcoming post-2015 development agenda this issue 
of inclusiveness is one of the issues receiving strong attention. As will be 
demonstrated by one of the papers in this volume, investment in those 
who are generally regarded as vulnerable and unproductive could pay off 
not only from the humanitarian perspective but also from the perspective 
of economic welfare.  
Exposure to Shocks and the Promotion of the Resilience of Growth
Another quality that the growth of the 21st century must embody is 
resilience: an ability to keep driving human development outcomes in the 
context of shocks and uncertainties (Spence 2011).   Indeed progress 
toward the MDGs has been critically hindered by shocks and crises such 
as natural disasters, manmade disasters, economic and financial crises, 
and conflicts (Conceicao et al. 2011).
3. World Bank (2009). 
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The evidence base is thin in this area. There are several papers that link 
shocks to growth: for example, Dell et al. 2012 find evidence that 
temperature shocks are significantly associated with dips in economic 
growth rates, especially in poorer countries.  There are fewer papers that 
identify the attributes of growth that make it more or less able to 
withstand shocks. One example is the work of Wen and Wu (2014), 
comparing China’s post global financial crisis experience with other 
countries.  Wen and Wu argue that it is not the rate of growth pre-shock 
that was important.  They conclude that China’s growth was the most 
resilient of all nations in the face of the 2008 global financial crisis due to 
some of its features (the role of state owned enterprises) and some of its 
policies (such as an aggressive fiscal stimulus).  
However, the blind pursuit of resilience is not always going to be 
consistent with other goals of growth such as poverty reduction.  While 
the benefits of adopting the concept of resilience as an analytical 
framework to understand how systems respond to shock/stress have been 
widely recognized in the social-ecological systems literature (see e.g. 
Carpenter et al. 2001; Chapin et al. 2009) the evidence of benefit in 
development is less clear.  Indeed, Béné et al. (2012) argue that resilience is 
not necessarily a pro-poor concept—countries, institutions and people 
who are better off can invest in resilience—and that there is no automatic 
link between poverty reduction and resilience.
Nevertheless, many conclude that it is better to be safe than sorry, and 
Hoddinott (2014), in a wide ranging review, argues that the post 2015 
development framework will need to give much more to identifying and 
promoting policies to nurture the capabilities of more vulnerable 
economies, people, and communities to deal with external shocks. 
Understanding the characteristics of growth that make it more resilient to 
shocks while maintaining or improving its pro-poor features is an 
important area for future research. 
 
The Contributions of the Papers in This Volume
This collection of papers contributes to this debate on the quality of 
growth in a number of ways.  First, we show how different 
conceptualisations of growth, when measured, deliver very different 
assessments of country performance over time, and between countries. 
The paper by Aglietta shows that for many countries, what appears to be 
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strong performance is revealed as a path towards depletion.  The 
unsustainability of extractive resource based economies is clearly 
demonstrated, but so too the weak performance of economies that appear 
robust but which place the greatest emphasis on individual as opposed to 
social welfare.  The easiest thing to do is to continue with the façade of 
measuring and reporting GDP per capita, but reporting real wealth or IWI 
reveals the truer benefits and costs of resource allocation decisions. 
Policymakers need to decide whether to choose between truth or 
simplicity.  The negative shocks of the last decade—and the promises of 
ever more frequent and severe shocks in the future—suggest that 
simplicity has become merely simplistic and that truth cannot be 
dismissed for the sake of convenience.  
Second, we show how 20th century conceptions of growth do not deliver 
on the issues we care about in the 21st century.  Even the most reliable 
refuge of those who protect current definitions of economic growth—its 
ability to drive down extreme income poverty—will soon offer no 
protection. Bluhm, de Crombrugghe and Szirmai show that even under 
the most optimistic of scenarios there will be a slowdown in the ability 
of growth to reduce $1.25 a day poverty.  A much overlooked dimension 
of the quality of growth is its spatial distribution—if poverty rates are to 
continue declining at historical rates, each of the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa will have to grow at 4.5% per capita for the next 15 years. 
In the past 10 years, they have—on average—achieved 2.5%, an excellent 
performance, but not good enough for the next 15 years if we want to 
continue to drive down extreme poverty.  The next three papers in the 
volume remind us that even this historically good performance of 
growth in driving down poverty has bypassed the most vulnerable 
members of society.  Tsuruga shows that in Cambodia, despite excellent 
macroeconomic performance between 2004 and 2010 and extremely 
rapid declines in income poverty rates, households with certain 
attributes (primarily agrarian, who own little or no land) remain stuck 
in poverty.  
Using global data, Haddad, Masset and Smith show that compared to 
income poverty rates, infant stunting rates are much less responsive to 
economic growth and that this has implications for their own poverty as 
adults and for the likely poverty of their children. Using a large dataset 
from Nepal, Lamichhane, for the first time, is able to compare the 
responsiveness of human development outcomes to income growth 
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between individuals with and without disabilities.  The paper makes it 
clear that income growth delivers less for individuals with disabilities.  
 
Third, we show that different components of growth deliver different 
development outcomes.  There are policy choices and they matter. What 
attributes of growth do we need to pay more attention to make it a driver 
not a destroyer of the kinds of development transformations we want to 
see?  We focus on growth that helps control greenhouse gas emissions, 
that generates employment, that does not increase susceptibility to 
external shocks, and that capitalises on fundamental demographic 
transitions in Africa.  Willenbockel’s analysis makes it clear that without 
low carbon growth in the low income countries global emission targets 
will not be met, causing problems for all countries.  He argues that it is in 
the interests of low income countries—and everyone else—for them to 
avoid the “grow now, go green later” strategy.  This, he stresses, is the 
rationale for rich country investment in low carbon growth in the poorest 
countries.  Jobs are a driver of development and decent work is a vital 
component of human wellbeing.  Cirera analyses the links between 
income growth components and different components of employment. 
His analysis demonstrates the evidence gaps in our understanding of how 
to direct growth towards better employment outcomes.  
Using local government panel data from Japan, Shimada refutes the 
notion that long run growth is spurred by the impact of natural crises. 
He estimates significant short run and long run impacts of disasters on 
growth.  He also explores whether some growth patterns are better or 
worse at mitigating the impacts of a given disaster.  The susceptibility of 
different types of growth to shocks is another key dimension of quality. 
Focusing on Africa, Losch highlights the major demographic trends that 
Africa will experience in the coming decades.  In particular, over the 
next 40 years the ratio of adults of working to nonworking age will 
double—from one to two—presenting African countries with the 
potential for a demographic dividend.  This transition will represent a 
dividend if employment opportunities can be created by investments 
now.  How to realise this potential and avoid a demographic nightmare? 
For countries, where agriculture is an employer of a large percent of the 
population, investing in agriculture is one way of stimulating rural 
income, lowering the real price of food in urban settings, stimulating the 
demand for non-farm goods and bidding up rural wages.  It is also a pro-
poor way of growing.  But is this an adequate strategic response to the 
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potential demographic dividend?  The paper also discusses the 
possibility of a time window where wage rates in some African 
countries will become much more competitive with those in Asia.  The 
potential of these overlapping windows sharpens the focus on making 
the right strategic choices about growth.  
Finally, as the papers by Hosono and Mejia Acosta make clear, there is no 
single path towards high quality growth. There are many policy choices 
and many common ingredients, but the heterogeneity of context is great 
and sequencing matters enormously. These papers also remind us, as 
does Willenbockel, that single policy instruments should not be relied 
upon to move forward multiple dimensions of growth quality.  A range of 
instruments should be employed to advance a range of growth attributes. 
Trade-offs are inevitable and generate winners and losers, at least in terms 
of short run perceptions.  This means that politics come into play—at the 
global, national and subnational levels.  Mejia Acosta examines the policy 
choices that have been deployed to attempt to convert one key source of 
growth—natural resource extraction—from a historically low quality 
type of growth into a higher grade.  He focuses on the oil and gas sectors 
in ten low and middle income countries and highlights the complexities 
and technical and political trade-offs involved in strategizing around 
stabilisation and savings funds, revenue sharing formulas (between 
regions and between different levels of government) and cash transfers. 
Hosono’s paper brings us back to an expanded definition of the quality of 
growth, adding security to the standard component of innovation and the 
newer recognition of inclusiveness and sustainability. His paper 
examines four case studies that are widely recognised to exhibit some 
attribute of high quality growth.  He analyses Chile’s salmon industry, the 
Cerrado in Brazil, the automobile industry in Thailand, and the garment 
business in Bangladesh.  The case studies vividly demonstrate the 
structural transformations that took place, the vital role of learning, 
knowledge and institutional innovation, but the analysis also highlights 
the vulnerabilities of even these success stories in terms of sustainability 
(Chile), security (Bangladesh). 
Implications for Policy
Several implications for policy emerge from these papers, and from the 
work they build on. 
12
Introduction
First, policymakers need to become more discerning about growth.  Not 
all types of growth are good.  Some forms advance the human 
condition—now and in the future—and some do not.  Growth is a 
contingent means to an end, not an end in itself.  The numbers in the paper 
by Aglietta pull back the curtain on what growth has really been achieved 
and at what cost.   This is a difficult position for low-income governments 
to take when increases in GDP per capita are (still) an effective way of 
reducing poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2013).  Thus the middle and high-
income countries must lead the way in changing their behaviour towards 
growth. They will not do this until their failure has some electoral 
consequences.  The gradual strengthening of the green movement and the 
hollowness of jobless growth will eventually bring about this awakening. 
We can only hope it will be before some irreversible physical threshold 
has been crossed (Hughes et al 2013). 
Second, we need to set out to design the kind of growth we want.  If we 
want growth to reduce poverty, to not destroy the environment, and to 
not be fragile to shocks, we know what to do: at the very least prevent 
inequality from worsening, make sure social and environmental costs are 
incorporated into benefit-cost ratios, and view growth through a 
resilience lens, where diversification is a key principle.  The resource curse 
literature has shown that governance is the difference between growth 
that is high quality and low quality (Moore 2011).  The rules of the game 
can be influenced to make it more likely that higher quality growth will 
be generated. Innovations that promote lower resource footprints per unit 
of growth need to be incentivised and shared via R and D spending, well-
designed public-private partnerships to shift incentives in the use of long-
term investment resources, targeted tax breaks and international charters 
which reduce transactions costs on high quality growth-promoting 
intellectual property. As envisaged more or less explicitly in different 
papers of the volume, notably Aglietta, the most coherent and ambitious 
way forward should consist in a massive and coordinated global 
investment initiative to accelerate the transition from low cost non-
renewable to low cost renewable energy sources. This would require 
strong global political support and a financial commitment of long-term 
resources backed by central banks in order to pool the risk on the path to 
this energy transition. 
Finally, we need to measure the things we care about.  How much 
employment is generated per unit of growth? How many resources are 
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used per unit of growth?  How much emissions are produced per unit of 
growth? There are many efforts to answer these questions (e.g. Schreyer 
and Jorgenson 2013) and they must be supported.  Until we have reliable 
measures of these dimensions, growth for growth sake will prevail.  The 
SDGs need to set the standard here for a new generation of indicators and 
targets that fuse economic, social and environmental outcomes, guiding 
domestic and external resources. Key here is that any development 
spending targets expressed as percentages of income need to have 
denominators that incorporate all dimensions of growth quality. 
The papers in this collection do not underestimate the challenge of 
thinking and acting differently about growth.  For 80 years since the 
creation of national accounts, massive investments have been made in 
consolidating and refining that system.  The creaking nature of the 
national accounts infrastructure—and to some extent, how we measure 
income at the national level 4—has only become widely apparent in the 
past 15 years.  It will take more evidence, more persuasion and, perhaps, 
more shocks for this agenda to accelerate more rapidly.  We hope that this 
collection contributes in some small way to that much needed 
acceleration. 
4. Even going so far as using night light data as an income proxy (Henderson et al. 2011).
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Chapter 1  
What is the Quality of Growth?
Sustainability and Inclusiveness
Michel Aglietta
1� Introduction
The world is in the grip of a three-dimensional crisis: financial, social 
and ecological. This lingering crisis provides a warning that the finance-
led growth regime dominant since the early 1980s is now worn-out. It is 
plagued by ever-widening inequalities in income, the huge rent levied 
by finance on the economy, the dearth of productive investment, the 
crumbling social systems and the degradation of ecosystems. The 
magnitude and persistence of the problems mean that the in-built mode 
of regulation of financialised capitalism is unable to correct the 
distortions in the market economy.
Shareholder value, efficient market hypothesis and “fair value” 
accounting are the principles that have precipitated deep havoc in every 
part of the market economy. Shareholder value has given rise to 
extravagant concentrations of wealth, made the cost of capital 
prohibitive for many firms and has diverted profit from productive 
investment. The efficient market hypothesis, supposed to reveal 
objective fundamental values as a linchpin for market price adjustment, 
has been invalidated by the financial cycle, much studied by the BIS, 
which has led to the global financial crisis. Mark-to-market accounting 
has exacerbated ample and long financial cycles driven by momentum 
and interspersed by devastating financial crises, triggered by the 
reversal of debt-induced asset price bubbles. It follows that a longer-term 
view of the future of our economies is necessary to provide a basis for 
overhauling the basic principles that underlie failing modes of 
regulation.
It is now more and more accepted that the growth regime must be 
overhauled in the direction of inclusiveness and sustainability. 
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Defining inclusiveness
On a theoretical level, any relevant and useful understanding of society 
cannot escape a definition of social welfare. If inclusiveness is a social 
end worthy of pursuit, a process of social choice must provide guidance 
in the selection of relevant policies. In democratic societies that rest on 
principles of market economies, welfare theorists might wish that social 
choice could be based on individual preferences. However this 
endeavour is a dead end, because it encounters Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem1. There is no non-arbitrary social choice procedure regarding 
minimal conditions of consistency in choices. This sweeping and very 
powerful achievement stems from the impossibility of aggregating 
heterogeneous individual preferences in any meaningful social welfare 
function. It is why neo-standard models in macro economies are usually 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models based upon a single 
representative agent. They ipso facto ignore distribution problems. It 
follows that neither absolute poverty nor relative inequalities can be 
considered in such a framework. 
To overcome this dead end, equity must be defined in a way that permits 
interpersonal comparisons. One cannot rely on a majority vote to enact a 
fair rule of income sharing. It excludes underrepresented minorities, as 
much as the market excludes people with no access to money. One 
cannot be content with abstract and empty formulas, like so-called 
“human rights” much praised by Western politicians. Individuals are 
embedded in civil society with multiple belongings. A collective 
expertise of social interdependencies, where economists shall have their 
say, is needed. However, to contribute valuably, economics must be 
thought of as part of the social sciences without any pretence to 
supremacy.
In order to address social welfare issues, it is impossible to bypass 
ethical principles, as they provide a linchpin for social justice. To this 
end, John Rawls has set up a cardinal principle regarding access to the 
basic resources of society: primary goods of which no one should be 
deprived. It follows that social development should be measured 
according to improvements in the accessibility of primary goods 
amongst the most disadvantaged people. In this respect China has 
succeeded in raising 400 million people over the UN absolute poverty 
1. See Arrow (1963) for more on the theorem, its meaning and the substance of the 
demonstration.
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threshold (less than 1.25$ a day) in 30 years. Should this not also be 
considered one of the highest achievements for human rights?
Rawls (2001) understands primary goods as a broad set of public 
resources: material, educational and institutional. They encompass the 
accessibility and quality of public health, primary education, basic civil 
rights and environmental goods, all of which are not market 
commodities. Therefore, in setting his principle of justice, Rawls asserts 
forcefully that equality between human beings worth to be pursued is 
far from being only formal.2 It is a plain rejection of utilitarianism 
attached to homo economicus. Inequalities can be justified only if they 
help raise productivity in such way as to expand accessibility to primary 
goods. The market can contribute if it is embedded under development 
policies dedicated to that end.
Therefore the key concept of capability goes beyond Rawls’s principle, as 
far as policies aiming at inclusiveness are concerned. He emphasizes the 
conversion factors of primary goods into life achievements. Indeed 
equality in the space of primary goods cannot prevent per se serious 
social inequalities, all of which can be magnified by runaway market 
expansion. A few of them are evils of contemporaneous societies. Ethnic 
discrimination, gender discrimination in social roles, structural 
unemployment, power relationships in corporations and institutions are 
all levers exploited in present-day capitalist societies. They help in 
shaping labour markets so that real freedoms of many people are 
subordinated to the paramount objective of shareholder value: extracting 
maximum rent for the benefit of an elite, with the main outcome the 
extravagant rise in income inequalities over the past 30 years.
Defining sustainability
Sustainability is an intergenerational concept. It is the conservation and 
possible improvement over time of social welfare as defined above. A 
society cannot be sustainable if it is not inclusive. As we will see in the 
next section, sustainability cannot be measured by GDP paths. 
Because it involves time, sustainability is intrinsically intertwined with 
2.   In 2001, Rawls revisited his theory and clarified the link between social justice and equity 
(see Rawls 2001). Freedom of speech and of vote are formal liberties that pertain to primary 
goods. But freedom for people that are starving and illiterate does not mean much. This is 
the kind of problem that the “largest democracy in the world” encounters. 
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finance. When one is evoking finance, one is confronted with the sacred 
core of market fundamentalism in its most dogmatic belief: the efficient 
market hypothesis in its strongest form. It stipulates that financial markets 
reveal fundamental values of assets, i.e. the marginal contributions to 
social welfare of all types of capital. If it were true, the moving price system 
in financial markets over time would be the most relevant expression of 
what society values in pursuing its own perpetuation. 
The problem raised with this assertion is profound indeed. Upheld by 
most powerful financial interests, fostered by the ever-lasting 
deregulation and globalization over more than 30 years, it has led to 
dramatic policy failure leading up to the devastating financial crisis and 
its costly aftermath. Indeed, finance has moved under a momentous 
dynamic for so long and generated a financial cycle so huge and long-
lasting that the efficient market hypothesis cannot stand under Karl 
Popper’s reality principle. What is at stake is a much more fundamental 
question than market imperfections, asymmetrical information and 
bounded rationality. It is the implicit assumption about what constitutes 
economic time and what value means.
As everyone should notice, only the strong form of market efficiency is 
relevant in sustainability, because that form is required to pretend that 
market finance achieves the optimal allocation of saving overtime. Only 
this assumption can amalgamate rational expectations and the 
fundamental value of assets. The basic question is the feedback of the 
future (expectations) on the present economic equilibrium. No 
mechanical or biological system can be said to be determined by the 
future. Their workings and law of motions proceed from more or less 
complex linkages that science has the mission to discover more or less 
accurately. Causal time is an arrow that is not reversible whatever the 
knowledge mustered on it. Social systems are different because human 
beings are capable of beliefs about the future. However the reflexivity of 
financial expectations on observed economic variables cannot be called 
causal in any meaning of the word causation. However market 
fundamentalism pretends that fundamental values have a 
predetermined objectivity (in logical sense of the word) external to 
financial markets that the market reveals. Such an assertion is the result 
of a confusion in regard to the notion of time. It is postulated that the 
causal time of objective processes is homogenous to the subjective time 
of expectations. How can it be so?
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Let us look at the fundamental value of an asset when all rational market 
participants share all the available relevant information. The 
fundamental value stemming from market efficiency is:
VFt = Et  Rt+1+VFt+1 )/(1+x),
 
where VF is the fundamental value, E(R) the future expected income 
from holding the asset and x the discount rate.
To assume that market participants make expectations in such way that 
the market is balanced at a price Pt =VFt, x must be known. However 
this equation is just an arbitrage saying that in an efficient market there 
cannot be excess returns. An arbitrage is just a condition equating the 
returns on two assets. It can be used to determine the price of an asset 
only if the return on the other is known. But the VF equation is a very 
peculiar arbitrage that equates the return of the asset… with itself. 
Indeed it can be rewritten:
Et (Rt+1+VFt+1) = (1+x )
　　VFt
The left hand side term is the definition of the asset return. The right 
hand side is the required return x=r +ρ with r the riskless interest rate 
and ρ the risk premium of the asset. ρ is as much unknown as VF 
itself. Therefore the efficiency hypothesis teaches us nothing as far as the 
determination of fundamental values is concerned, because it 
encapsulates two unknowns: fundamental value and risk premium. 
One has to specify a model able to determine x. But it has nothing to do 
with market efficiency. There will be as many asset price dynamics as there 
are a priori beliefs on the future of the economy that embodies those assets. The 
core reason is the reflexive nature of the feedback of expectations on 
market prices. It is so because the subjective time of expectations is 
counterfactual. It bears no logical homogeneity with objective time of past 
events. The market creates values; it does not reflect pre-existing values. Values 
depend irrevocably on beliefs. The relevant question is how beliefs are 
coordinated through strategic interrelationships, gurus, prophets or 
market manipulators, focal points, self-generated fixed points in 
converging mimetic processes. All kinds of processes can occur in 
financial markets. A particular convergence of expectations defines a 
value and, as a result, an economic equilibrium can ensue. A different 
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belief that gives rise to another focal point might also produce 
equilibrium. Beliefs about the future are a priori unlimited. 
Subsequently, reflexivity generates multiple equilibria. This is the very 
nature of the coordination by the future.
Because financial markets have been allowed to get loose in the last 30 
years or so, a powerful financial cycle encompassing real estate, equity, 
fixed income and the associated derivatives has dominated financial 
valuations. Momentum has been the mode of coordination of 
expectations fuelled by leverage. The piling up of risky exposures in the 
balance sheets of both asset owners and financial intermediaries has 
created an interlocking of fragilities that no supervisor can embrace 
even if it were willing. Indeed regulators were not willing to look inside 
the intricate web of counterparty risks, because they assumed that 
finance was self-regulating by nature. They were not upset by the 
extreme of the momentum in the real estate market, believing that the 
extravagant levels reached by property prices were fundamental prices. 
It follows that the turnaround of the momentum surprised them. Indeed 
the precise date of the turnaround was unknowable, even if the burst of 
the bubbles was certain!.
This phenomenon points to the theoretical distinction between risk and 
uncertainty3. The latter cannot be dissolved into the former. The future 
pertains to counterfactual time because finance is nothing but trading 
promises. It is driven by fluctuating beliefs, migrating from one 
equilibrium to another. How can a long-term horizon emerge in such a 
world without strong regulation imposed by a public authority? 
Therefore the mutation of the growth regime to one based on 
sustainability and inclusiveness is a daunting collective task that 
requires an intellectual revolution to re-embed economics into social 
sciences, a deep social reform to make the firm a locus of participative 
social contracts between stakeholders, a transformation of finance to 
allow investors with long-run view, a better say in social choices.
If sustainable growth is to be taken seriously, it will turn economics 
upside down. Society comes first. There is no longer an axiomatic micro-
foundation of the macro-economy, but a social welfare theoretic 
3. Hyman Minsky was the author that most forcefully elaborated on Keynes’s conception of 
uncertainty. See H. P. Minsky (1992) for more on the theoretical formulation of his 
thinking. 
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approach that derives macro conditions to be implemented by 
individual agents through proper incentives. This paper can only 
pinpoint theoretical problems and browse the main results from serious 
attempts to measure sustainable development by international 
institutions. 
2� Conceptual issues and measurement problems
A social welfare approach involves a revolution in macroeconomics. It is 
akin to the revolution in economic thought that was triggered by World 
War II. After Keynes’ (1940) memorandum to the British Chancellor of 
the Exchequer on May 4, 1940, followed by another paper by Colin Clark 
(1940), the conceptual and measurement work to create national 
accounting began because the British government wanted to know what 
were the resources the country could muster for the war and how much 
they were worth. The research program achieved the first consistent 
system in the 1945 memorandum published by the UN in 1947 (Stone 
1947). As a result, GDP was invented and measured for the first time. 
The impulse for this breakthrough was entirely political: the urgent 
need to muster and mobilize all the economic resources of the country 
for the war effort on the one hand, and the fear that the great depression 
would resume after the war on the other. To act efficiently the 
government needed to measure the aggregate supply and demand of the 
country, something a decentralized market economy does not provide.
Nowadays climate change is a worldwide peril, threatening the 
ecological foundation of economies, exacerbating precariousness and 
inequalities among countries and jeopardizing the welfare of future 
generations. Nonetheless, even if political elites talk of inclusiveness and 
sustainability, it is just lip service. The sense of urgency is nowhere 
apparent in the West. Public opinion is indifferent at best, and rather 
hostile in countries like France. Powerful vested interests in energy-
producing and electricity-using industries pay armies of scientists to 
spread climate-scepticism. A related scepticism arises on the ability to 
measure linkages between environmental processes and social 
preferences. On that matter there is a strange de facto alliance between 
industrial and financial lobbies on the one hand, and “fundamentalist” 
ecologists on the other hand (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Both consider 
that persistent and strenuous efforts to internalize externalities are not 
worthwhile. 
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The first group, the industrial and financial lobbies, follows its own 
interests and disguises them under the claim that markets cannot fail. To 
enhance private profitability it is better to deny that more costs should be 
taken account of in pursuing its own activities. This is the usual divorce 
between private and social ways of assessing values while there are 
market failures. The second group, the “fundamentalist” ecologists, 
pretends that ecosystems are so radically alien that their impact on 
human beings, regardless of damage or benefits, cannot be intrinsically 
measured in value terms. This is pure nonsense because any factor that 
impinges upon wellbeing always has a social marginal value or cost. Yet 
what is true is that this social marginal value is not always revealed by a 
market price, often by a wide margin. Renouncing the quest to evaluate 
those social values amounts to denying that a global strategy for 
sustainable development is possible. This is not the way responsible 
governments and vivid civil societies should behave. Measuring social 
values is the best and most rational way to define and deliver common 
goods and therefore to detect the best capital assets in which to invest. In 
other words it is the indispensable input of social choices.
Starting from a very imperfect situation it is understandable that several 
methods have been advocated to handle the problem. They differ in 
scope: macro or micro, all-encompassing or digging into specific 
questions and using partial economic analysis. They also differ in their 
time span, dealing with urgent questions and setting specific objectives 
or elaborating the theoretical basis of a sustainable growth regime in the 
long run. Some possible ways forward have been explored in the Stiglitz 
report (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009). Enriching GDP from a public 
policy perspective would need to take account of inequalities, 
completing GDP with an array of physical indicators without measuring 
their social marginal values, broadening the scope of capital assets in an 
extended accounting registered in satellite accounts, and developing a 
new integrated social accounting system based upon a generalized 
version of capital
In the next section, I will follow the way forward explored in the UN 
project in improving the measurement of an extended definition of 
capital and its link with social welfare. I will also acknowledge the 
proximity and differences with the World Bank project. Both 
approaches are endeavours to link the theoretical framework of social 
welfare to sustainability conditions. They differ in their dealings with 
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externalities to measure marginal social values. Then I will introduce a 
problem left aside in the Stiglitz report. On one side, a macro model of 
social capital growth is necessary to frame a long-run policy of 
sustainable development. On the other side, capitalism will still prevail 
in allocating resources for the foreseeable future. Therefore processes to 
achieve social incentives will still be shaped by the pursuit of private 
returns in decentralized firms. Therefore there is an inescapable 
problem of incentives. Although social values are not reflected in market 
prices, they should be. In one way or another, they impinge upon the 
prospective rates of return of the firms, which will invest in the types of 
capital that might produce those social values. It follows that firm 
accounting must also be reformed to become consistent with social 
accounting conditions. The literature on business accounting ignores the 
problem entirely. Corporate management is content with the rhetoric of 
social responsibility, an empty discourse without any meaningful 
impact on the business model of the firms. Setting the problem has only 
one virtue for the time being: displaying how far we are from the 
beginning of a transition to sustainable growth. Correlatively, I will 
sketch the conception of long-run financing investments driven by 
sustainability conditions, focusing on climate policy.
3� A social welfare-theoretic approach of sustainability
The present paper is not the place for a survey of the different 
approaches for dealing with sustainability. As explained above, it takes 
the view of those who base measurement upon monetary value, hence 
who are concerned with valuing environmental and intangible assets, as 
well as ecological services with no market values. International 
institutions lead the investigations. The World Bank (2012) explores a 
weak condition of sustainability with its genuine saving concept. The 
High Level Panel set up by the general secretary of the UN explores a 
strong condition summed up in the inclusive wealth indicator (IWI)
(High Level Panel 2012). However both derive the sustainability 
condition from the concept of social welfare not decreasing over time. 
Let us first understand the theoretical underpinning of the 
measurement methodology based upon an extended concept of social 
capital. Many forms of this all-encompassing concept of capital are 
public goods that boost the productivity of privately-owned capital. 
Those relationships imply interdependence, viewed as strong or weak 
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depending on the way one defines social marginal productivity, 
between public choices and private property rights. Measurement is 
controversial because those social marginal productivities are shadow 
prices, i.e. expected marginal contributions to social wellbeing of the 
different forms of capital. Shadow prices are not observed; they are 
counterfactual by their very nature, because they depend on the future 
path of the economy.
Because society is a collective that pervades over time, well-being is 
trans-generational. Its productive base is economic development. 
Sustainability is defined as a pattern of development that along with 
intergenerational well-being does not decline. There must be an 
aggregate measure of the productive base of a national economy, called 
total national wealth. Social well-being is produced by its productive 
base. There exists a generalized production function relating them. 
Aggregate net investment is a measure of the rate at which the marginal 
intergenerational well-being changes over time, provided that the 
different types of capital comprising social wealth are measured at their 
social marginal values in terms of welfare (shadow prices) and that the 
shadow prices can be taken as constants to get a measure of the 
“volume” of the growth in wealth. Another way to look at it is by saying 
that aggregate wealth is the shadow value of the stocks of all assets 
available in the economy. Box 1 sketches the basic model used by the 
High-Level Panel.
Therefore the strong condition of sustainability is the following: a long-
run economic policy is sustainable if and only if aggregate net investment 
measured at shadow prices is positive over time.
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Box 1. Definition of the sustainability condition
V(t) = intergenerational well-being
Ki(t) =stock of i asset in t. K(t)={K1(t),.…, Ki(t),…Kn(t)} vector of capital 
assets.
V(t)=V[K(t),t] function of intergenerational wellbeing
Shadow price of time: Q(t)=dV(t)/dt
Shadow prices of capital assets: Pi(t)=dV(t)/dKi(t) if the economy 
does not cross a tipping point. If not, dV(t) is a finite step that must be 
estimated directly
Because of externalities in the V function, shadow prices are not 
market prices. Estimating them implies ethical values, which in turn 
depend on the conception of equity, theories on environmental/
social interactions, info on asset size, their distribution and their 
substitutability.
One can define inclusive wealth:  
 
And the sustainability condition: if shadow prices are constant, the 
duality theorem gives the following condition:  
On a time line short enough so that shadow prices can be held as constant, 
social welfare does not diminish if and only if inclusive wealth does not 
diminish.
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Figure 1 gives a stylized view of the approach.
Figure 1� National wealth and social well-being: strong concept of sustainability
Total real wealth Social welfare
・Tangible productive capital: equipment/ 
structures/urban real estate
・Intangible capital: human capital/ 
knowledge/ institutional 
infrastructures/ social capital/ net 
foreign assets
・Natural capital: fossil resources/ 
timber and other forest resources/ 
protected areas/ crops and pastures
・Private consumption adjusted for income 
inequalities
・Public services imputed to households 
and consumed in the same period
・Environmental services degrade by 
pollution/ exhaustion of fossil 
resources/ damages to biodiversity
Capital inputs Function of social well-being
　　Strong sustainability: 
net investment in real wealth 
　　　 non-decreasing
　  Discounted value of social welfare 
　　　　　  non-decreasing
To adjust private consumption for inequality of income for the purpose 
of tracking inclusive growth, the social welfare function must be 
increasing in average income growth and satisfy the transfer property: 
any transfer from a richer person to a poorer one increases the value of 
the function (Mishra and Peiris 2013). It can be measured this way:
Inclusive income growth= average income growth + (average income) (Δ 
median/average income).
The main problem is the measure of the services of ecosystems whose 
substitutability to private consumption is low. Estimating shadow prices 
is a tricky problem, while there is no market price equivalent because of 
externalities. Shadow prices must be approximated with notional prices. 
They are the outcomes of agreements among people with a social 
consciousness to internalize particular externalities. Getting 
agreements involves debates between partners concerned by the costs of 
negative and the advantages of positive externalities to be shared. Those 
debates will extend into a considerable time line while people better 
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understand the challenge of ecological degradation for their life style. 
While social preferences are going to change through experience, better 
information and more political debates, improved valuation will be 
reflected in national accounts.
One challenge concerning the value of the services of ecosystems and of 
valuing natural capital more generally is their non-linear dynamic. 
Unknown thresholds can induce unknown discontinuous changes. 
There are different regimes when tipping points are crossed (e.g. 
destruction of fisheries and of the tropical rainforests). Some of the 
regimes may induce global systemic crises, massively destroying real 
wealth and decisively transforming human civilization as we know it 
(e.g.an increase in average world temperature over 5°C) (Oreskes and 
Conway 2014). The IPCC has argued convincingly about the non-
negligible probability of this catastrophic scenario by the end of the 
century. Discontinuities in ecological processes should be reflected in 
shadow prices because the latter capture the substitutability between 
capital assets in the present and the future. Crossing a tipping point 
entails a discontinuous slump in substitutability between natural and 
other capital assets. It will provoke a violent surge in the shadow prices 
associated with these assets, making it uneconomical to draw further on 
them and forcing an immediate reinvestment in the worst possible 
economic environment, because societies will have suffered the losses of 
a systemic crisis. This is why the Stern Review (Stern 2007) has 
advocated the use of a quasi-zero discount rate and some authors have 
shown that there is a strong rationale to apply the precautionary 
principle (Weitzman 2009).
The High-Level Panel of the UN Secretariat has been following this path 
in the Inclusive Wealth Report that will be progressively reviewed every 
two years (High Level Panel 2012). However, there are other less 
demanding ways. The World Bank has settled for a criterion of weak 
sustainability drawn from a more restrictive view of total real wealth, 
called comprehensive wealth, that leads to a criterion of sustainability 
based upon an extended measure of national net saving, called genuine 
saving. Such a measure is a weak criterion because it avoids the estimate 
of shadow prices. It is essentially a revised measure of GDP.
The World Bank has drawn upon pioneering work by Pearce and 
Atkinson (1993). Development depends on total wealth defined in a 
32
Chapter 1
restrictive way compared to UN methodology, e.g. produced, human, 
social and natural capital. Sustaining total wealth is the key for viable 
growth regimes. For the World Bank the different forms of capital are 
defined in the following way:
Produced (tangible) capital= equipment + structures + urban land
Intangible capital= human capital +institutional infrastructures + social 
capital + net foreign financial assets
Natural capital= subsoil assets + Timber resources + non-timber forest 
resources +protected areas + crop land + pasture land
The sum of the three components is the real wealth of the nation. The 
change in real wealth has been named the adjusted net saving (or 
genuine saving). If the different types of capital that make up the 
productive base of the economy in a general ecological and economic 
sense can be measured, the variation of total wealth per capita is the 
sum of the growth of total factor productivity and the increase in the 
aggregate growth in the volume of the different types of capital. Since 
the variation of total net real wealth or genuine wealth is the net 
investment of society, the condition of sustainability is that society does 
not destroy its wealth in mustering enough adjusted saving or genuine 
saving to match net investment. Therefore the sustainability condition 
becomes the following: the development path of an economy is sustainable if, 
at every date, adjusted social saving (or genuine saving) is non-negative. If it 
becomes negative, it means that society is destroying its wealth.
The definition of genuine saving is the following:
Genuine saving = economic gross saving of the nation – fixed productive capital 
depreciation + change in value of human capital + change in value of social capital – 
depletion of mineral and energy fossil resources – net reduction of forests – damages 
due to pollution in ≈ CO2
How do inclusive wealth and comprehensive wealth compare 
methodologically? They have in common the intent to measure total 
wealth. Both introduce estimates of how well they can value intangibles 
and they both also try to measure the degradation in natural capital. 
However they have differences too. In inclusive wealth accounts, wealth 
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is measured directly from its productive base while notional prices have 
been estimated. No pre-assumption is made on sustainability. 
Unsustainable trajectories are included. Inclusive wealth tries to 
disentangle ecosystem services (fisheries and water-related ecosystems). 
Furthermore population is a critical factor of sustainability. Population 
changes are directly estimated. In comprehensive wealth accounts 
population is supposedly stationary or increasing at a constant growth 
rate. Furthermore the social welfare function is only related to private 
consumption that is supposed to grow at a constant rate. Wealth is its 
present value. A given path of consumption is deemed unsustainable if 
adjusted net saving is negative for this path.
4� Comparing three measures of development: gross domestic
    product, comprehensive wealth, inclusive wealth�
Table 1 compares the evolution of the three indicators over long-run 
periods for some advanced and emerging market countries. In doing so 
they improve the picture given by GDP markedly. This is definitely an 
irrelevant indicator in framing long-run policies. For all but advanced 
countries the WB indicator is grosso modo between GDP and IWI. For the 
emerging market economies (EMEs) it is closer to GDP than to IWI. The 
reason is that natural capital weighs much more in total wealth in EMEs 
than in advanced countries where the weight of intangibles and their 
impact on development is much larger. However, the WB 
underestimates the losses in wealth due to the destruction of ecosystems 
that the UN panel tries to capture. This is why the former undervalues 
ecological losses.
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Table 1� Different measures of development
Countries GDP/individual
(% annual growth 
rate 1990-2008)
Real wealth/indiv
(WB, % annual 
growth rate 
1995-2005)
IWI/individual
(UN, % annual 
growth rate 
1990-2008)
Advanced countries:
Germany
France
US
UK
Japan
1.5
1.3
1.8
2.2
1.0
1.3
1.7
2.3
2.8
1.5
1.8
1.4
0.7
0.9
0.9
EMEs:
Brazil
China
India
South Africa
1.6
9.6
4.5
1.3
0.9
6.9
3.6
1.3
0.9
2.1
0.9
-0.1
Oil-exporting countries:
Nigeria
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
2.5
1.2
1.3
1.3
-1.5
-
-0.8
-1.3
-1.9
-0.3
-1.1
-0.3
Based on these terms, the case of China is striking: massive expansion of 
fixed productive capital, fuelled by over-accumulation of capital in 
infrastructure and heavy industries, has produced outstanding growth 
in GDP. According to the gauge of comprehensive wealth the 
performance is reduced, but by not that much, because depreciation is 
taken into account (it is a net and not a gross concept like GDP) and 
because massive environmental damage is somewhat accounted for, but 
less than in inclusive wealth, which looks at the losses due to the 
deterioration of the regulatory properties of ecosystems. The IWI still 
attributes the best performance to China over the 30-year period or so, 
but it is no longer considered an outstanding performance. On the 
positive side the achievement is the eradication of absolute poverty – 400 
million people have been taken out of absolute poverty in 30 years, the 
best performance worldwide of all time. Investment in human capital 
has also advanced substantially but it is still lagging in the rural sector. 
However, China is the country where the negative gap (IWI-GDP) per 
capita is the largest. It means that intensive growth in fixed capital has 
entered a stage of fast-decreasing marginal return and that the 
degradation in natural capital is destroying real wealth alarmingly. The 
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new Chinese leadership has pledged to link the new urbanization drive 
with environmental policies and has issued detailed directives to guide 
the strategic planning for an overhaul of the growth regime. In India the 
situation might be worse since the political system seems to be unable to 
invest in infrastructure and in basic education for the larger masses of 
the population, while keeping enshrined crippling social 
discriminations, not least against women. However bottom-up frugal 
innovations are well under way, which save energy use and broaden the 
range of goods affordable by the nascent middle class.
In advanced countries, the comprehensive wealth indicator usually 
depicts better performance than GDP, essentially thanks to its 
measurement of intangible capital, something that has become the most 
important factor of growth since the ICT revolution. However what is 
striking is that the WB indicator veers toward GDP, rather than IWI in 
the comparison between advanced countries. In particular, the 
performance of Germany and France compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries is reversed. The latter fare much better in GDP and much 
worse in IWI. Remember that IWI is a measure of well-being. In the US, 
public health is appalling in terms of life expectancy, morbidity and 
obesity, while costs are prohibitive. This boosts GDP per capita since 
wages must be higher than in other countries just to pay for the rents 
drawn by the medical and the insurance sectors on the population. 
Therefore what is counted as a plus in GDP deteriorates IWI. Add to it 
that the US has not invested sufficiently in their public infrastructures, 
impairing the stock of public capital in the UN IWI. As for the UK, that 
share largely with the US the non-inclusive character of their growth 
model, especially the extreme inequality of income and the inefficiency 
of their health care, the exhaustion of oil fields has not been redeployed 
in real capital but in elusive foreign financial assets.
Furthermore, both the WB indicator and the IWI, as opposed to GDP, 
concur to show that non-advanced oil-producing countries are on an 
unsustainable path. This is the well-known curse of primary resource 
ownership for development. Be they increasing or decreasing in 
population, densely or sparsely populated, those countries have 
governments that impoverish their people. This is because the 
appropriation of the scarcity rent is squandered or redistributed 
according to the feudal (Saudi Arabia) or populist nature (Venezuela) of 
the political systems of the countries. In any case it is not invested 
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enough in wealth-producing forms of capital to offset the exhaustion of 
fossil resources.
5. From macro to micro: how can firm accounting provide 
     the right incentives to contribute to sustainable development?
As was acknowledged at the beginning of this paper, sustainability is a 
problem that stems from the dynamic of complex systems. The 
interactions between economy and ecology on the one hand, and the 
elaboration of policies for inclusiveness in societies impacted by 
multiple conflicting interests on the other, raise the questions of the 
incentives of economic agents that will make collective objectives come 
through. Because externalities are not exceptions but are dominant in 
environmental problems, because market prices are massively 
incomplete and finance has proved to be more than inefficient but 
systemic risk-prone, the macro–micro problem is both inescapable and 
daunting. The welfare theoretic approach and the generalized wealth 
accounting build tools for strategic planning to formulate societal long-
run objectives. However in countries with vibrant civil societies, lifelong 
goals come from the bottom and economic implementation of those 
goals raises enterprises to the fore. Innovations in measurement in 
macro accounting must impact measurement in business accounting for 
policy goals to be conveyed into the right incentives. This is all the more 
challenging as the present business model of most firms is still based 
upon shareholder value, which is alien to the theoretical foundation of 
sustainable development. 
Shareholder value, market finance and the social interest
It has been commonly said, since the implicit contract view of the firm 
has become most influential in financial elites and popular among 
academics and politicians, that firms are agents of their shareholders4. 
Meanwhile the average holding time of business equities in OECD 
countries has dramatically declined from five years in the late 1960s to 
five months in 2010. The reason is the spread of the Anglo-Saxon model 
4. In 2001, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001, p.89) wrote that the rules of corporate 
governance were being uniformed under shareholder value. The principle according to 
which firms must be exclusively run for the sake of their shareholders had already reached a 
very large normative consensus. They added that the dominant ideology of shareholder 
value would not be challenged in the future. According to their opinion, it amounted to the 
“end of history” in corporate governance. Hansmann H. and Kraakman R. (2001), “the End 
of History for Corporate law”, Georgetown Law Journal, vol.89, pp.439-468. 
37
What is the quality of growth?
Sustainability and inclusiveness
of dispersed ownership in continental European countries where 
diverse forms of governance used to prevail: insider, family or block-
ownership control. Obviously dispersed and tieless owners, obsessed 
with liquidity, have neither the interest nor the means to control firm 
strategies. Therefore the principal agent relationship is irrelevant as far 
as individual shareholders are concerned. Dispersed ownership and 
controlling power are contradictory.
The basic question remains: how should firms be managed and to 
achieve what? The goal looks fairly obvious: maximizing the total return 
of shareholders via share buybacks, dividend distributions and M&As. 
The entity capable of disciplining firm management to conform to those 
predicaments is the stock market. As long as the circulation of property 
rights is frictionless, the stock market is the principal of the firms since 
the liquidity of shares homogenize shareholders. Firm managers are 
under the threat of potential owners on the one hand and are induced to 
conform to shareholder value by the distribution of stock options on the 
other hand.
Therefore, if and only if equity markets are perfectly efficient, the 
anonymous control they exert achieves the social interest because all 
types of productive capital are represented and the equilibrium market 
returns are equal to their marginal social costs. If one buys these 
axioms, one must accept the conclusion: shareholder value is relevant in 
matching the macro–micro problem. Moreover the financial structures 
of the firms are meaningless because all financial assets are perfect 
substitutes in their risk-adjusted returns. 
It is enough to spell out those conditions to understand how much they 
are irrelevant for the macro–micro problem. Contemporary societies 
must overcome the mutation from the failed growth regime of 
financialised capitalism to bring their economies onto a sustainable 
growth track. In Section 1, the basic reasons grounded in the very nature 
of finance were provided to reject the strong efficiency hypothesis. 
Correlatively, the assertion that the firm has no existence as an 
autonomous entity, being a knob of implicit contracts, does not hold.
Stakeholdership, the social interest and responsible shareholders
The failing of the implicit contract theory in equating shareholder value 
and societal responsibility has two flaws regarding the firm on top of its 
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idealised view of finance. The first is its inability to recognize that the 
corporation is a legal entity of its own. In this respect the corporation is 
an entity in its capacity to make commitments on behalf of the enterprise. 
Excluding slavery, the enterprise is not an object that can be possessed by 
anyone. It is a human gathering dedicated to the production of social 
values. Its productivity depends crucially on the complementarity and 
cooperation of talents, as much as they are able to develop collective tacit 
knowledge. All bearers of intangible assets that contribute to the 
productive capacity of the firm and that have no directly marketable 
property rights are stakeholders in the social value produced by the 
enterprise. They should be as much entitled to have their say in the 
strategy of the corporation and to share the profit as the shareholders. 
They have even more stake since they do not enjoy the liquidity of the 
assets they own. As a consequence, they are more interested in long-run 
strategies that consider the corporation as a going concern.
Therefore, the quality of growth at the macro level depends on 
shareholder ship being replaced by a much larger stakeholders hip in 
corporate governance (Mayer 2013). Stakeholders are all the people 
bringing productive assets, be they tangible or intangible, to the 
collective productive strength of the enterprise. Since the productive 
capacity of the enterprise lies in the cooperation, individual marginal 
productivity cannot be measured in full. Correlatively individual 
marginal productivity cannot be measured entirely.
Stakeholders have multiple interests. With the stock market being 
unable to determine the business model that aligns the corporation 
governing the enterprise on the social interest, the business model must 
be the outcome of a strategy debated and decided by an organ of a 
political nature, the board of directors. The board is not only a 
controlling body working as the agent of a predetermined end, 
shareholder value. It must define the finality of the corporation and its 
associated strategy to make account of the multiple relationships of the 
enterprise both inside the organization and within its environment. In a 
stakeholder corporation, the board must gather the delegates of all 
stakeholders to elaborate the common interest. To establish the 
responsibility of management, checks and balances must be embedded 
in the structure of governance: separation between the chair of the 
board and the chief executive officer, equal participation of employee 
delegates in the board, pay and audit committees protected from the 
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pressures of management, and objective criteria need to be linked to the 
strategic objectives defined by the board to assess the performance of 
management.
Such a structure might be able to link the participation of human capital 
to innovative investment projects, i.e. to make the achievements of 
individual “capabilities” fit with the larger finalities of the quality of 
growth. Stakeholder corporations are inclusive due to the participation 
of employees, not only by redistribution that was a principle of the post-
war growth regime labelled “Fordism”. They will be actors of 
sustainability if their strategies are shaped by investments that conform 
to environmental and societal criteria. Those investments aim at curbing 
the trends that are degrading the life of people: climate change, scarcity 
of resources, giant inequalities, discriminations, structural 
unemployment, and financial fragilities. 
Those bad trends have noxious effects on long-run capital return 
because externalities develop over time and are loaded with 
irreversibility. They are intrinsically non-linear. Therefore they generate 
extra financial risks that must be converted into financial values. It is 
why business accounting and economic calculus of investment returns 
must be overhauled. The recognition of such needs requires long-term 
investors acting as responsible shareholders in stakeholder corporations.
Governance matching corporate interests and social involvement 
needs an overhaul in business accounting
Investment projects are selected according to their internal rates of return 
(IRR). The IRR of a project is the discount rate that cancels the net 
present value of future cash flows stemming from all revenues and 
expenditures up to the horizon of the project. This measure does not 
take account of the positive and negative externalities that impinge 
upon the social value linked to the project. The social value of an 
investment is the net present value of all costs and benefits entailed by 
the investment, whether this is comprised of money flows accruing to 
the investment or external impacts (positive or negative). This is, for 
instance, crucial for clean projects that abate a computable amount of 
greenhouse gases. They generate positive externalities in the amount of 
abated GHGs. These externalities can be valued if society recognizes 
that avoided GHG emissions are something of value and institutes a 
notional price: the social value of carbon, for a unit of avoided carbon-
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equivalent. Therefore externalities must be valued from notional prices 
that should be agreed upon in non-market social procedures. Rigorously 
the notional prices to guide investment choices of firms must be the 
shadow prices of the different types of capital on a sustainable trajectory, 
computed as the shadow prices associated to this trajectory. This is the 
macro–micro consistency. Practically such a consistency is out of reach at 
the present time: the development of numerical estimates of shadow 
prices that can be used in computing expected rates of return. However 
this normative consistency teaches a lot of what a price is all about. 
Indeed, true market prices, i.e. prices whose determination follows a 
Walrasian adjustment, exist only in centralized asset markets. A price is 
much more general than a market price. This is an implicit, tacit 
agreement between two or more parties in sequential trade, when for 
instance consumers buy products at prices that are already posted in 
shops or stores. Or it is the product of negotiations between 
intermediaries (e.g. wages decided in collective bargaining), or it is 
notional like transfer prices between sub companies of a multinational 
corporation, or it is purely conventional – like accounting prices used in 
analytical accounting. Therefore the argument that it is impossible to 
value what has no market is empty of meaning. If pollution is not valued 
it is because public authorities have not instituted a carbon price and 
obliged firms to compute pollution costs in their operating accounts. The 
reason why they do not do it is because the political dominant influence 
in financialised capitalism makes it self-evident that a narrow view of 
property rights legitimates incentives of firm managers to maximize 
shareholder value.
While sustainable growth has gained momentum as a primary finality 
in the political debate, the need for consistency between the macro 
accounting of total real wealth and business accounting should become 
a requirement in order to fulfil incentives embodying environmental 
and societal objectives in corporate governance. Under those new 
incentives it will become necessary to correct the IRR and compute an 
integral internal rate of return (IIRR), valuing the externalities produced 
by firms’ activities according to a generalized view of valuation. Such a 
view rests on the stakeholder view of the corporation where the board 
must answer the following questions: who are the stakeholders to whom 
must the firm be accountable? Which performance criteria must be 
accounted for? Under which procedures must they be accounted for? In 
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stakeholder-corporate governance, corporations would have to report to 
their different stakeholders, so that it would be possible to identify and 
measure the global imprint of each firm on its natural, social and 
economic environment. In particular there should be a reporting 
towards socially responsible investors who need to assess the potential 
of investment projects according to IIRR.
In the first stage of implementing the new paradigm, one should not aim 
at a unified reporting where extra-financial valorisation are integrated 
in standard financial accounts. Extra-financial accounting would have to 
be experimental in any first stage. There should be satellite accounts 
whose ability to feed the extended calculus of the IIRR must be tested. 
The enlarged accounting must be built as a new metric of societal responsibility. 
But a metric it should be, which means prices defined in money as the 
universal unit of account. Business accounting must check whether 
particular firms contribute to sustainable development, e.g. create at 
least as much resources as they consume. To define prices that guide 
strategic investment decisions capable of attracting long-run investors, 
consultations between stakeholders interested by a particular domain of 
externalities must be organized (Schoum, de Saint-Front and Veillard 
2012).
Considering social responsibility, since the capabilities of workers 
acting as a team comprise the main productive asset of the firm, 
expenditures to reproduce and expand them must not be treated as 
operating costs, but as investments in human capital. Discounted 
inflows and outflows of future wages due to the mobility of workers and 
revalorization of wages due to expenditures in vocational training 
would appear much more valuable in such accounting. Instead of 
dealing with a wage policy as a cost to compress as much as possible, 
wage policy would become investment policy to be anticipated as an 
integral part of investment projects.
6. Long-term finance and sustainable growth: How to finance
    climate policy?
Both the scope of possible human and material damages and their 
irreversible character if the average temperature increases above 2°C 
(compared with pre-industrial times) are arguments in favour of urgent 
and strong action by societies against climate change. The intervention 
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should be much more energetic than what has been accomplished 
during the last 40 years to reduce the sources of emissions and increase 
the absorption wells. The last report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2014”) indicates that the emissions from human 
origins have increased during the years 1970-2010 at a rate higher than 
2% per year, and that the last decade 2000-2010 has known the biggest 
increase in human history5. Past climate policies, which do not allow the 
increase in temperatures to be reversed, have thus been largely 
insufficient.
The uncertainties of the costs resulting from climate change cover 
several types of realities: uncertainty regarding the scope of climate 
damage with respect to the increase in temperatures; uncertainty about 
the scope of technical change, also mostly irreducible, allowing us to 
reduce the costs of abatement activities; uncertainty on the discount rate 
to be used today to evaluate damages that could occur in the very long 
run.6 These different forms of uncertainties provide compelling reasons 
for societies to take early action against climate change, and eschew all 
forms of delay. The fifth evaluation report of the IPCC, published in 
2013-2014, strongly called for increases in the level and the changes in 
structure of annual productive investment in the period 2010-2030 to 
help mitigate climate change. These included a reduction of the 
investments in fossil fuels, an increase of around $150 billion for 
investments in renewable and nuclear energy, as well as capture and 
storage of carbon emissions; and an increase of around $340 billion for 
investment in increasing energy efficiency in transport, housing and 
industry. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
annual investments in energy efficiency and low carbon technologies 
should reach $790 billion in 2020 and $2300 billion in 2035 in order to 
limit the temperature increase to 2°C.
5. According to a new analysis by the UN Wprld Meteorological organization, CO2 
concentration rose 2.9 parts per million (ppm) between 2012 and 2013, the biggest annual 
increase sinc 1984. The IPCC 2014 report (part 1) states that the last three decades have been 
successively warner at the earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850.In the 
Northern Hemisphere, 1983-2012was likely the warmest 30-yearperiod of the last 1400 
years. 
6. This uncertainty has polarized the debates on the costs of climate change after the Stern 
report (Stern 2007.) There has been criticism of the choice of a very low pure time preference 
that is not reflected in the discount values emerging from market prices (Nordhaus 2007).
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From Kyoto to Cancùn: a paradigm shift
Guiding the climate negotiations according to an ethical principle – 
leading the northern countries to finance the climate mitigation in the 
southern countries – does not amount to giving equal emission rights to 
everybody. The allocation of emission permits is just a form of allocation 
of financial assets. In a world where wealth inequality reaches extreme 
levels, the richest have soon bought their desired amount of permits on 
the market for emission rights, circumventing the equity principle. 
Emissions per head should be equalized in the very long run.7 
Such an objective provides direction to the principle proposed by India 
at the Cancùn Conference, that of “equal access to sustainable 
development” (soon to be called the ‘Cancùn paradigm shift’). Logically, 
this will require a massive increase in help from developed countries to 
developing ones. In this regard, the Cancùn Conference of Parties (COP-
16) can be understood as a real shift, translating international 
negotiations from a top-down and insufficiently cooperative approach 
(a unique carbon price linked to a world market between states for 
emission reductions and burden sharing) based on the obligations of 
states towards an international climate regime based on the 
responsibility of states to voluntarily promote nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions8.
Among the economic instruments allowing the correction of the 
distortions due to externalities, we usually distinguish between the 
price policies (taxes or subsidies) to control the prices paid by polluters 
and the quantity policies pretending to control the quantities of emitted 
GHGs. The markets for the emission permits (such as the “European 
Emission Trading Scheme”, or EU ETS) are among those. If future 
damages due to GHG emissions were knowable with certainty, -, taxes 
and permits would be equivalent. In certain economic conditions it is 
always possible to determine the quantities of permits such that the 
market price is equal to a certain tax level. But the uncertainty of the real 
world makes the equivalence disappear. The market gives certainty on 
quantities; tax gives it on prices. The tax is more predictable only if the 
government has a well-defined climate policy in the medium run, 
7. As Stern (2007) clearly states, if the world must emit less than 20 billion tons of CO2eq in 
2050 and the planet will have around 9 billion inhabitants at that time, this means that 
emissions should be limited everywhere to 2 tons of CO2eq per head in 2050. 
8. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for developing countries and 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for all countries. 
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associated with a trajectory of carbon prices on which it is credibly 
engaged. On the other hand, the emission rights market is an asset 
market, and is thus accompanied by chaotic price trajectories, as the 
European market has well illustrated. A market that is affected by 
multiple externalities cannot be efficient. Price flexibility is a benefit only 
for the speculators, except if the market is regulated by a public entity 
able to insure a medium run trajectory in line with what would give a 
tax in a credible abatement scenario on 5 to 10 years. The tax is thus a 
priori better than the market, which was not the reasoning of the Kyoto 
Protocol. This advantage only exists however if the announced evolution 
of the value of the tax is considered credible by all the actors. And we 
know by experience that this is not the case. The political cost is so high 
that if a tax is put in place, its level can only be too weak to direct the 
new investments in a significant way.
The world of the perfect market is oblivious to weak environmental 
policies that are reached without any conviction, and prone to 
unpredictable changes of direction, amplifying the risks linked to the 
investments. They generally are not very popular when they take the 
form of a tax or a carbon market establishing a price from one day to the 
other. When they are put in place seriously, they impose immediate 
transition costs on entire sectors of the economy, early and indifferently 
depreciating parts of the installed capital of the economy to give value to 
a capital that is yet to come, and they have certain redistributive effects 
that are hard to quantify. The political economy arguments do not play 
in favour of these traditional tools, which do not seem to be preferred at 
a political level, compared with regulations, sector subsidies or other 
forms of industrial policies.
In developing countries, nationally appropriate mitigation actions, 
(NAMAs) could lead to an emphasis on national objectives of 
development: tightly linking low carbon technologies and the local 
environment, investing first in human capacities and R&D using the 
macroeconomic policies to lower the arbitrages between technical and 
social costs. There are several potential bottom-up initiatives here. The 
compatibility between many decentralized actions and the global goal 
of containing climate change becomes crucial (Guesnerie and Stern 
2012). The NAMAs allow the governments of developing countries to 
integrate the governmental objectives into their national development 
policies. But the GHGs emissions are a global externality. As Roger 
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Guesnerie puts it, a global coordination for a global control of quantities 
must be created. For that matter countries must agree on a global 
emission level. 
An international permits market would regulate the gaps between the 
permits allocated to countries and emissions, creating an international 
coordination at the margin (and not on each carbon unit emitted as in 
the Kyoto Protocol), while the States and the regional groupings of States 
would look for their internal objectives with the help of taxes and 
investment public policies. The compatibility between several 
decentralized actions and global climate change can thus be insured. 
Of course the installed “dirty” capital must be depreciated in order to 
make room for “clean” technologies. But this must be done at the margin 
by new investments accumulating over time. Developing a new 
direction for the current investments and the investments to come is a 
priority that can be compared to the revaluation of the whole stock with 
a disruptive price. It can be done through a valuation of carbon through 
a notional price applied to investment categories that produce an 
abatement of GHGs, which independent agencies could validate. 
We call such a level of abatement a carbon asset. Because it is not (or too 
partially) raised by a tax incorporated into the price of the produced 
goods, the return on these investments can be adjusted through the 
acquisition of carbon assets produced against monetary emissions. 
Money is indeed something that is universally acceptable and thus 
validates the product of all economic activities. It can answer the 
question of the financing of public investment policies in favour of the 
carbon externality.
Confronting the funding gap
There is a huge funding gap in achieving a transition to a low-carbon 
economy. To assess the funding gap one should not confuse the flow of 
payments over the duration of the projects to cover capital and operation 
costs and the upfront costs, i.e. the cash necessary to cover the cost of the 
equipment before it enters into operation. The latter might be two or 
three times the former. Furthermore the financing need is not only what 
will finance net investment flows to accumulate capital in clean 
technology but must also cover the redirection from old production 
capacities in existing energy systems to new ones in low-carbon energy 
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systems. If, for instance, a renewable energy plant produces electricity at 
a cost 30% higher than a coal plant, the real amount of investment to 
replace coal-fired electricity is 130%. Finally the total incremental costs 
of the changeover from one energy system to another must account for 
redirecting investment in building and transportation to achieve higher 
energy efficiency and lower energy demand permitted by changes in 
consumer behaviour. For around $500bn of incremental investment 
costs in 2020, a back-of-the-envelope calculation gives about $4100bn of 
redirected investment (Aglietta et al. 2014).
Confronting this huge need for finance, the cash flow generated by the 
clean development mechanism is utterly insufficient. Moreover it yields 
cash at the end of the project and thus is not designed to reduce the 
upfront investment cost. Public finance mechanisms do bring funds 
during the incubation phase of the investments, but they cover only the 
extra costs of low-carbon technology, not the bulk of the investment 
projects. Not considering the uncertainty in the time line of the new 
industrial revolution, they assume implicitly that without the extra 
incremental costs the projects will spontaneously yield positive internal 
returns.
Climate finance is fragmented for several reasons: the international 
market for polluting rights does not exist; the resources must be 
mobilized on a much larger scale and must be borrowed on highly 
diverse financing channels; climate change must be integrated into the 
development strategies of each country, so that financing is predictable 
and sustainable, contrary to the volatility of carbon finance. Only the 
appropriation of needs by the beneficiary countries will allow financing 
of overly narrow and divided projects to be avoided, because they are 
defined from the outside by international institutions or donating 
countries.
However market instruments are not available. The availability of 
savings can be found in public and private institutional investors, but 
they usually hold easily tradable assets - exactly what infrastructure and 
green bonds are not. These are alternative assets the institutional 
investors seldom possess, i.e. <1% of their portfolio for the pension 
funds in countries of the OECD (OECD 2013), because these instruments 
have the triple handicap of not being liquid, having high levels of risks, 
and dependant on tentative policies. So the energy policies in Europe 
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are chaotic and contradictory. The subsidies for new sources of energy 
can be excessive and then suddenly disappear with devastating effects 
on the cash flows of the on-going projects. From the point of view of the 
financing sources, a strong diversification of instruments and a change of scale 
are vital.
Political uncertainty and the weakness of market structures to invest in 
environmental infrastructures are a double handicap. The obstacles to 
alternative investments are well-known: the competition of asset 
managers for the quarters’ prize lists means that only the short term is 
valued, with most investors facing regulatory restrictions on long-term 
asset ownership. Competition policies that separate grid producers and 
service producers force the investors to choose the property rights they 
want to own without being able to incorporate the synergies in their 
investments. And while the activities are technically and economically 
integrated, there is no history of prices or benchmarks, forcing 
producers to internalise the management of assets completely (with 
supplementary costs). The green investments have supplementary 
handicaps. The most crippling argument is the inadequacy or even the 
non-existence of a carbon price determined by the market for polluting 
rights. This handicap is all the more striking given that innovations in 
“low carbon” investments bear both technological and ecological risks. 
Without a sufficiently credible valuation of carbon, guaranteed by the 
governments and increasing over time, and without the cessation of 
fossil fuel energies, these investments will continue to be dominated by 
the existing infrastructure. 
As a conclusion, these binding constraints force the need to find a 
cutting-edge equilibrium. Engaging in industrial policies to mitigate 
climate change requires reorienting several billions from energy and 
soil without any existing cheap substitute for fossil fuels. To reorient 
savings in low carbon investments, risk profiles must be lowered 
without supplementary charges on the taxpayer. For that matter, the 
abatement of emissions has a monetary value that grows over time. But 
this monetary value cannot be obtained at present by a tax or a market 
that weakened economies after the crisis could bear (Hourcade, 
Shuklaet and Cassen 2014), One must thus think in a different way: the 
base of financing the transition towards a low carbon economy can only 
be monetary.
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7. A carbon-based financial intermediation backed by money
Fundamental principles of the proposal
The first principle is an international agreement instituting a social 
value of carbon. Better to do it at the COP21 in Paris 2015. The IPCC 
defines the social cost of carbon as the price that equalizes the marginal 
cost of reducing emissions and the marginal gain of avoided climate 
damage, along a sustainable growth trajectory. It is neither a price 
determined by a carbon market, nor a tax incorporated into the price of 
current goods. It is a notional price, defined as the value of the avoided 
ton of equivalent CO2, and applied to new investments, and not to the 
existing stock of capital. The estimations of the available models indicate 
that the social value of carbon is highly uncertain, because it relies on a 
large ensemble of parameters of which some are unknown (Dumas, 
Hourcade and Perrissin-Fabert 2010). This is the reason why it should be 
defined by a political agreement. We know that it should increase with 
time according to predefined agenda, which could be revised every five 
years. 
This proposal introduces a temporal distinction in climate policy by 
distinguishing the valuation of new investments – that is the future 
capital to be produced and the valuation of already installed capital and 
the goods and services it produces. This distinction is made because the 
investments are urgent, uncertain and risky, while the introduction of a 
tax or a market price at a sufficient level to make these investments 
profitable is politically out of reach today in most countries. This 
distinction thus solves a political deadlock, which has affected climate 
negotiations until today, with the argument related to the high 
immediate employment impacts and welfare costs of a carbon price. The 
social cost of carbon, defined in monetary units, establishes a new space of 
commensurability, which is the space of carbon assets. These assets are the 
values applied to the volumes of avoided CO2-eq emissions thanks to 
“low carbon” investments in all economic activities. Carbon assets are 
produced when the quantity of avoided GHGs is checked and certified 
by competent and independent agencies. 
The second principle is government guarantee. The government of each 
participating country guarantees for a period of five years a certain 
quantity of carbon assets as a contribution to the international climate 
policy. Effective emission reductions will be validated in kind by 
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independent experts and give rise to a monetary value. Thus this 
financial organization aims at eliminating the divorce between private 
and social returns of investments, a drawback that plagues investments 
involving high degrees of externality. The firms bearing the projects will 
find advantage in the certainty of the rise in the social value of carbon, 
since it increases the relative value of low-carbon investments. Their 
lenders find the opportunity of a new source of credit for which the risks 
due to the production of carbon assets are shared at a level linked to the 
validated carbon assets. The governments should be interested in giving 
a guarantee on a certain level of carbon assets for their development 
policies. However, the process can only be started through an 
international agreement on the social value of carbon, and the 
identification of carbon assets must be accompanied by the expertise of 
independent agencies. Therefore an international supervision body 
should be instituted, to monitor the protocol followed by the 
independent agencies in their investigation. In order to foster a first 
wave of projects, it would be good that this international supervision 
body define the framework in which national states would be persuaded 
to promote investments: the technologies, sectors, temporal horizons. It 
could also propose the allocation rules of carbon assets, and thus the 
acceptability of the certificates by project type depending on the 
anticipation of avoided GHGs. There would be a common guide for the 
participation of each State.
The third principle allows central banks to register the value of the 
guaranteed carbon assets on the asset side of their balance sheets. On 
the liability side, the central bank can register carbon certificates. These 
carbon certificates are reserves or collateral for the financial institutions 
(development banks, investment funds, private equity funds) that have 
financed the validated investment projects. The risk for the investor who 
finances the projects is in a way socialized. It is diminished by the 
amount of carbon certificates on the guaranteed carbon assets.
The fourth principle has to do with time consistency. Monetary 
financing can be understood as a temporary device to launch a wave of 
innovative investments as much as quantitative easing (QE) has been to 
alleviate the impact of the financial crisis. As long as those investments 
are implemented, the production structure will change towards clean 
technology. The consumption structure will change with the use of 
capital while former “dirty” capital has been replaced. Therefore the 
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resistance against a carbon tax or cap-and-trade market will wane. It 
should be possible to come back to a form of standard taxation, in the 
framework of a new international agreement. The exit condition would 
be the convergence in the long run of the valuation of the carbon 
externality through the monetary tool, and the one from a future carbon 
tax (or a carbon market such as the ETS). Without this convergence 
condition, there would be a time inconsistency in the expected return of 
investments during the transition from one tool to the other. In the long 
run, the proposed financial policy can be institutionalized in a new 
monetary system or can be thought of as temporary before the 
introduction of more traditional tools.
Carbon assets in the monetary and financial systems
The monetary financing proposal for low carbon projects is not akin to 
QE, which involves the purchase of already existing assets on secondary 
markets. Our proposal involves the direct financing of new real 
investments, creating carbon assets by monetization of credit. The 
monetization only occurs for validated projects by independent and 
official agencies. There is no endogenous inflation, since the price is 
predefined on the expected abatement trajectory and the counterpart of 
the monetary creation by the central bank is a real asset for which the 
state has defined a total maximum amount for a determined period and 
guarantees its value. The only risk lies in possible errors from the certification 
agencies, which may accept projects that do not produce the anticipated carbon 
assets. There would thus be carbon asset destruction, cancellation of the money 
created and loss for the bank who gave the loan and/or loss for the entrepreneur 
who took the risk.
The balance sheet of this monetary intermediation appears on table 2.
Table 2. Bank balance sheets of a financial intermediation resting 
                    on carbon assets
Central Bank Commercial and development banks
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
-Foreign 
exchange
-Bills and bonds
-Carbon assets
-Currency
-Bank deposits
-Carbon 
certificates
-Non-monetary 
items
-Reserves 
-Commercial 
loans and 
securities
-Loans on low-
carbon 
investments
-Deposits and 
ordinary bond 
issued
-Bonds issued on 
low-carbon 
investments
-Capital
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A complementary mechanism can be designed to tap the large pools of 
savings collected by institutional investors. Indeed, not only banks but 
also specialized non-bank financial investors can use the carbon-based 
monetary facility to back climate-friendly financial products. The idea is 
to create a financial intermediation to match the preference for low risk 
of the bulk of institutional investors worldwide and the involvement of 
specialized risk-taking funds. A green fund, backed by governments 
that would provide the core of its capital base, could issue climate bonds 
on carbon assets transferred by the specialized funds that had 
contributed to finance the investments. Those bonds would be dedicated 
to institutional investors. The accounting side of this intermediation 
scheme is depicted in Table 3.
On the asset side of its balance sheet, the green fund would finance a 
large array of financial specialists, which themselves finance diversified 
projects. It could acquire liabilities of private equity funds, buy project 
bonds, and lend to development banks. 
Table 3� Financial intermediation via Green Funds
Specialized financial investors Green Fund Institutional investors
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Carbon 
assets from 
validated 
projects
Loans from 
EGF
Loans to 
finance 
specialists Bonds on 
carbon 
assets
Climate 
Bonds on 
carbon 
assets
Collective 
saving 
(retirement 
contracts, 
life 
insurance, 
state 
funding of 
SWFs)
Other loans Project bonds Other bonds
Other assets Capital Equities Capital Equities Capital
Therefore green funds could be established in every country 
participating in the international agreements on the notional carbon 
price and related state backing of carbon assets. The funds can mediate 
the financing of well-diversified investment projects, thereby creating 
carbon assets. Thanks to the diversification of risk in its interventions 
and the strong backing of its capital, the European green Fund is 
presumed to get the highest rating and be able to issue high-rated bonds 
with a high multiple of about 10 ($1000bn equivalent with a capital of 
$100bn). Institutional investors worldwide would be able to diversify 
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their asset allocation with a new class of assets weakly correlated with 
existing assets. Because the specialists financing individual projects can 
be dispersed throughout the territories, the scheme can be 
decentralized. It can finance industrial policy linked to urban 
development, recycling processes and bio-agriculture that can re-
territorialize industry, reducing heterogeneity and dependence on 
imported carbon intensity via foreign energy dependencies.
8� Conclusion
The paper has emphasized the linkages between a conceptual 
framework of social welfare improvement that can be called sustainable 
development, and shown the need for deep reform in national 
accounting to make operational the concept of total national wealth 
upon which long-run development policies can be implemented. It has 
also indicated that deep changes in corporate governance and business 
accounting are required to provide incentives for private firms to 
correspond with strategic national planning goals. Finally, the paper has 
taken the view that climate policy could be the decisive driver of 
sustainable development objectives. It is the domain where investment 
projects must be upgraded urgently. An international agreement on a 
notional price of carbon as well as the commitment of governments to 
achieve a definite amount of carbon abatement in a finite period of time 
is a precondition to define and run a new financial intermediation. This 
will provide the monetary backup necessary to overcome the inability 
of financial markets to provide the huge amounts of credit needed to 
reorient the production system.
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Poor Trends: The Pace of Poverty Reduction 
after the Millennium Development Agenda1
Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and  Adam Szirmai
1� Introduction
“We are at an auspicious moment in history, when the successes of past decades 
and an increasingly favorable economic outlook combine to give developing 
countries a chance, for the first time ever, to end extreme poverty within a 
generation” (Jim Yong Kim, World Bank President, speaking at Georgetown 
University, April 3, 2013)
Only 13 years after the Millennium Summit in September 2000 at which 
world leaders agreed on halving the 1990 global poverty rate at $1.25 a day 
by 2015, the end of extreme poverty seems to be in sight. Recent estimates 
suggest that the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) was already 
reached in 2010 and about 700 million people were lifted out of poverty. In 
2013, the World Bank declared a new organizational goal of ending 
extreme poverty by 2030; that is, reducing the $1.25 a day poverty rate to 
3% by 2030. The last two decades clearly ushered in unprecedented 
success, but is 2030 really likely to mark the end of extreme poverty? Our 
main contribution is to demonstrate that this is unlikely.
In this paper, we review the origins of the ‘dollar-a-day’ poverty line, 
discuss progress over the last three decades, and forecast $1.25 and $2 a 
day poverty rates until 2030. It is well known that regional trends in 
poverty alleviation are very heterogeneous. In spite of rising inequality, 
rapid growth in China was the driving force behind global progress 
1. We have greatly benefited from discussions with several participants of the AFD/IDS/
JICA workshop on the “Quality of Growth”. In particular, we would like to thank Lawrence 
Haddad, Nicolas Meisel, Charles Kenny and Laurence Chandy for useful comments and 
suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD). The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this 
paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent policies 
or views of Maastricht University, UNU-MERIT, AFD and/or other affiliated institutions. 
All remaining errors are those of the authors.
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over the last two decades and accounts for more than three quarters of 
the reduction in the number of people living below $1.25 a day. 
However, most of the poverty reduction potential coming from China is 
now exhausted. Poverty reduction in the developing world outside 
China has been considerably slower, although economic growth has 
accelerated significantly since 2000. In 2010, three-fourths of the 
extremely poor lived in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, as opposed 
to approximately 40% in 1981. This changing regional composition of 
world poverty has important ramifications for future trends in poverty 
reduction. Historically fast growing countries make up less and less of 
the global poor.
Building on a new method for estimating poverty elasticities and 
predicting poverty headcount ratios developed in Bluhm, de 
Crombrugghe, and Szirmai (2013), we show that the pace of poverty 
reduction at $1.25 a day is likely to slow down significantly after 2015. 
Extreme poverty barely falls below 8% in the most optimistic scenario. 
Ravallion (2013) first suggested the 3% target relying on the assumption 
that consumption in developing countries would continue to grow at 
the average post-2000 trend, or 4.5% per year. We find this ‘equal-
growth’ assumption too optimistic. Poverty tends to be higher in 
countries with rapid population growth and lower than average 
consumption growth. None of our scenarios predict a poverty rate near 
3% once country-specific trends from 2000 to 2010 are used. However, 
the $2 a day poverty rate may fall below 20% in 2030, while a slowdown 
happens only late during the forecast period or not at all. A distinct 
advantage of our approach is that it is computationally inexpensive. 
Hence, it can easily be used for benchmarking progress as new data 
become available.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the 
controversies surrounding the setting and updating of international 
poverty lines. Section 3 is a data-driven review of global poverty and 
inequality trends with a particular focus on China, India, Brazil and 
Nigeria. Section 4 presents projections of global and regional poverty 
rates until 2030 at the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines using different 
growth and inequality scenarios. Section 5 concludes and offers some 
policy recommendations.
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2� Drawing the line: international poverty lines
The dollar-a-day poverty line was first defined in a background paper to 
the 1990 World Development Report (in 1985 PPPs), then updated to 
$1.08 (in 1993 PPPs) in 2000, and again updated to $1.25 (in 2005 PPPs) in 
2008. While the first update went by almost unnoticed, the most recent 
change has sparked a controversy. Redefining extreme poverty as living 
below $1.25 a day raised the global poverty headcount by about 10 
percentage points and reclassified approximately 450 million people as 
extremely poor (Chen and Ravallion 2010). In this section, we briefly 
review the origins of the $1 a day measure and discuss shortcomings of 
the current updating procedure.
The problem of setting a global poverty line is far from trivial. Even if 
we could use a ‘basic needs’ or calorie-intake approach to devise a 
minimum consumption bundle for the entire world, it is inherently 
difficult to apply any such bundle in international comparisons. 
Subsistence needs, relative prices, and purchasing power vary across 
countries and over time. Faced with these problems, Ravallion, Datt, 
and van de Walle (1991, henceforth RDV) suggested an original solution. 
Since many national poverty lines are set using a basic needs or calorie-
intake method, there should be a universal lower bound among the 
absolute poverty lines, which may be recovered from the data. 
Converting 33 national poverty lines and the corresponding 
consumption levels from the 1970s and 1980s into international dollars, 
RDV showed that a poverty line of about $31 per month ($1.02 a day, in 
1985 prices) was shared by the six poorest countries in their sample, 
while those of two other countries came close. They argued that a 
rounded-off poverty line of $1 a day was a sensible threshold for 
measuring global poverty, since any one poverty line is likely to be 
estimated with error and the non-food allowance included in the 
subsistence basket varies across countries. RDV also estimated a lower 
line of $23 per month (about 76 cents a day) for the poorest country in 
their sample. This lower line was close to India’s poverty line at the time 
and became widely used as the international poverty line during the 
1970s and 1980s (e.g. Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery 1979).
Setting the poverty line in international prices has the advantage that 
domestic inflation is typically taken into account when average incomes 
or expenditures from surveys are converted into (base year) 
60
Chapter 2
international dollars, so that the line itself does not have to be explicitly 
updated annually. However, purchasing power parities (PPPs) change 
over time as countries grow richer (due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect). 
In addition, the quality of PPP estimates has been improving 
substantially with each round of the International Comparison Program 
(ICP), so that updates are needed approximately every decade. When the 
1993 ICP data became available, Chen and Ravallion (2001) revised the 
$1 a day line to $1.08 in 1993 prices. Using the same data as in the 
original study, they found that $1.08 a day was the median poverty line 
of the ten poorest countries. However, when the 2005 ICP was 
completed, instead of converting the old poverty line to 2005 prices, new 
data were collected and the poverty line was redrawn. Ravallion, Chen, 
and Sangraula (2009, henceforth RCS) compiled a dataset of 74 national 
poverty lines to update the original analysis. They found that national 
poverty lines do not rise with per capita consumption until a certain 
turning point (about $60 per month) but increase strongly thereafter (left 
panel, Figure 1). RCS set the global line as the average poverty line of the 
15 countries below this threshold, or $1.25 a day in 2005 prices.
Figure 1� Poverty lines and consumption levels around 2000
 
Notes: Author’s calculations using the data reported in Ravallion et al. (2009) and following the 
illustration of Deaton (2010). The non-linear trends are estimated using a (weighted) local linear 
smoother with bandwidth 0.8.
Deaton (2010), as well as Deaton and Dupriez (2011), take issue with this 
approach. They argue that updating the international poverty line based 
on new data leads to “graduation effects” when countries move out of 
the reference group. They illustrate their case using India and Guinea 
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Bissau as examples. India was part of the initial reference group in RDV, 
and both countries appear in RCS’s more recent reference group. India 
has a relatively low poverty line ($0.90 a day in 2005 prices) and a 
population of more than a billion people, whereas Guinea Bissau has a 
higher poverty line ($1.51 a day in 2005 prices) and is home to less than 
1.5 million people. As average consumption in India grew considerably 
until 2000, it crossed the $60 threshold and is no longer part of the 
reference group. Even though the average Indian has become richer, 
both the international poverty line and the global poverty headcount 
increased as a result of India dropping out of the average. With Guinea 
Bissau the case is reversed. Its poverty line is currently part of the 
average. A move out of the reference group would entail a fall in the 
global poverty line and a reduction in global poverty that is many times 
greater than the population of Guinea Bissau. The left panel of Figure 1 
illustrates this relationship. The bold horizontal line marks the $60 per 
month threshold (labeled RCS’09). A related issue is that the ICP data are 
primarily designed for comparing living standards of entire 
populations, not just poor people. The typical consumption basket of the 
poor, and the associated price level, may be very different than the 
reference basket used for computing PPPs.
To address both the graduation issue and the PPP issue, Deaton and 
Dupriez (2011) propose using an alternative procedure. Linking 
consumption surveys to ICP data for the 50 poorest countries, they 
simultaneously estimate the poverty line and PPPs of those near the 
poverty line (PPPs for the poor, or P4s). This procedure yields lower 
poverty lines in between $0.92 and $1.19 a day. However, the effect of the 
P4s on the global poverty counts – at similar poverty lines – is relatively 
small. The resulting estimates of global poverty are lower primarily due 
to the lower poverty lines and not due to differences in relative prices.
To an extent, the Deaton-Dupriez criticism can be addressed within the 
RCS approach by (1) weighting the national poverty lines by population 
sizes, and (2) extending the reference group of “poorest” countries. The 
Deaton-Dupriez proposal, labeled DD’11 below, is to select the 50 
poorest countries to constitute a fixed reference group. Clearly, the 
threshold of 50 countries is arbitrary. A possible alternative is to 
replicate the RCS approach but estimate the consumption gradient using 
population weights instead of equal weights (right panel, Figure 1). This 
is the approach proposed here. Examining the plot to find the point 
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where the slope of consumption begins to be positive, we visually 
identify a threshold of about 5 log dollars or $148.41 per month ( (cluster t 
= -2.40) percentage points, respectively. Using an alternative $2 a day 
poverty line, the magnitudes and differences in speeds across regions 
remain broadly similar.2
Figure 2� Population-weighted poverty trends by region, 1981 to 2010, $1�25 a day
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on surveys from PovcalNet.
An important question is whether consumption growth or 
redistribution is driving the decline in poverty. Estimating the historical 
contributions of growth and changes in distribution during the 1980s 
and 1990s, Kraay (2006) found that most poverty reduction was due to 
income or consumption growth. Our analysis broadly corroborates this 
finding (although we do not explicitly estimate contributions). The 
population-weighted growth rate of the survey means from 1981 to 2010 
across all countries is a very robust 4% per year (cluster t = 3.03). Over 
the same period, within-country inequality, as measure by the Gini 
coefficient, actually increased slightly by about 0.7% per year (cluster t = 
1.64). This implies that, on average, changes in distribution may have in 
fact moderately slowed the pace of poverty reduction. Poverty reduction 
over the last three decades has mostly been due to income and 
consumption growth. However, both the high average growth rate in 
2. East Asia and Pacific (slope = -2.31, cluster t= -7.33), Europe and Central Asia (slope=-0.26, 
cluster t=-2.33), Latin America and Caribbean (slope=-.55, cluster t = -5.74), South Asia (slope 
= -0.72, cluster t= -4.92), and sub-Saharan Africa (slope = -0.02, cluster t= -0.07). 
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the survey means and the apparent rise in within-country inequality 
are driven by China. Excluding China, the survey means grew about 
1.8% per year (cluster t = 2.45) and inequality barely moved (increased 
0.047% per year, cluster t = 0.13). In other words, poverty reduction in the 
developing world outside China has been steady but slow and has (on 
average) not been helped by improvements in distribution. 3
These findings are also in line with estimates of poverty at the $1.25 a day 
poverty line reported by the World Bank (see Appendix Table A-1). Chen 
and Ravallion’s (2010) estimates indicate rapid progress in China, little 
improvement in sub-Saharan Africa, and moderate poverty reduction 
elsewhere. The poverty headcount ratio in sub-Saharan Africa only fell by 
about three percentage points over the entire period from 1981 to 2010, 
and actually exceeded its 1981 value for most of the period. Combining 
these trends with population growth rates reveals the dire absence of a 
robust positive trend in terms of the number of global poor outside of East 
Asia. While China has lifted an astonishing 680 million people out of 
poverty between 1981 and 2010, the rest of the world has only about 50 
million fewer extremely poor people in 2010 than in 1981. This trend is 
owed to persistently high poverty rates coupled with strong population 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa and India. This is most evident in sub-
Saharan Africa where the number of extremely poor has roughly doubled 
over three decades (in spite of the slight decrease in the headcount ratio). 
The rise of China from a poor to a middle-income country also implies 
that the relative composition of world poverty is changing rapidly. In 1981 
about 40% of the world’s extremely poor lived in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, by 2010 their share has risen to 75%.
A very intuitive approach to illustrating past progress (or lack thereof) is 
to approximate the shape of the income or expenditure distribution at 
various points in time and examine how the features of the distribution 
(esp. quantiles) shift over time. Figures 3 and 4 plot the lower tail (up to 
$400) of the monthly income or expenditure distribution for the most 
populous country of the four poorest regions – East Asia, South Asia, 
Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa – in 1985, 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
The vertical lines are the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines in terms of 
monthly consumption. After lining up the survey data in time, we 
estimate the different density functions using a log-normal 
3. Excluding India in addition to China from the sample does not qualitatively alter this 
result. 
64
Chapter 2
approximation.4 While the assumption of log-normality has its 
weaknesses5, it usually provides a useful first estimate of the shape of 
the income distribution. A key advantage is that it only requires 
knowledge of the mean and Gini coefficient.
We can illustrate a few essential concepts with these graphs. The area 
under the curve to the left of the poverty line gives the fraction of the 
population that is poor (the poverty headcount ratio), while the spread 
of the distribution reflects inequality. The raw difference between two 
such areas under the curve is the absolute change in the poverty 
headcount ratio in percentage points and the relative difference gives 
the percent change in the poverty headcount ratio. The sensitivity of 
poverty reduction to changes in income or inequality is often measured 
in the form of elasticities or semi-elasticities. The income elasticity of 
poverty is the percent change in poverty for a one percent increase in 
incomes, and the income semi-elasticity of poverty is the percentage 
point difference in poverty for a one percent increase in incomes. The 
inequality elasticity and semi-elasticity are defined analogously. An 
attractive feature of the semi-elasticity is that it first increases and then 
decreases again during the development process. It measures the pace of 
poverty reduction in terms of the percentage of the population lifted out 
of poverty. Hence, it is usually more informative for policy-makers and 
more useful than reporting relative changes.6 
Figure 3 visualizes the tremendous progress in reducing poverty rates 
in China over the last three decades.7 As noted before, poverty in China 
4. We interpolate and extrapolate the data as follows. First, we project mean consumption 
forward and backward using the corresponding growth rates of personal consumption 
expenditures from the national accounts. Second, we linearly interpolate between the 
available Gini coefficients and extrapolate beyond the first or last available measure by 
keeping inequality constant. The same data set (with all countries from PovcalNet) is later 
used for computing the inequality indices in the developing world. 
5. Log-normality typically works better with consumption surveys than with income 
surveys (Lopez and Serven 2006), tends to underestimate the level of poverty (Dhongde and 
Minoiu 2013), and overstates the pace of poverty reduction (Bresson 2009). 
6. In relatively rich countries with low percentages of people below the poverty line, 
elasticities can be very misleading. Small reductions in the poverty headcount rate can 
manifest themselves as very high elasticities. For a more detailed discussion of the 
properties of elasticities and semi-elasticities of poverty see Bourguignon (2003), Klasen 
and Misselhorn (2008), and Bluhm et al. (2013). 
7. The implied poverty rates for China correspond well with the official World Bank 
estimates. At the $1.25 a day poverty line, our estimates imply a poverty rate of 60.56% in 
1985, 56.92% in 1990, 31.97% in 2000 and 9.75% in 2010. 
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at $1.25 a day fell rapidly over the entire period. The biggest gains 
occurred early on, between 1985 and 2000, when the peak of the 
distribution was close to the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines. By 2010, the peak 
of the distribution has moved considerably to the right of both poverty 
lines and the overall spread has widened. A great many Chinese are 
now considered part of a developing country ‘middle class’ (if defined 
between $2 and $13 per day).8 However, this also implies that the 
poverty reduction potential from China is largely exhausted. The 
income semi-elasticity of the poverty headcount is far beyond its peak 
and steadily approaching zero. In addition, inequality has increased 
remarkably over the same period. In 1985, the Gini coefficient was 0.28 
and by 2010 it has risen to 0.44.
Figure 3� Estimates of the expenditure distribution: China and India, 1985–2010
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations. China’s expenditure distribution is estimated based on a weighted mean 
and a rural-urban ln-mixture for the Gini coefficient. China’s surveys in PovcalNet are consumption-
based after 1987 and income-based before.
In India, on the contrary, there remains much greater potential for 
poverty reduction in the medium-term future. While the mode of the 
income distribution was near the $1.25 line around 1985 and 1990, the 
peak of the distribution in 2000 and 2010 is located between the two 
poverty lines. The process of “bunching up” in front of $2 a day 
observed by Chen and Ravallion (2010) implies that, in the medium-term 
8. Ravallion (2010) defines the size of the ‘middle class’ by developing country standards as 
the proportion of the population living on at least $2 per day but less than $13 per day, where 
the upper bound is the poverty line in the United States. Naturally, this is one of many 
possible definitions. 
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future, the pace of poverty reduction in India (defined as the absolute 
change in the headcount) will be particularly fast at the $2 a day line and 
continue at a fast but decelerating pace at the $1.25 line. Put differently, 
India’s income semi-elasticity around 2010 is very high and a moderate 
rate of growth will immediately have a large (but decreasing) effect on 
the poverty headcount ratio at both thresholds.
Figure 4 illustrates two very different cases. The left panel shows that 
from 1985 to 1990 poverty reduction in Brazil was very slow, with some 
progress at the $2 a day line but a nearly unchanged poverty rate at the 
$1.25 line. Yet, on average, Brazilians were already considerably better 
off in the 1990s than their Chinese or Indian counterparts in 2010. After 
1990, the pace of poverty reduction accelerates and by 2010 only 4.92% of 
the population was below the $1.25 a day poverty line.9 Lifting the 
remaining people out of poverty will require sustained economic 
growth, as both the income and distribution semi-elasticities of poverty 
in Latin America as a whole are rather low (Bluhm et al. 2013). With a 
Gini of 0.56 in 1985 income inequality was initially very high in Brazil, 
peaked at 0.61 in 2000 and then fell again to 0.55 by 2010, thus positively 
contributing to poverty reduction after 2000. The right panel illustrates 
that poverty in Nigeria was considerably higher in 2000 or 2010 than in 
1985. Nigeria’s plight is characteristic for most of sub-Saharan Africa in 
the 1980s and 1990s, as real consumption on the subcontinent was 
declining at a pace of about 0.82% per year. Only after 2000 did 
expenditures recover and the poverty headcount ratio began to decline. 
Yet even by 2010, the peak of the expenditure distribution is still 
noticeably to the left of the poverty line and the implied poverty rate at 
$1.25 a day is 65.96%.10 In addition, inequality in Nigeria increases over 
the observed period, starting from a Gini of 0.39 in 1985 to 0.49 in 2010.
9. The World Bank estimates a poverty rate of 5.38% at $1.25 a day for Brazil in 2010. 
10. The World Bank estimated a poverty rate of 67.98% at $1.25 a day for Nigeria in 2010.
67
Poor Trends: The Pace of Poverty Reduction after the Millennium 
Development Agenda
Figure 4� Estimates of the expenditure distribution: Brazil and Nigeria, 1985– 2010
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Brazil’s distribution is based on incomes instead of expenditures. The 
2010 data for Nigeria was revised in late 2014 (not incorporated here).
Taken together, these four distributions exemplify the changing 
composition of global poverty and broadly represent the trends in their 
respective regions. Over the last three decades, most poverty reduction 
occurred in East Asia where consumption growth was fastest, some 
poverty reduction occurred in India where real consumption growth 
was steady, and little poverty reduction occurred in sub-Saharan Africa 
where real consumption growth was slow and volatile. This suggests 
that without significantly faster growth in sub-Saharan Africa than in 
the past, possibly coupled with improvements in the income or 
expenditure distribution, the global pace of poverty reduction will 
inevitably slow down in the near future.
Another essential aspect of poverty analysis is studying the evolution of 
inequality. In this part, we focus only on inequality among citizens of 
developing countries, as our interest is the changing relative position of 
people in the developing world rather than their position vis-à-vis rich 
countries. Interestingly, many of the global trends are also evident even 
when we restrict our attention to this truncated distribution. We 
compute three measures of inequality by applying Young’s (2011) 
mixture of log-normal distributions approach to the PovcalNet data. 
‘Overall inequality’ is the Gini coefficient for citizens of developing 
countries regardless of their country of residency. ‘Within inequality’ is 
a population-weighted summary measure of inequality within each 
country. Last, ‘between inequality’ is the population-weighted Gini 
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coefficient of average incomes among all developing countries. In other 
words, the first measure encompasses both the within-country and 
between-country components that make up overall inequality in the 
developing world. Naturally, global inequality – including the citizens 
of developed countries – is typically estimated to be considerably 
higher. Recent estimates of the global Gini suggest that it is around 0.65-
0.70, and may be even higher if underreporting of top-incomes is taken 
into account (e.g. see Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009; Milanovic 2012; 
Chotikapanich, Griffiths, Rao, and Valencia 2012; Lakner and Milanovic 
2013).
Table 2� Inequality in the developing world, 1980–2010
Gini coefficient
Year Overall Within Between MeanConsumption Population
1980 0.596 0.356 0.486 73.29 2907.8   83
1985 0.555 0.353 0.421 79.05 3223.2   86
1990 0.578 0.367 0.449 95.98 4049.3 104
1995 0.559 0.385 0.411 98.41 4555.2 114
2000 0.537 0.395 0.374 102.45 4931.4 121
2005 0.535 0.399 0.372 120.34 5285.6 123
2010 0.554 0.404 0.399 150.72 5625.1 123
Δ 1980-2010 (in %) -7.186 13.632 -17.82 – – –
Δ 1990-2010 (in %) -4.17 10.095 -11.081 – – –
Δ 2000-2010 (in %) 3.066 2.2 6.642 – – –
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The sample size varies over the years. A total of 124 countries are 
recorded in PovcalNet but we lack PCE data for West Bank and Gaza. The results are very similar if 
we constrain the developing world to consist of the 104 countries from which we have (interpolated) 
data from 1990 onwards. Due to the lower coverage, the results for the 1980s should be interpreted 
with caution. For details on the ln-mixture calculations refer to Young (2011). 
Table 2 reveals some interesting trends. Overall inequality in the 
developing world has been falling between 1990 and 2005, but it exhibits 
an increase in 2010. At the same time, within-country inequality has 
been rising steadily since the mid-1980s. Between-country inequality 
fell over most of the period but also shows a slight increase between 
2005 and 2010. If we exclude China from the computations given that its 
weight is very high, then these trends are considerably muted or even 
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non-existent.11 Hence, two developments drive the overall change. First, 
inequality of incomes within China has been increasing significantly 
and second, its relative position among developing countries has been 
changing rapidly. Rising mean incomes in China from the 1980s 
onwards initially implied a reduction of between-country inequality as 
the average citizen in China was moving from the bottom towards the 
middle of the developing country ranks, but they now put upward 
pressure on overall inequality as incomes in China continue to grow 
and the distance from incomes in sub-Saharan Africa increases.12 
3 Going forward: poverty projections until 2030
As the expiration date of the MDGs is approaching quickly, new goals 
will have to be selected. Picking from a wide range of possible 
benchmarks invariably involves formulating expectations towards a 
fundamentally uncertain future. Thus, it becomes important to ask: 
what can the current data and methods tell us about the prospects for 
poverty alleviation over the next two decades? The list of policy-relevant 
questions is long. What level of poverty do we expect to prevail in 2030? 
Will it be feasible to truly eradicate extreme poverty by 2030? Or, how 
quickly do we expect poverty rates under the $2 a day poverty line to 
decrease? Here, we provide both a glimpse into several likely futures 
and some potential answers to these questions.
This section draws heavily on Bluhm et al. (2013), where we develop a 
‘fractional response approach’ for estimating income and inequality 
(semi-) elasticities of poverty. Among other things, the paper shows that 
this new method can be used to easily forecast global poverty rates 
using only two variables (the survey mean and the Gini coefficient). A 
key advantage of this approach over, say, linear trend extrapolations, is 
that it builds in the non-linearity of the poverty-income-inequality 
relationship. Neither the income or inequality elasticity nor the income 
or inequality semi-elasticity is assumed to be constant. The method 
11. Overall inequality is estimated as 0.583 in 1990 and 0.584 in 2010, within-country 
inequality is estimated as 0.384 in 1990 and 0.391 in 2010, and between-country inequality is 
estimated as 0.450 in 1990 and 0.454 in 2010. Removing India in addition to China has little 
effect on the trends in the inequality measures. 
12. This trend is corroborated by the literature on global inequality. According to Lakner 
and Milanovic (2013), average incomes in sub-Saharan Africa were $742 in 1988 and just $762 
in 2008 (in 2005 PPPs), while Chinese incomes increased by 228.9% and no longer make up a 
large part of the lower tail of the global income distribution. They also show that inequality 
within China has risen between 1988 and 2008. 
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accounts for the fact that income growth will have an increasing effect in 
very poor countries, where the mass of the distribution is to the left of 
the poverty line, and less and less of an effect in rich countries, where 
the mass of the distribution is far to the right of the poverty line.13 
Similarly, the effect of changes in distribution will indirectly depend on 
the prevailing levels of both income and inequality.
We are of course not the first to present poverty projections over the next 
two decades. Ravallion (2013), for example, outlines an aspirational 
scenario where an additional billion people are lifted out of extreme 
poverty by 2025-2030. Karver, Kenny, and Sumner (2012) discuss the 
future of the MDGs more generally and simulate poverty rates at the 
$1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines for 2030.14 Yet there are some important 
conceptual and methodological differences between our approach and 
these studies. First, the assumption that the developing world will 
continue growing at the accelerated 2000 to 2010 pace for another twenty 
years (our optimistic scenario) is questionable. There is a well-known 
instability of growth rates across decades that should not be ignored 
(Easterly et al. 1993), especially since the high average growth rates in 
the developing world were driven by rapid growth in China. A more 
conservative assumption is that countries will grow at rates much closer 
to their individual long-run growth path. Second, the changing 
composition of the countries contributing to global poverty matters a lot 
for the expected speed of global poverty reduction. Unless there is a 
persistent acceleration of consumption growth in sub-Saharan Africa on 
top of the post-2000 growth rates and sustained consumption growth in 
India, we can show that the pace of poverty reduction at the $1.25 line is 
likely to experience a pronounced slowdown in all of our forecast 
scenarios (defined below). Third, pro-poor growth can potentially make 
a sizable difference in the expected poverty rates, while a rise in within-
country inequality will hasten the arrival of the slowdown. Fourth, our 
method approximates the ‘official’ PovcalNet results at a fraction of the 
13. The inability to account for countries that have relatively high incomes and zero poverty 
at some point in time (typically the beginning or end of a spell) is a key weakness of studies 
investigating poverty elasticities. 
14. Karver et al. (2012) allow for country-specific growth rates but use older data (their 
PovcalNet reference year is 2008) and disregard the difference between GDP per capita 
growth and growth of the survey mean. This leads them to overestimate the speed of 
poverty reduction relative to our forecasts. A recent study by Chandy, Ledlie, and 
Penciakova (2013) echoes some of our results. They use GDP per capita rather than 
consumption expenditure data for most of the period, but apply a conversion factor, and 
report lower poverty estimates. 
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computational cost, so that a variety of scenarios can be easily estimated 
(and frequently updated with the arrival of new data).
We define three different constant growth scenarios on the basis of the 
historical personal consumption expenditure (PCE) growth rates from 
the national accounts.15 An ‘optimistic’ scenario uses the average PCE 
growth rate of each country from 2000-2010, during which period 
growth rates were significantly higher than before 2000. A ‘moderate’ 
growth scenario uses the average PCE growth rate of each country from 
1980 to 2010 – the long run average over the entire dataset. Finally, a 
‘pessimistic’ growth scenario uses the 1980 to 2000 average PCE growth 
rates. The latter scenario assumes that mean consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa is shrinking at a rate of about 0.82% per year.16 Table A-2 
in the Appendix reports the population-weighted average regional 
growth rates over several different periods to illustrate the implied 
regional income dynamics. 
For each growth scenario, we also simulate three different inequality 
patterns. ‘Pro-poor growth’ implies an annual decline in the Gini 
coefficient of approximately -0.5%, ‘distribution-neutral growth’ keeps 
inequality constant at the level prevailing in 2010, and ‘pro-rich growth’ 
implies an increase in the Gini coefficient of approximately 0.5% per 
year.17 As an illustration, if a country’s Gini coefficient is 0.40 in 2010 and 
we apply the pro-poor pattern, then by 2030 we project a Gini coefficient 
of about 0.36. If we apply the pro-rich pattern, then the Gini coefficient is 
about 0.44 in 2030. Changes of this magnitude are in line with the 
population-weighted regional trends obtained from the surveys.
We forecast the poverty rates until 2030 as follows. First, we estimate the 
model outlined in Bluhm et al. (2013) for the $1.25 a day poverty line 
using all nationally representative surveys recorded in PovcalNet over 
the period from 1981 to 2010. Next, after lining up all surveys in 2010, we 
apply each of the nine growth and distribution scenarios to project the 
15. The term ‘national accounts’ refers to data from the World Development Indicators or the 
Penn World Table 7.1, whichever has more data over the 30 year horizon. 
16. Owing to the post-communist transition, consumption and incomes in Europe and 
Central Asia were shrinking over the same period. However, given the small number of 
poor in 2010, the influence of that region on the global poverty headcount in 2030 is 
minimal. 
17. All reported growth rates (in percent) are computed as log differences if not otherwise 
noted. 
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income and inequality data forward to 2030, country by country.18  Then, 
we predict the poverty headcount ratios in five-year intervals over the 
period 2015 to 2030, country by country. Finally, we calculate 
population-weighted regional poverty rates and apply these to the 
projected total population in each region. For consistency with 
PovcalNet, the population projections are also taken from the World 
Bank and the ‘developing world’ is defined as in 1990 – the countries 
targeted by the MDGs – no matter how high we forecast the average 
level of consumption to be in 2030. Contrary to the World Bank’s recent 
redefinition of the denominator, we still focus on the percent of poor 
population in the developing world and not the entire world.
Figure 5 plots the historical evolution of the poverty headcount from 1981 
to 2010, a linear trend fitted through the observed data and then 
extrapolated until 2030, and our different scenarios. The linear trend serves 
as a reference for the non-linear projections. Several points are noteworthy. 
First, only the linear extrapolation predicts a poverty rate in the vicinity of 
zero by 2030. Regressing the global poverty rate at $1.25 a day on time one 
obtains a slope of about one percentage point per year (see also Ravallion 
2013). 19 As the global poverty rate was about 20.6% in 2010, the linear trend 
predicts that extreme poverty will have vanished by 2030. Second, all our 
projections show a decelerating rate of poverty reduction. Even in the most 
optimistic scenario, the pace of poverty reduction slows down. Most 
forecasts show a decelerating trend early on. In the optimistic scenario the 
slowdown only becomes noticeable by about 2020. Third, all scenarios but 
the optimistic pro-poor growth or optimistic distribution-neutral growth 
scenarios imply a poverty rate higher than 10% in 2030 at the $1.25 a day 
line. The optimistic pro-poor growth and distribution-neutral scenarios 
suggest a poverty rate in 2030 of 7.9% and 9.1%, respectively. In a nutshell, 
2030 is not likely to mark the end of extreme poverty, even under very 
optimistic assumptions. Our projections suggest that the World Bank’s 
goal of 3% extreme poverty in 2030 is not likely to be reached.
18. To line up all surveys in 2010, we use the actually observed PCE growth rates from the 
national accounts to extrapolate the survey means from the latest available survey. In doing 
so, we keep inequality constant at the last observed Gini coefficient. In 2010, the average 
year when the last survey was conducted is 2006.7, so about 3 years prior to 2010. More than 
40% of the last surveys were conducted in 2009 or 2010. 
19. This differs from the 1.5 percentage points estimated in the previous section as the 
global poverty rate is measured by lining up and weighting all surveys at reference years 
(three year intervals from 1981 onwards), whereas in the previous section we were using an 
unbalanced panel of unequally-spaced, population-weighted survey data with a wide yet 
somewhat selective coverage. 
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Figure 5� Actual and projected poverty headcount ratios at $1�25 a day, 1981–2030
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Bluhm et al. (2013) and survey data from PovcalNet. The solid 
black line beyond 2010 refers to the moderate (distribution-neutral) growth scenario in Table 3, while 
the solid grey lines represent the distribution-neutral variants of the optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios. The pro-poor and pro-rich variants are shown as grey dotted lines and are located above 
or below a solid line.
Table 3 provides the corresponding regional and total poverty rates in 
2030 including the expected number of poor in the various scenarios. 
Our moderate growth estimate suggests a global poverty rate of 13.2% in 
2030, implying about 950 million poor versus 1.2 billion poor people in 
2010. The pace of poverty reduction will have slowed significantly both 
in terms of relative changes and in terms of numbers of poor people. In 
this scenario, about 70% of the world’s poor live in sub-Saharan Africa 
and about 23% in South Asia by 2030. In contrast, the (distribution-
neutral) optimistic result suggests a poverty rate of 9.11%, with about 655 
million people remaining extremely poor. About 76% percent live in 
sub-Saharan Africa and about 17% in South Asia. The pessimistic case 
suggests next to no progress at all. Given an unchanged distribution, the 
poverty headcount ratio is estimated at 16.82% and the world is still 
home to 1.2 billion extremely poor people. Even if growth rates in sub-
Saharan Africa were to double relative to the post-2000 trend, the global 
poverty rate in 2030 is still projected to be 6.50% with pro-poor growth, 
7.67% with distribution-neutral growth, and 8.81% with pro-rich growth.
All of these estimates imply that it will take considerably longer than 2030 
to lift the remaining 1.2 billion people out of poverty. The good news is that 
by 2030 extreme poverty in Europe and Central Asia, East Asia, Latin 
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America, and Middle East and North Africa may virtually disappear 
(projected to be less than 5% in most forecasts). However, we predict a strong 
increase in the (relative) share of global poverty located in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which suggests that a non-trivial fraction of extreme poverty may be 
concentrated in ‘fragile states’. Whether these countries will overcome civil 
strife, political instability and corruption will ultimately decide whether 
there is a lower bound at which extreme poverty will continue to exist.
Gradual changes in inequality raise or lower the overall headcount in 
between 1.2 and 2.1 percentage points and account for about 100 million 
poor people more or less. Contrary to suggesting that inequality does 
not matter (we only assume slow changes), this finding hints at two 
crucial points. First, if the developing world as a whole is to truly 
maintain the impressive record in poverty reduction of the last decades, 
then this requires both sustained high growth at the level experienced 
since 2000 and improvements in distribution. Second, any systematic 
worsening of within-country inequality, particularly in large and 
largely poor countries like India or Nigeria, will reinforce the slowdown 
and thus more strongly decelerate the global rate of poverty reduction.
Readers may wonder why these results are so different from the 
projections reported in Ravallion (2013). Our results differ mainly because 
Ravallion (2013) uses the average growth rate of the developing world to 
project poverty in countries with very different track records, while we use 
country-specific average growth rates. Otherwise there are only minor 
differences in the data used and our method closely approximates results 
obtained using PovcalNet. Ravallion (2013) calculates that a PCE growth 
rate of 4.5% per year may bring the global poverty rate down to 3% by 2027. 
However, he makes the (in our view implausible) assumption that all 
developing countries will continue to grow equally fast at this common 
rate of 4.5%. Likewise, the linear projection of the global poverty rate on 
time ignores all issues of aggregation and provides an overly optimistic 
picture of the medium-term future.20 Yet composition matters, even if we 
incorporate the optimistic assumption that the post-2000 trend will 
continue. The average hides that rapid growth is less likely in some 
countries than in others. As we have shown, this has direct consequences 
20. We do not mean to imply that Ravallion (2013) is not aware of the aggregation issues. In 
fact, he uses PovcalNet precisely to confirm that his ‘optimistic scenario’ is possible once the 
intrinsic non-linearity of the poverty-income-inequality relationship is accounted for. Our 
point is rather that he envisions “the best possible world” to be used as a benchmark for 
future progress while we also focus on other, more likely, scenarios. 
76
Chapter 2
for when a slowdown will be observed and how strong the deceleration 
will be. However, even if we assume a uniform growth rate for all 
developing countries, a deceleration appears sooner or later within the 
next two decades (although it may actually be preceded by a brief 
acceleration if we assume growth rates in excess of 5% p.a.). It is comforting 
that, in line with Ravallion (2013), our method implies that if consumption 
in the entire developing world grew at a distributional-neutral pace of 7.6% 
per year, then extreme poverty would indeed virtually disappear by 2030 
(fall to 1.1%). The 3% target can be reached with a uniform distribution-
neutral growth rate of approximately 5.5% per year.21 
We repeat this exercise at the $2 a day poverty line. The results are 
reported in Table 4 and Figure A-1 in the Appendix. Interestingly, the 
linear projection is a much better approximation of progress at the $2 
poverty line than at the $1.25 poverty line. This is not due to a slower 
historical poverty reduction record: a regression of the global poverty rate 
at $2 a day on time also yields a slope of approximately one percentage 
point per year. However, the composition of countries (or people) near the 
$2 a day poverty line in 2010 is more reminiscent of its $1.25 counterpart in 
the early 2000s. At the start of the decade in 2010, the total $2 poverty rate 
is 40.67% – roughly double the $1.25 poverty rate. Fast growing East Asia 
and moderately fast growing South Asia still make up more than half of 
global poverty, implying that progress in these two regions will have a 
large effect on the overall poverty headcount.
Our moderate growth scenario predicts that about 1.87 billion people 
(26%) live on less than $2 a day in 2030 versus about 2.4 billion people in 
2010. Considerably greater gains are possible. Global poverty at the $2 
line falls below 20% in the optimistic distribution-neutral and pro-poor 
scenarios. If this occurs in 2030, then more than one billion people will 
have left poverty at the $2 a day line – undeniably a remarkable 
achievement. In most scenarios we also observe a slowdown at the $2 a 
day line but this slowdown tends to occur later and is less pronounced 
than at the lower threshold. In the most optimistic scenario, the rate of 
poverty reduction actually accelerates somewhat to about 1.16 
percentage points per year, while the moderate growth scenario gives a 
trend of 0.73 percentage points per year over the projection period.
Examining the regional distribution, we find that poverty in East Asia is 
21. Interestingly, a recent working paper by Yoshida et al. (2014), independently and using 
different methods, comes to very similar conclusions. 
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likely to fall to around 5% by 2030, down from 29.7% in 2010. Nearly 
everyone in East Asia will have entered the middle class (by developing 
country standards), but this forecast partially hinges on fast growth in 
China. In fact, some observers suggest that there is reason to believe that 
China runs a non-negligible risk of falling into a ‘middle-income trap’ 
(Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2013) which might make it harder to 
achieve less than 10% poverty at $2 a day by 2030.22 Progress in South 
Asia is also likely to be rapid. According to our moderate growth 
estimate the expected poverty rate is 35.9% in 2030, implying about 716 
million poor, down from 66.7% and about 1.1 billion poor in 2010. In the 
optimistic pro-poor growth case, the headcount ratio falls by about one 
third to less than 20% and the number of poor decreases to less than 400 
million. As a stark contrast, the $2 a day poverty rate in sub-Saharan 
Africa is expected to remain very high. Our moderate growth scenario 
predicts a poverty rate of about 66%, down from 69.9% in 2010, which at 
current population projections implies almost one billion poor in sub-
Saharan Africa alone. Even in the optimistic distribution-neutral growth 
scenario, we project a poverty rate of about 55% and more than 750 
million poor. This is underlined by the analysis in the preceding section 
where we suggest that the mass of the consumption distribution is far to 
the left of the $2 a day poverty line in 2010 for most of the subcontinent. 
Poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa remains the primary 
development challenge of the first half of the 21st century.
4 Conclusion and policy recommendations
The main contribution of this paper is to forecast global poverty rates until 
2030. To set the stage, we first highlighted that there is a fundamental 
uncertainty about the precise levels of extreme poverty. For the sake of 
comparison, we selected the standard poverty lines of $1.25 and $2 a day 
(in 2005 PPPs). We then discussed a robust set of global poverty and 
inequality trends. The global MDG of halving the 1990 extreme poverty 
level was reached in 2010 but this apparent progress hides substantial 
regional heterogeneity. Most of the global success was driven by rapid 
growth in China. Inequality among the citizens of developing countries 
and between developing countries was declining until 2005, while average 
within-country inequality was rising steadily until 2010.
22. However, our estimates suggest that this would require an exceptionally large 
slowdown. For poverty in East Asia to remain above 10% at $2 a day, growth needs to be less 
than half of the 2000-2010 trend. 
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The changing composition of global poverty has profound implications 
for the medium-term future. After 2010, fast growing East Asia will 
contribute less and less to global poverty reduction, while the share of 
the global poor residing in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will 
continue to rise. All of our projections show that the global rate of 
poverty reduction at $1.25 a day will slow down markedly between 2020 
and 2025. None of our nine scenarios predicts a poverty rate near zero by 
2030. This stands in stark contrast to earlier studies and the ‘3% by 2030’ 
target recently announced by the World Bank. The Bank’s target can 
only be reached if we make the unrealistic assumption of equally rapid 
growth in all developing countries. Once country-specific growth rates 
are used, even our most optimistic scenarios suggest a poverty rate of 
between 7.9% and 10.5%, depending on the evolution of inequality. At $2 
a day, the slowdown will occur much later and remarkable gains are 
possible if the post-2000 growth trends continue. An optimistic estimate 
suggests that the $2 a day poverty rate may fall below 20% by 2030, 
implying one billion fewer poor people than in 2010.
We propose two new ‘twin targets’ on the basis of these findings. An 
aspirational but realistic benchmark for progress would be to “reduce the 
proportion of the population living below $1.25 to 8% by 2030 and reduce the 
proportion of the population living below $2 a day to 18% by 2030.” Both of 
these targets are firmly anchored in our optimistic pro-poor growth 
scenarios. The $2 a day poverty line should receive more attention in the 
future to better track continued progress in East Asia and, later on, 
South Asia. Partly for the same reason, China has recently raised its own 
national poverty line to about $1.80 a day.
These targets can be reached in a variety of ways but not only through a 
continuation of the current path. They will require either an additional 
acceleration of growth in poorer countries, or improvements in 
distribution. Reversing the trend of rising within-country inequalities 
would speed up the pace of poverty reduction and still ensure progress 
at more moderate growth rates. The returns to redistribution are 
increasingly high in East and South Asia, and remain relatively large in 
Latin America. However, in some regions growth takes precedent. 
Rapid poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa still requires a 
significant and sustained acceleration in consumption growth.
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Appendix A
Table A-1� World Bank poverty estimates by region, 1981 to 2010 (selected years)
Year
1981 1990 1999 2005 2010
Panel (a) –  Headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (in percent)
East Asia and Pacific 77.18 56.24 35.58 17.11 12.48
China 84.02 60.18 35.63 16.25 11.62
Europe and Central Asia 1.91 1.91 3.79 1.33 0.66
Latin America and Caribbean 11.89 12.24 11.86 8.66 5.53
Middle East and North Africa 9.56 5.75 5.01 3.45 2.41
South Asia 61.14 53.81 45.11 39.43 31.03
India 59.83 51.31 45.62 40.82 32.67
Sub-Saharan Africa 51.45 56.53 57.89 52.31 48.47
Total 52.16 43.05 34.07 25.09 20.63
Panel (b) – Poor population at $1.25 a day (in millions)
East Asia and Pacific 1096.5 926.42 655.59 332.08 250.9
China 835.07 683.15 446.35 211.85 155.51
Europe and Central Asia 8.21 8.87 17.83 6.26 3.15
Latin America and Caribbean 43.33 53.43 60.1 47.6 32.29
Middle East and North Africa 16.48 12.96 13.64 10.47 7.98
South Asia 568.38 617.26 619.46 598.26 506.77
India 428.68 448.34 472.74 466.3 400.08
Sub-Saharan Africa 204.93 289.68 375.97 394.78 413.73
Total 1937.83 1908.45 1742.53 1389.2 1214.98
Total excl. China 1102.76 1225.3 1296.18 1177.35 1059.31
Notes: Based on PovcalNet and Chen and Ravallion (2010, 2013).
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Table A-2� Population-weighted regional PCE growth rates over various periods
Period
2000–
2010
1990–
2010
1980–
2010
1980–
2000
1990–
2000
East Asia and Pacific 5.906 5.772 5.598 5.377 5.608
(0.813) (0.653) (0.725) (0.677) (0.508)
Europe and Central Asia 6.085 2.755 2.558 -0.769 -1.225
(0.989) (0.412) (0.411) (0.916) (1.027)
Latin America and 
Caribbean
2.444 2.219 1.445 0.677 1.931
(0.239) (0.140) (0.098) (0.171) (0.337)
Middle East and North 
Africa
3.495 2.532 1.851 0.495 1.253
(0.443) (0.440) (0.293) (0.545) (0.648)
South Asia 4.448 3.612 3.179 2.173 2.511
(0.489) (0.388) (0.351) (0.284) (0.294)
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.382 1.419 0.698 -0.818 0.016
(0.689) (0.470) (0.472) (0.540) (0.688)
Overall average 4.544 3.809 0.132 2.565 2.862
(0.152) (0.132) (0.114) (0.161) (0.225)
123 123 123 122 122
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Chronic Poverty in Rural Cambodia:  
Quality of Growth for Whom?
Ippei Tsuruga
1. Introduction
For the past decade, policy makers and researchers have paid great 
attention to pro-poor growth, focusing in particular on what types of 
growth would decrease poverty. With the post-2015 era approaching 
and with smaller poverty headcounts compared to the past, debates 
surrounding poverty have started seriously considering the quality of 
growth to eliminate extreme poverty in the coming decades, rather than 
just its decrease. Zero poverty cannot be realised without tackling 
structured poverty. The Chronic Poverty Report (Shepherd et al. 2014) 
calls for the implementation of a comprehensive set of protective and 
preventative measures for those living in chronic poverty, or those 
moving in and out of poverty over time due to limited capacities. The 
paradigm shift from reduction to elimination requires future growth to 
be aware of whose poverty counts, or quality of growth for whom. High 
growth and consumption increases are likely to benefit many of the 
poor, but what of the chronic poor who structurally remain in long-term 
poverty. One of the critical questions concerns the effects of past 
growth, particularly in terms of structured poverty, and implications for 
the quality of growth in the new era.
Taking the case of Cambodia, this paper aims to assess the effects of past 
growth on the chronic poor by estimating the remaining population in 
chronic poverty, and analysing the structural characteristics that keep 
them in poverty indefinitely. Cambodia still faces significant challenges 
in its poverty reduction policy. After the devastating destruction of 
physical, social and human capital throughout the Pol Pot regime and 
the following period of unstable recovery, the country is finally enjoying 
steady development. With a favourable macroeconomic environment, 
the country achieved a dramatic improvement in consumption by the 
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poor between 2004 and 2010. With more people emerging from poverty, 
there are more people concentrated near or just above the poverty line. 
The latest poverty assessment has emphasised the need to prevent these 
people from falling back into poverty (World Bank 2013a). Despite 
experiencing an excellent pro-poor growth period, households with 
certain attributes still live in poverty. What is missing in the poverty 
discussion in Cambodia, mainly due to lack of data and analysis, is the 
critically important focus on chronic poverty as well as the transient 
poor.
This paper attempts to make two major contributions: one is to fill the 
research gap on chronic poverty. Recent works by the Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) are the only widely published 
studies that have assessed persistent poverty (Tong 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
The second is to provide an estimated chronic poverty headcount with 
locally meaningful multidimensional criteria. The research by Tong 
provides a better understanding of chronic poverty through 
econometric analysis using panel data but has limited data coverage. In 
the absence of nationwide panel data, I estimate a nationally 
representative figure. The findings of this study could potentially be of 
benefit in identifying and targeting programmes for the chronic poor.
2. Growth and poverty in Cambodia
(1) Pro-Poor Growth and Distribution
This section assesses the extent to which pro-poor growth has been 
achieved from the following perspectives. The definition of pro-poor 
growth in this study is simply “growth with poverty reduction,” as 
widely adopted in the development community (DFID 2004). Pro-poor 
growth can be achieved in several ways, such as income growth (Dollar 
and Kraay 2001, Kraay 2006), distribution change (White and Anderson 
2001; Ravallion 2004) and the favourable sectoral pattern of growth 
(Eastwood and Lipton 2000).
Quantitative data for poverty analysis has been derived from a series of 
Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys (CSES). Following the Socio-
Economic Surveys of Cambodia (SESC) conducted in 1993 and 1996, 
CSES was initiated in 1997, and data is available from 1997, 1999, 2004, 
and every year from 2007 onwards. Since 2004, the questionnaire has 
been improved to provide more information. The sample size was 12,000 
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households in 2004 and 2009, and 3,600 households in the other years. 
National poverty indicators have been calculated using CSES. In April 
2013, the Cambodian government modified the official calculation 
method of consumption aggregation and redefined national poverty 
lines based on CSES 2009 (Cambodia. Ministry of Planning 2013). The 
food poverty line is now calculated based on an equivalent food 
consumption of 2,200 K-calories per person per day. The total poverty 
line is calculated by adding an allowance for non-food items to the food 
poverty line. Taking price differences into consideration, separate 
poverty lines are defined in three geographic areas: Phnom Penh (KHR 
6,347), other urban (KHR 4,352), and rural (KHR 3,503) areas.
Applying the new method and adjusting poverty lines for inflation, 
Table 1 shows estimated poverty indicators. All the poverty indicators 
present a very positive improvement between 2004 and 2010. The 
poverty headcount ratio dropped significantly from 62.82 percent to 
20.02 percent at the poverty line and 31.67 percent to 3.38 percent at the 
food poverty line. In terms of depth and severity of poverty, poverty 
indicators show a large improvement across the nation as well. The 
poverty gap dropped from 22.38 points to 4.17 points, whilst the 
squared poverty gap followed the same trend from 10.34 points to 1.32 
points.
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Table 1. Poverty Estimation
Indicator Region
Food Poverty Line Poverty Line Obs.
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
p0 Other Urban 22.89 2.70 53.50 15.90 8,685 2,938 
 Rural 35.50 3.83 66.61 21.54 45,258 10,011 
 Phnom Penh   6.88 0.38 39.09 11.93 5,909 3,561 
 Cambodia 31.67 3.38 62.82 20.02 59,852 16,510 
p1 Other Urban   5.96 0.45 19.02   3.36 8,685 2,938 
 Rural   8.98 0.62 23.94   4.47 45,258 10,011 
 Phnom Penh   1.79 0.05 12.05   2.63 5,909 3,561 
 Cambodia   8.03 0.55 22.38   4.17 59,852 16,510 
p2 Other Urban   2.30 0.10   9.03   1.12 8,685 2,938 
 Rural   3.27 0.14 11.05   1.40 45,258 10,011 
 Phnom Penh   0.75 0.01   5.34   0.82 5,909 3,561 
 Cambodia   2.95 0.12 10.34   1.32 59,852 16,510 
Updated Other Urban 1,774 2,694 2,962 4,498 – –
poverty Rural 1,565 2,377 2,384 3,620 – –
lines 
(riels) Phnom Penh 2,124 3,226 4,319 6,559 – –
Region (Rural Only)
Headcount ratio 
(%)
Regional Share 
(%) Obs.
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
Mekong Plain 63.92 18.02   54.95    43.57 26,548 5,485
Tonle Sap 69.29 16.66 26.8        21 11,384 2,659
Coastal 58.22 17.99      5.64       5.58 2,840 665
North and Northeast 
Mountain 79.83 45.63    12.61     29.85 4,486 1,202
Cambodia 66.61 21.54    100     100 45,258 10,011
Source: Author’s calculations based on CSES
Note: Poverty lines have been adjusted by consumer price index (CPI) in Phnom Penh equally across 
the regional poverty lines because the regional CPI breakdown is not available. Fixing the averaged 
CPI October/December 2009 as 100 points, CPI for the other reference years was 0.68 for 2004 and 1.03 
for 2010 (Carpenter 2012, National Institute of Statistics). All presented indicators have been assigned 
population weights provided by each survey, calculated based on General Population Census 1998 
and 2008 respectively for CSES 2004 and 2010. Poverty indicators are calculated based on the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke method (1984).
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This trend is likely a result of the favourable macroeconomic 
environment and growth pattern. Between 2004 and 2010, even during 
the global financial crisis, the country enjoyed 6.17 percent annual 
growth in GDP per capita. Sectoral growth took place almost evenly in 
agriculture, which most poor people rely on, at 6.81 percent, as well as 
manufacturing and services, at about 8 percent (Appendix 1). The 
consumption growth of the poor was higher than that of growth rate in 
mean and at median in all regions, increasing annually by 9.11 percent 
in Phnom Penh, 11.66 percent in other urban and 10.34 percent in rural 
areas (Appendix 2). The growth incidence curve clearly indicates that 
growth and distribution patterns were pro-poor in the rural settings. 
Moreover, human development has improved substantially. The net 
enrolment ratio presents an upward trend at all levels, primary, lower 
secondary and upper secondary whilst school attendance and adult 
literacy follow similar trends. Child mortality has also improved in 
terms of neonatal, infant and under-5 age groups. Overall, the 
quantitative data both on macro and micro confirm that the country has 
achieved pro-poor growth.
Looking closely into the socioeconomic data in 2010, geographic 
distribution and economic activities illustrate poverty characteristics 
further. All poverty indicators are noticeably higher in rural regions 
than urban settings. Rural poverty was 21.54 percent whilst urban 
poverty was even lower, 11.93 percent in Phnom Penh and 15.9 percent in 
other urban areas. Although the difference in poverty rates between 
rural and urban areas might be seen as small, it is significantly different 
in absolute terms. In spite of increasing urbanisation, rural areas are still 
home to 80 percent of the population and over 86 percent or 2.3 million 
of the poor. This geographic distribution correlates with the trends in 
economic activities: 72 percent of poor people depend on agriculture1 for 
their livelihoods in Cambodia, and the rate increases to 78 percent in 
rural settings. Of the poor agrarians, crop farmers account for 80 
percent. Although agricultural labourers, livestock farmers, forestry 
workers, fishery workers and hunters constitute a minority (12 percent), 
these groups contribute a higher share to poverty (18 percent) than their 
population share. Poverty rates are relatively higher among them too. In 
rural areas, 33 percent of fishery workers and 40 percent of agricultural 
labourers live below the poverty line. On the other hand, urban poverty 
1  Main economic activities of households are defined by time that household members 
spend on particular sectors. A detailed definition is discussed later.
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shows quite different patterns in economic activities, with 95 percent of 
the poor in Phnom Penh and 52 percent in other urban areas working in 
secondary or tertiary sectors.
To sum up, Cambodia seems to have achieved pro-poor growth between 
2004 and 2010. Both macroeconomic environment and human 
development progress were steadily positive, consumption growth of 
the poor increased more than that of other socio-economic groups, and 
poverty indicators dramatically improved.
(2) Existing Literature on Chronic Poverty
Quantitative regional studies provide fruitful insights on chronic 
poverty. Tong (2012a) conducted a dynamic poverty study using CDRI 
panel data of 793 households, collected in 2001, 2004/05, 2008 and 2011, 
from nine villages in seven provinces in four geographic regions, 
including Tonle Sap, Mekong Plain, Plateau and Coastal areas. The data 
include information on household demographics, consumption, asset 
ownership and economic activities. The study applies principal 
component analysis to construct a wealth index from mixed asset 
ownership for ranking households (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). 
Households always below the set poverty line (40th percentile or 60th 
percentile) are regarded as the chronic poor. The study finds that most 
poverty was transient during the period. It also finds the following 
characteristics of the chronic poor households. Compared to non-poor 
households, the chronic poor households are likely smaller and have 
more children under-six years, fewer adults aged 15-64, and the 
household heads tend to be younger, less educated, female and single. 
They likely lack agricultural land, non-land assets, livestock, and 
connection with their community than other households.
Using the same dataset, Tong (2012b, 2012c) reassesses chronic poverty 
with consumption measurements to compare results. It confirms all the 
major findings above except for household size and age of household 
heads. While the asset approach finds that the chronic poor tend to be in 
smaller households and their heads are likely young, the consumption 
approach finds larger households and no significant trends in head’s 
age among them. There is no further analysis of these particular 
contradictions.
These findings provide a valuable foundation for understanding chronic 
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poverty in Cambodia. In relation to the previous studies by Tong, this 
paper potentially makes an important contribution by confirming some 
of his major findings from a different approach and at the national level. 
There are certain differences in methodologies and scopes. For example, 
while Tong’s studies cover households with all the occupations in the 
selected areas, this paper limits its scope of analysis to agrarians in rural 
areas across the nation. While Tong’s study uses consumption poverty 
and a wealth index, this study defines chronic poverty by local 
perspectives through PPA as discussed later. 
3. Methodology for identifying chronic poverty
The methods for measuring the persistence of poverty have been 
disputed. In contradistinction to transient poverty, chronic poverty is 
commonly defined by poverty over long durations and regarded as 
intergenerational transmission of poverty through transferred capital or 
assets (Hulme and Shepherd 2003). For the identification of chronic 
poverty in practice, one of the most common approaches is quantitative 
assessment using a set of panel data (McKay and Lawson 2002; Haddad 
and Ahmed 2003; Wadugodapitiya and Baulch 2011). Comparing income 
or consumption of the same households over time, it provides 
informative analysis with figures. On the other hand, Hulme, Moore 
and Shepherd . (2001, 34) argued that monetary measurements cannot 
fully reflect the complexity of chronic poverty; therefore such analyses 
need to take into account the multidimensional characteristics of 
chronic poverty and can benefit from qualitative or subjective 
assessment by poor people themselves. White (2002) also argued that 
productive synergy can be established between them in poverty 
analyses.
Building upon these ideas, Howe and McKay (2007) developed an 
innovative framework for identifying chronic poverty by combining 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches. They pointed out that 
panel data analysis provides a narrow understanding of chronic 
poverty within the capacity of data availability or questionnaires, 
although it provides the numeric results that policy makers prefer to 
have for decision making. It can also assess relatively short spans and is 
usually sensitive to measurement errors. They also acknowledge the 
pros and cons of a qualitative approach. It provides narrative 
information based on rich local knowledge and experience that is 
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usually missed by purely numerical methods. Data can be ambiguous 
and therefore difficult for policy makers to use the results, as there are 
fewer objective figures and macro perspectives. To overcome the 
limitations and maximise the advantages, they innovated by combining 
the methodologies. The major value of the resulting methodology is that 
it does not require panel data – instead, it uses cross-sectional 
socioeconomic data at a single point in time and qualitative information 
collected through participatory poverty assessments (PPA). They 
proposed undertaking several steps of analysis: firstly, selecting criteria 
of chronic poverty defined by the poor people themselves in the PPA, 
translating those qualitative criteria onto nationally representative 
household data, and finally checking the robustness and sensitivity of 
the estimation.
As Howe and McKay (2007) acknowledge, the sustainable livelihood 
approach (SLA) is a useful framework to understand qualitative 
information in a vicious poverty cycle at the stage of criteria selection 
(Ellis 2000, 2006). In SLA, livelihood is conceived as a cycle of three main 
components: assets, activities and outcomes. Assets consist of five or 
more types such as human capital (skills, education, health), physical 
capital (goods), financial capital (savings, access to loans), natural capital 
(land, water, forest), and social capital (kinship, friendship). Households 
are considered to mobilise those assets to produce outcomes through 
different types of economic activities, and invest the outcomes to 
accumulate assets again. In terms of vulnerability in SLA, households 
are considered to utilise assets to practise risk management and coping 
strategies. If they manage the sequence successfully, they are able to 
build up assets. If unsuccessful, they deplete assets. Institutions and 
policies are involved in the framework to reduce vulnerability. In 
relation to chronic poverty, destitute households may live in a vicious 
cycle of asset-activity-outcome.
In this study, I adopt the approach of Howe and McKay (2007) to identify 
chronic poverty. The approach is relevant for this study in two reasons. 
The first reason is data availability. Cambodia does not have nationwide 
panel data but socioeconomic survey data and the results of PPA are 
available. Secondly, the methodology allows estimating the chronic 
poverty headcount at two points in time, enabling analysis of the extent 
to which pro-poor growth benefits the chronic poor over the period. As 
Howe and McKay admit, this is not the most rigorous way to estimate 
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chronic poverty and it has a tendency to underestimate the population 
but it is still considerably useful in assessing chronic poverty given the 
absence of panel data.
4. Qualitative insights into chronic poverty in Cambodia
This section reviews qualitative information to identify the 
characteristics of chronic poverty. The qualitative information is derived 
from the PPA conducted across the nation by the Asian Development 
Bank between October and December 2000 (ADB 2001). The PPA 
compiled local voices through focus group discussions (FGDs), 
formulated in geographically targeted poor regions based on 
quantitative surveys (National Population Census and CSES) and 
selection by local authorities, community or village members and 
nongovernmental organisations. Locally selected poor people 
participated in 169 FGDs in 154 villages in 70 communes in all 24 
provinces and in additional 15 urban areas. The regional share of FGDs 
was 47 percent in the Mekong Plain, 29 percent in Tonle Sap, 12 percent 
in the North and Northeast Mountain regions, and 12 percent in coastal 
areas. The participants included a variety of vulnerable groups: women, 
children, rural farmers, fisher folk, ethnic minority groups, female-
headed households, demobilised soldiers, orphans, street children, sex 
workers, plantation workers, garment workers, garbage collectors and 
cyclo-drivers. Females and ethnic minorities accounted for over 50 
percent and 13 percent respectively. The PPA paid particular attention to 
the process to have real voices from those socially weaker groups. For 
instance, the team members conducted separate discussions with 
women in situations where they could not openly explore gender issues 
in the FGD where men were present.
As designed, the PPA provides deep insights about the livelihoods and 
demographic characteristics of poor households. It found that food 
insecurity is a primary concern for all poor households regardless of 
region and ethnic group. Poverty means they spend a large amount of 
time looking for food, potentially causing loss of other opportunities 
such as participation in village activities. It also found that food foraging 
activities are often undertaken by women and children; therefore 
children, particularly girls, in poor families potentially have a higher 
risk of missing educational opportunities. Most PPA participants 
generate their livelihoods through agriculture. Rice farming was listed 
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as the most important economic activity by 83 percent, with market 
gardening second at 16 percent, and raising livestock third at one 
percent. Some households certainly mixed those activities but very few 
households had other supplemental activities for livelihood. Moreover, 
the PPA found a vicious poverty cycle in relation to asset deprivation. In 
rural Cambodia, the poorest families tend to sell assets to cope with 
major shocks like natural disasters, sickness or death of household 
members, resulting in low levels of asset ownership. As ownership of 
productive land was listed as very important for their lives, the coping 
strategy of selling land is certainly not an easy choice for the poor.
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Table 2.  Household Characteristics Identified in Participatory Poverty Assessment
Category Household Characteristics
Poorest
Kror bamphot: 
Extremely poor
Toal: People who 
have no way out of 
their present 
situation
1. Little or no land (0.8-1.2 ha)
2. Perhaps one draft animal but no farming implements
3. Housing made of thatch in very poor condition
4. Few household utensils
5.  Live on hand-to-mouth basis (food shortages for up to eight 
months)
6.  Much reliance on natural resources to meet subsistence 
needs
7.  Accumulated debts and inability to repay or borrow 
additional amounts
8. No kinship support
9. Large young families with 5-12 children
Poor
Kror: Literally poor
Kror thomada: 
Typical poverty
1. Less than 2 ha of land in unfavorable locations
2.  Usually have at least a pair of draft animals and some farm 
implements
3.  Houses made of thatch sometimes with tile roof and 
bamboo walls
4. Limited number of household utensils
5. Food shortages for 3-6 months
6. Able to borrow money for rice farming
Lower medium 
income
Kror imom: 
Reasonably poor
Kandal: Medium
1. Less than 3 ha of land
2. Draft animals and farm implements
3.  Houses made of wood or bamboo, thatched roof and walls 
and tile roof
4. Limited number of household utensils
5. Food shortages for 3-4 months
6. Able to borrow money for rice farming
Middle income
Mathyum: Average
Kandal: Medium
1. Land holdings of up to 6 ha
2. 2-4 draft animals, some livestock and all farm implements
3.  Houses made of wood with either bamboo or wooden floors 
and tile roof
4. Reasonable number of household utensils
5.  No food shortages except when major crisis or ritual occurs
6. Limited cash savings
7. Small-scale business
8. Old motorbike or boat
Least poor (Non-
Poor)
Throuthear: Fully 
self-sufficient 
without any debts;
Neak leu: Living 
above poverty
1.  More than one hectare of very productive agricultural land
2.  At least two draft animals and many other livestock and 
farm implements
3.  Houses made of permanent building materials, including 
corrugated iron and tiles
4.  Full food security with limited surplus for lending, sale or 
labor exchange
5. Well-furnished households, often with television 
6. Able and willing to lend money to other villagers
Source: Summarised by the author based on the PPA (ADB 2001)
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The PPA identified five broad livelihood ranks and those characteristics 
(Table 2), enabling a chronic poverty threshold to be defined. The first 
category clearly implies chronic poverty. The literal description in local 
language is Toal, people who have no way out of their present situation, 
and Kror Bamphot, extremely poor. The identified characteristics also 
confirm a significant deprivation – namely, lack of food security most of 
the time (eight or more months per year), relying on subsistent 
livelihoods (living on a hand-to-mouth basis), no productive assets or 
kinship support. Spending most months hungry and unable to escape 
the situation, those households in this category can be clearly identified 
as being in chronic poverty. The second and third categories are too 
ambiguous to be regarded as chronic poverty. Households in these two 
categories have land at unfavourable locations and limited farming 
implements with relatively long term food shortages. The PPA describes 
their marginalised situation but does not provide a clear definition or 
characteristics of poverty persistence. In order to avoid ambiguity and 
subjectivity for selection criteria, this study regards only the first 
category as chronic poverty.
Reflecting the limitations in coverage of the PPA, the above criteria 
potentially underestimate chronic poverty in particular groups. Firstly, 
the PPA provides little information about urban chronic poverty. 
Although there are some related descriptions such as lack of in-house 
toilet, mobile phone, car or motorcycle, or child’s education, it does not 
link to those characteristics to poverty persistence. Due to this lack of 
clear definition, this study is unable to estimate chronic urban poverty 
and therefore the following analysis focuses on rural areas. Secondly, 
the PPA does not provide sufficient information about characteristics of 
chronic poverty in secondary and tertiary sectors; therefore, the study’s 
scope is limited to chronic poverty in agriculture in terms of livelihood. 
Given the lack of information, it also potentially underestimates the 
chronic poor who rely on non-farming agricultural subsectors. For 
instance, as resource-based livelihoods are reported to have very 
different characteristics from farming (Ballard et al. 2007), households 
relying on fishery and forestry would not be rigorously identified in 
chronic poverty by the single set of criteria. Similarly, chronic poverty 
among ethnic minorities cannot be easily identified by the single 
selection criteria because each tribe has a variety of perceptions of 
poverty. For example, whilst the Stieng and the Tumpoun recognise loss 
of cultural identity as a characteristic of poverty, the dominant lowland 
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Khmer, the Cham or the Vietnamese do not have such perceptions. Stieng 
participants stated that they do not even have a term to describe poverty 
and would not compare life with others in their culture. A tribal elder of 
the Tumpoun in Ratanakiri defines poverty based on situations in which 
they would be unable to protect and hand over their land to the next 
generation, and they would not be rich even if they had enough money. 
Such differences in values cannot be taken into account in this study.
Lastly, on a possible critique for using the PPA conducted over a decade 
ago, I would argue that the validity can be reasonably confirmed, 
because Tong’s work (Tong 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), conducted throughout 
the decade after the PPA, also found similar demographic characteristics 
of chronically poor households, including lack of agricultural land, non-
land assets, livestock, and networks with their community.
In summary, this study defines chronic poverty by the first category of 
Table 2 and focuses solely on rural areas. With limited information, this 
study potentially underestimates chronic poverty among households 
who make their livelihood through non-farming activities, the urban 
poor and ethnic minorities. Further studies could explore such 
categories. Nevertheless, this study is still of value because the 
proportion of the population in urban settings, forestry, fishery or ethnic 
minority groups is relatively small and the vast majority of rural 
populations are covered in the following estimation. 
5. Chronic poverty estimation
I will now combine the quantitative information and the qualitative data 
to estimate chronic poverty. In order to identify the chronic poor, the 
general principle of criteria selection here is to translate as many local 
definitions as possible to household survey data. One critique of this 
combining method is that selected criteria are loosely associated with 
PPA results (Shaffer 2013, 49). Therefore, it is crucial for this study to test 
the robustness and sensitivity of the estimation result. This section 
reviews the descriptive statistics of each dimension that the PPA 
identifies, followed by an estimated chronic poverty headcount and 
finally, a robustness and sensitivity analysis.
Descriptive Statistics and Discussion on Selection Criteria 
Concerning economic activities, 77.34 percent of rural people relied on 
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agriculture in 2004 and 72.87 percent in 2010 (Table 3). The data allows 
further breakdown into agricultural subsectors, but the categorisation is 
not fully comparable over the two datasets at the subsector level. Among 
agrarians in 2010, most of them lived on crop farming (87.53 percent), 
while others relied on agricultural labour (7.5 percent), livestock raising 
(2.37 percent), fishery (1.35 percent) and forestry (0.26 percent).
In terms of asset ownership among agrarians in each survey year 
respectively, 58.81 percent and 57.34 percent owned one hectare or less of 
land for any agricultural activities such as vegetable gardening, crop 
cultivation, livestock raising or private forestry; 42.19 percent and 46.48 
percent owned one or no draft animals, which included cattle, buffaloes, 
horses and ponies but excluded other types of livestock like pigs, sheep, 
goats, chickens, ducks or quails; 82.35 percent and 75.44 percent owned 
no high value farming implements, such as tractors, bulldozers, 
threshing machines, hand tractors, rice mills, or water pumps; 58.49 
percent and 57.06 percent lived in houses where the walls or roof are 
made from bamboo or thatch.
Some particular dimensions need further discussion in order to 
determine selection criteria. Firstly, the PPA found that the chronic poor 
tend to have 0.8 hectare to 1.2 hectares of agricultural land, as shown in 
Table 4, while also indicating that owning productive cropland is one 
criterion for non-poverty. The major difference between these two 
descriptions is quality of land. Unfortunately, there is no translatable 
quantitative data available to distinguish the quality of land. Therefore, 
defining chronic poverty by taking land ownership of between one 
hectare and 1.2 hectares potentially includes households with 
productive land who are not poor according to the PPA. To avoid the 
inclusion error, this study takes one hectare as a threshold. 
Secondly, the farming implement criterion is disputable. Selecting 
households who have ‘no farming implements’, as the PPA indicates, 
identifies only 4.61 percent and 0.51 percent in respective years. It may 
cause significant underestimation of chronic poverty. On the other 
hand, selecting households with ‘a few farming implements’ potentially 
identifies those with productive agricultural machines. As the PPA 
implies that the poor rely on low productive activities, they are unlikely 
to own such modern farming tools. In order to minimise both inclusion 
and exclusion errors, this study adopts ownership of low productive 
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farming implements including an animal cart, plough, harrow, rake, 
hoe, spade, axe or none as a criterion. In other words, households with 
high productive farming implements are excluded from this category. 
The number of owned implements is not considered here because the 
PPA does not specify the extent of ownership.
Thirdly, the PPA identifies that housing in chronically poor households 
is likely made of thatch in very poor condition. Although it does not 
specify what types of housing materials are indicated, roofs and walls 
are repeatedly mentioned in the other categories. As the household 
survey data do not allow division of bamboo and thatch and those 
qualities, those two materials, in any conditions, are treated as a 
criterion in this study. Finally, the other listed characteristics in the first 
category are not precisely translatable due to either limitation of the 
survey data or the PPA description. They mostly provide rich 
understanding of chronic poverty but are insufficient as identification 
criteria. A wide range of utensil variables is actually available in the 
survey data but the PPA provides little indication of what types of 
durables the participants meant. Although utensil ranking and assigned 
weights can probably be inferred through statistical techniques like 
principal component analysis (Filmer and Pritchett 2001), the result 
would not reflect the self-rated characteristics of the poor people in this 
study.
Similarly, the narrative description of “live on hand-to-mouth basis” or 
“food shortages” is not directly translatable into the survey data, but 
alternatively, consumption data are available. Variables for debt 
accumulation and kinship support are not available in the household 
survey data. Lastly, the dimension of “large young families with 5-12 
children” is too ambiguous to be taken as a criterion and partially 
conflicts with the survey data. The survey data show no families with 
more than nine children and very few of them, 1.44 percent in 2010, have 
five children or more. This contradiction is probably because children in 
the PPA period have grown up and the household size norms have 
changed. However, this assumption cannot be verified with the 
available information. Some of these indicators will be used to test 
estimation robustness later.
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Table 3. Main Economic Activities and Asset Ownership in Rural Cambodia
 2004 2010
Main Household Economic Activities (%)
Crop farmers
77.34
63.50
Livestock farmers   1.73
Forestry workers   0.19
Fishery workers or hunters   0.99
Agricultural labourer   5.47
Mixed agriculture   0.99
Non-agricultural activities 22.05 26.73
None   0.60   0.40
Obs. 45,258 10,011
Land (among agrarian) (%)
0.8 ha or less 44.91 45.09
0.8< & <=1 ha 13.90 12.25
1 ha < 41.19 42.66
Obs. 34,786 7,317
Draft Animal (among agrarian) (%)
None 32.56 37.2
One   9.63   9.28
Two or above 57.81 53.52
Obs. 34,786 7,317
Farming Implement (among agrarian) (%)
High farm implements only   1.55   0.78
Both high and low value farm implements 16.10 23.77
Low value farm implements only 77.74 74.93
None   4.61   0.51
Obs. 34,786 7,317
Housing Material (among agrarian) (%)
Wall and Roof made of Bamboo or Thatch 16.50 13.84
Wall or Roof made of Bamboo or Thatch 41.99 43.22
Others (Tiles, Fibrous cement, Concrete etc.) 41.50 42.94
Obs. 34,772 7,317
Source: Author’s calculations based on CSES
Note: Main economic activity is defined by share of time that household members spend on each 
activity. The sum of months that household members spend in agriculture is divided by the total sum 
of months in all occupations to obtain the share of agricultural activity for each household. Then, main 
economic activity is identified in agriculture if the share is 50 percent or above. All the presented data 
are population-weighted.
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(2) Selection Criteria and Estimation Result
As discussed above, this study adopts the following criteria for 
identifying chronic poverty, and regards households that meet all of 
these criteria as clearly chronically poor according to the local 
definition. The identified households would not have sizable-enough 
land to harvest sufficient food for household subsistence needs. They 
have very limited farming assets to increase the productivity and 
efficiency of farming activities, although they invest most time and 
labour in agriculture throughout the year. The vicious poverty cycle can 
be observed in the SLA framework as well. The criteria take into 
consideration physical capital (draft animals and farming implements), 
natural capital (agricultural land) and human capital (labourers). This 
provides a convincing enough picture of the negative spiral of poverty 
in the household: 
 • Main household economic activity is agriculture,
 • Household owns agricultural land of one hectare or less,
 • Household owns one draft animal or none,
 • Household owns no high value farming implement, and
 • Household walls or roof is bamboo or thatch.
Of the total rural population, these criteria identify chronic poverty 
rates of 11.53 percent and 11.34 percent in the reference years (Table 4). 
Although there are a few variations across different regions, it is notable 
that the chronic poverty headcount almost levelled off over the 
favourable period for economic growth and reduction in consumption 
poverty.
Table 4. Estimated Chronic Poverty Headcount in Rural Cambodia
Region (Rural Only)
Headcount ratio 
(%)
Regional Share 
(%) Obs.
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
Mekong Plain 11.04 12.24 54.8 56.19 26,548 5,485
Tonle Sap 13.63 10.25    30.45 24.53 11,384 2,659
Coastal    7.39    9.56      4.13    5.63 2,840 665
North and Northeast 
Mountain 11.64 10.98    10.62 13.64 4,486 1,202
Cambodia 11.53 11.34     100   100 45,258 10,011
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
102
Chapter 3
(3) Robustness Analysis
In order to see the robustness of estimation, I compared the other indicators 
of poverty and human development, specified by PPA participants, 
between two groups: the chronic poor and non-chronic poor in the same 
economic activity at the 95 percent confidence level. The PPA claims that ill 
health and education access are major determinants of poverty and food 
shortages are important factors in defining chronic poverty. In relation to 
these descriptions, there are rich quantitative data available to create 
indicators of human development and consumption. 
In general, the result shows that the estimation is robust across different 
indicators (Table 5). The education indicators of the chronic poor, 
including school enrolment, attendance and adult literacy, are 
significantly lower than those of the others in the same economic 
activity, except for primary net enrolment ratio in 2010 (for which the 
difference is statistically not significant). Looking over time, although 
the primary net enrolment ratio has improved equally and is even 
slightly higher among the chronic poor, the gap becomes much more 
evident in secondary education. Whilst both lower and upper secondary 
net enrolment ratio improved remarkably among the non-chronic poor, 
the results were different for the chronic poor. Only 8.93 percent of 
chronic poor children in the relevant ages go to lower secondary school, 
compared to 27.19 percent in non-chronic poverty in the same activity, 
and 35.53 percent for the non-agrarians. Moreover, the share of 
household members who ever attended school and the proportion of 
adult members who are able to read and write show considerable 
deprivation among the chronic poor. 
Similarly, prevalence of illness or injury tends to be slightly higher 
among the chronic poor. The share of people who seek advice or care 
from health practitioners is not very different between the groups. That 
is probably because access to health care services improved equally and 
most people now seek health care services when they become ill. In 
terms of consumption, the estimation is also robust. The result presents 
a large proportion of chronic poor identified in the bottom consumption 
quintile, 34.32 percent and 32.83 percent, and few in the highest quintile, 
5.99 percent and 3.16 percent, respectively; and most of the other chronic 
poor are concentrated in second and third lowest quintiles. The 
comparison of food consumption also follows the same distribution 
pattern. Overall, almost all indicators demonstrate a significant 
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difference between the chronic poor and the others both in 2004 and 
2010. It may provide an indication of the robustness for the estimation.
Table 5. Comparison of Socio-Economic Indicators
2004
Indicators (%)
(1)
Chronic 
Poor (CP)
(2)
Non-CP 
in same 
activity
All 
other Total
(2) - (1)
Diff. t-value
Net enrolment ratio (ages 6-11) 65.60 74.84 79.72 74.70 9.24 5.34
Net enrolment ratio (ages 12-14) 4.84 10.26 21.34 12.17 5.42 4.54
Net enrolment ratio (ages 15-17) 2.55 3.64 8.75 4.67 1.10 1.12
Ever attended school (ages 5+) 61.52 72.59 81.39 73.39 11.08 13.92
Adult literacy (ages 15+) 50.55 64.50 77.39 66.07 13.95 13.91
Prevalence of illness or injury 20.51 18.20 16.99 18.19 -2.31 -3.75
Seek care during the survey period 13.64 11.70 10.97 11.76 -1.94 -3.68
Seek care when ill or injured 66.87 64.36 64.70 64.76 -2.51 -1.56
1st quintile, Food consumption 27.37 24.63 14.85 22.73 -2.74 -3.98
5th quintile, Food consumption 8.86 11.21 24.07 13.86 2.35 5.38
1st quintile, Total consumption 34.32 24.58 13.61 23.22 -9.74 -13.43
5th quintile, Total consumption 5.99 9.41 25.40 12.64 3.42 9.22
Food consumption 1,351 1,459 1,903 1,547 108 9.88
Total consumption 1,920 2,270 3,761 2,568 350 12.84
2010
Indicators (%)
(1)
Chronic 
Poor (CP)
(2)
Non-CP 
in same 
activity
All 
other Total
(2) - (1)
Diff. t-value
Net enrolment ratio (ages 6-11) 87.51 81.95 90.48 84.77 -5.57 -1.95
Net enrolment ratio (ages 12-14) 8.93 27.19 35.53 27.43 18.26 4.67
Net enrolment ratio (ages 15-17) 2.74 11.72 23.20 13.94 8.98 3.69
Ever attended school (ages 5+) 68.30 78.05 85.94 79.14 9.75 6.06
Adult literacy (ages 15+) 56.50 71.43 81.31 72.65 14.93 7.37
Prevalence of illness or injury 23.36 18.60 21.46 19.91 -4.76 -3.47
Seek care during the survey period 19.97 16.21 18.96 17.38 -3.76 -2.92
Seek care when ill or injured 85.51 87.18 88.36 87.30 1.68 0.65
1st quintile, Food consumption 32.83 23.51 21.19 23.94 -9.31 -6.17
5th quintile, Food consumption 5.54 9.12 16.64 10.75 3.58 4.63
1st quintile, Total consumption 38.46 23.20 19.44 23.91 -15.26 -9.77
5th quintile, Total consumption 3.16 8.78 18.81 10.86 5.62 9.04
Food consumption (constant 2004) 1,937 2,132 2,398 2,182 195 7.39
Total consumption (constant 2004) 2,978 3,780 4,570 3,904 802 13.15
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
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(4)  Characteristics of Chronic Poverty, Regional Distribution and Key 
Factors
The previous sections have shown some key characteristics of the 
chronic poor – they have limited assets and relatively lower human 
development. Table 6 shows additional demographic characteristics. 
Chronically poor households are more likely to be headed by females 
with 31.96 percent, compared to 17.72 percent for the non-chronic poor in 
the same economic activities. The proportion of either elderly- or ethnic-
minority-headed households is not statistically significant. Notably, 
households in chronic poverty tend to have higher dependency, in 
particular child dependency, mainly due to fewer working aged 
members, and household size is significantly smaller compared to other 
groups. The chronic poor also tend to be younger. The average age of 
household heads and members is about two years younger than the 
national average.
These results support some of the key findings of the previous studies. 
As Howe and McKay (2007) in Rwanda and Tong (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) in 
Cambodia found, chronically poor households are likely female-headed 
and smaller in rural Cambodia. As Tong also found, the chronic poor 
are liable to have fewer adults, younger members and less educated 
household heads. From a different approach, this paper confirms that 
chronically poor households seem to have structural challenges to 
accumulate human capital and make a living with fewer economically 
active members and high child dependency.
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Table 6. Demographic Characteristics of Chronic Poor in 2010
Indicators
(1) 
Chronic 
Poor (CP)
(2)
Non-CP 
in same 
activity
All 
other Total
(2) - (1)
Diff. t-value
HH head: female (%) 32.01 17.53 24.79 21.35 -14.48 -4.82
HH head: elderly 65+ (%) 10.27 11.13 11.29 11.06 0.86 0.43
HH head: ethnic minority (%) 4.19 4.95 2.65 4.24 0.76 0.59
HH head: age 43.66 45.81 46.67 45.76 2.15 2.28
HH member: age 24.55 26.82 26.98 26.60 2.26 3.60
HH head: school attainment (year) 3.03 3.99 5.29 4.22 0.96 4.79
Average HH size 3.98 4.65 4.62 4.55 0.67 5.65
Average number of working age 2.27 2.92 2.99 2.85 0.64 8.15
Average number of children 0-14 1.54 1.51 1.41 1.49 -0.03 -0.31
Average number of elderly 65+ 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.05 1.86
Dependency ratio (%) 85.13 73.45 67.18 73.30 -11.68 -2.24
Child dependency ratio 0-14 (%) 75.91 62.21 59.02 63.12 -13.70 -2.83
Aged dependency ratio 65+ (%) 9.22 11.24 8.16 10.17 2.02 1.02
Source: Own calculations based on CSES
Looking at regional distribution, the criteria seem to capture the chronic 
poor better in some regions than in others. Most notably, the criteria 
possibly underestimate chronic poverty in the North and Northeast 
Mountain region. The consumption poverty headcount ratio was 45.63 
percent in the region in 2010, compared to 16.66 percent to 18.02 percent 
in the other regions. This regional disparity does not appear on the 
estimated distribution of chronic poverty, which is almost at the same 
level across the four regions. This estimation gap between the two 
measurements was also observed in 2004. One possible reason for the 
underestimation is diversity within the region. As discussed later, 
estimation in the region is relatively more sensitive to housing and land 
ownership criteria than the other regions. It possibly reflects the 
diversity of ethnicity, livelihood and concept of value, which 
standardised criteria cannot capture. To overcome this potential 
underestimation, more information both from quantitative and 
qualitative sides is necessary.
Regarding key factors, ownership of high value farming implements is 
the most influential variable among the four criteria (Appendix 5). With 
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the highest contribution rate, lack of a high value farming implement 
explains chronic poverty most, followed by non-ownership of land, lack 
of draft animals and type of housing materials. In other words, owning 
high value farming implements has the largest impact on decreasing 
chronic poverty among the four variables; and worsening housing 
materials to thatch, and loss of draft animals to zero potentially increase 
chronic poverty most. Moreover, in the North and Northeast Mountain 
region, the ranking is clearly different from the others: farming 
implements, housing, land and draft animals in order. This implies again 
that particular attention needs to be paid to the unique and diverse 
characteristics of the Mountainous region in identifying chronic poverty.
(5) Chronic Poverty and Consumption Poverty
In practice, poverty targeting commonly focuses on consumption 
poverty; it is useful to know whether consumption poverty can provide 
a good proxy for chronic poverty. Comparison between consumption 
poverty and chronic poverty shows that measurement based on the 
national poverty line cannot capture a large proportion of the chronic 
poor identified in this study (Table 7). The total poverty line identifies 
only 36.32 percent of the chronically poor. Nevertheless, in terms of 
human development, the rest of the chronic poor (chronic poor but not 
consumption poor) are also greatly deprived. Their education indicators 
are as low as the consumption poor in lower and upper secondary 
enrolment, school attendance and adult literacy, except for the primary 
enrolment ratio. Health indicators show that the chronically poor 
become ill slightly more frequently than the consumption poor but 
access health care services almost equally. One interesting question for 
further studies at this point is how much the chronic poor spend on 
health services. They might be trapped in a vicious cycle of long-term 
poverty because of high prevalence of illness and health expenditure. 
In addition, some counterintuitive differences in demographic 
characteristics are worth noting. Unlike in other low-income countries, 
female-headed households are not a particular phenomena among the 
consumption poor in Cambodia but more evident amongst the chronic 
poor. The chronic poor tend to have smaller families while the 
consumption poor have larger ones, although both groups face higher 
dependency in common compared to the average.
Inconsistencies between the two measurements likely become greater 
when the population below the poverty line is smaller. In fact, the 
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consumption poor overlapped 79.44 percent of the chronic poor in 2004, 
compared to only 36.32 percent in 2010. It works even better to look at 
consumption poverty in relative terms – by adjusting consumption 
quintiles, chronic poverty can be identified more successfully. Looking 
cumulatively from the bottom, there are 38.46 percent in the lowest 
quintile, 65.41 percent in the second and 87.41 percent in the third 
bottom quintile in 2010. The result was almost identical in 2004, with 
80.35 percent in the third bottom quintile. The national poverty line fails 
to identify the majority of the chronic poor but most of them are 
identified in the third cumulative consumption quintile.
The challenge of consumption poverty measurement is that it 
potentially underestimates the chronic poverty identified in this study, 
and that the applied criteria here overestimate it by including better-off 
people in consumption term. There is no doubt that consumption 
poverty measurement is useful for chronic poverty identification 
because households with the most vulnerable demographic 
characteristics appear in a group identified both in consumption 
poverty and chronic poverty. This study therefore suggests that 
consumption based targeting programmes should apply the criteria to 
identify chronic poverty in a mutually complementary manner. For 
example, this method can be used to identify potentially chronically 
poor households above the consumption poverty line, and to divide the 
consumption poor into the persistent poor and the others.
(6) Sensitivity Analysis
There are three types of sensitivity analysis to be considered, including 
sensitivity to selection of different criteria, level of identified criteria, 
and combination of identified criteria. Testing sensitivity to criteria 
selection is irrelevant here because chronic poverty is defined by 
satisfying all the criteria that the PPA specifies, so there are no unused 
criteria left. The other two sensitivity analyses are tested below.
Firstly, sensitivity to level of identified criteria can be tested through the 
comparison of the chronic poverty headcount ratio when changing the 
level of dimensions. There are 16 possible combinations generated by the 
abovementioned four variables, which have two alternative levels for 
each (Appendix 4). The alternative levels are associated with ambiguity 
that the PPA leaves as it defines the dimensions with ranges. The result 
shows that the hovering trend changes little at the national level no 
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matter which levels of dimensions are adopted: the chronic poverty 
headcount almost stagnates between 2004 and 2010. It also indicates that 
the estimation is most sensitive to the ownership of farming implements 
followed by housing materials. Applying a criterion of no farming 
implements, the estimation comes up closer to zero for any 
combinations. Although the PPA recognises that the chronic poor tend 
not to have any farming implements, the household survey result shows 
that there are very few farmers who meet this criterion. Adopting 
farming implement ownership as a criterion, future research or 
targeting policy would need to be careful about the level, which may 
have strong effects on project outcomes. Excluding the farming 
implement variable, which hides the effects of other criteria, looking by 
regions reveals interesting tendencies. In the Mekong Plain, the 
estimation is sensitive to housing criteria. The Coastal and the Tonle Sap 
are not sensitive to the level of any of these selection criteria. In the 
North and Northeast Mountain region, the estimation is sensitive to 
both housing materials and land size.
Secondly, sensitivity to combining method can be tested using the 
counting method to examine whether the combination of identified 
criteria affect the trend (Appendix 5). In this method, cutoffs are defined 
for each dimension, and one point is assigned for each person below the 
cutoff. The process is repeated for other variables. It is then aggregated 
to obtain the total value of deprivation points (A). Then, the headcount 
ratio (H), which is the share of people below a set cutoff (k), is calculated. 
The adjusted headcount ratio (M0) is then calculated by the formula H 
times A divided by the number of deprivation criteria. In general, choice 
of different methods has little effect on the trend over the period. At 
almost all cutoff levels from 1 to 4 in every region, particularly at the 
higher or stricter cutoffs, little improvement in headcount ratio is 
observed (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Adjusted Headcount Ratio with Different Cutoffs in Rural Cambodia
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
Furthermore, over the different combining methods, the relevance of 
the intersection selection may be justified for two reasons: the 
comparison with consumption poverty and conceptual framework. 
Firstly, only cutoff 4 shows a lower chronic poverty headcount ratio than 
consumption poverty. The headcount rates between cutoff 1 and 3 are 
even higher than the consumption poverty headcount both in 2004 and 
2010. The estimation at cutoff 4 is also close to the estimation of Tong 
(2012a), 6 to 10 percent. From this point, the intersection method is likely 
to be a more suitable option among four alternative cutoffs. Secondly, in 
relation to the SLA framework of a vicious poverty cycle, the 
intersection method may be more appropriate than applying other 
cutoff levels. The main question mark for applying the other cutoff 
levels is on the determination of selected criteria and assigned weight. In 
this study, I attempt to draw locally meaningful definitions and criteria 
as strictly as possible, so chosen dimensions must be drawn from the 
PPA and be able to delineate a vicious cycle of poverty with the chosen 
criteria. From this point, with the PPA information, there are no reasons 
to justify the application of other cutoffs and weightings. Hence, the 
intersection method may be the most relevant combining method with 
given information availability.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Despite the achievement of pro-poor consumption growth, this study 
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concludes that chronic poverty in rural Cambodia, based on criteria 
defined by the poor, barely improved between 2004 and 2010. The result 
implies that rapid economic growth has certainly raised the 
consumption of chronically poor households by 43 percent in food and 
55 percent in total, but done little to help them accumulate productive 
assets and human capital to break structural constraints of persistent 
poverty.
Regarding policy implications, one of the major findings is that 
consumption measurement based on the national poverty line cannot 
identify a majority of the chronic poor. In other words, targeting 
programmes or poverty analysis based on the poverty line would 
potentially ignore the chronic poor, which may result in them being left 
behind in the country’s development process. More concretely, when the 
government attempts to implement social assistance, social insurance 
and public works to reduce poverty and vulnerability under the 
umbrella of the National Social Protection Strategy (Cambodia. Royal 
Government of Cambodia.  2011), its targeting mechanisms largely rely 
on consumption measurement. The application of defined criteria in this 
study may help the programmes related to the strategy to identify the 
chronic poor. Furthermore, the findings show that the consumption 
poor and the chronic poor have a lot of similar characteristics but some 
differences, such as household size and the sex of the household head. 
As the social protection strategy is expected to play a key role in ending 
poverty in Cambodia, these features of chronic poverty should be 
understood in order to implement programmes more effectively.
References
Asian Development Bank. 2001. “Participatory Poverty Assessment in 
Cambodia.” Manila: ADB.
Ballard, Brett M., ed. 2007. “Participatory Poverty Assessment of the 
Tonle Sap Basin.” Phnom Penh.
Cambodia. Ministry of Planning. 2013. Poverty in Cambodia – A New 
Approach: Redefining the Poverty Line. Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia.
—. 2013. “Identification of Poor Households Programme (IDPoor).” 
Accessed December 20, 2013. http://www.mop.gov.kh/Projects/
IDPoor/tabid/154/Default.aspx 
112
Chapter 3
Cambodia. National Institute of Statistics. 2004. Cambodia Socio-Economic 
Survey 2004.
—. 2010. Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2010.
—. 2013. Consumer Price Index in Phnom Penh. Accessed December 20, 
2013 http://www.nis.gov.kh/
Cambodia. Royal Government of Cambodia. 2011. National Social 
Protection Strategy for the Poor and Vulnerable. Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia.
Carpenter, K. 2012. “A Basic Consumer Price Index for Cambodia 1993–
2009.” CDRI Working Paper Series No. 67. Phnom Penh: CDRI.
Department for International Development (DFID). 2004. “What is Pro-
Poor Growth and Why Do We Need to Know?” Pro-Poor Growth 
Briefing Note 1. London: DFID Policy Division.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay. 2001. “Growth Is Good for the Poor.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2587. Washington DC: World 
Bank.
Eastwood, R. and M. Lipton. 2000. “Pro-poor Growth and Pro-Growth 
Poverty Reduction: Meaning, Evidence, and Policy Implications.” 
Asian Development Review 18 (2): 22-58.
Ellis, F. 2000. Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2006. Livelihoods Approach. In The Elgar Companion to 
Development Studies, edited by D. A. Clarke, 345-349. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar.
Filmer, D. and L. H. Pritchett. 2001. “Estimating Wealth Effects Without 
Expenditure Data-or Tears: An Application to Educational 
Enrolments in States of India.” Demography 38 (1): 115-132.
Foster, J., J. Greer and E. Thorbecke. 1984. “A Class of Decomposable 
Poverty Measures.” Econometrica 52 (3): 761–766. 
Haddad, L. and A. Ahmed. 2003. “Chronic and Transitory Poverty: 
Evidence from Egypt 1997-1999.” World Development 31(1): 71–85.
Howe, G. and A. McKay. 2007. “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods in Assessing Chronic Poverty: The Case of Rwanda.” 
World Development 35 (2): 197-211.
Hulme, D. and A. Shepherd. 2003. “Conceptualizing Chronic Poverty.” 
World Development 31 (3): 403-423.
Hulme, D., K. Moore and A. Shepherd. 2001. “Chronic Poverty: 
Meanings and Analytical Frameworks.” CPRC Working Paper 2. 
Manchester: Institute of Development Policy and Management 
University of Manchester.
113
Chronic Poverty in Rural Cambodia: Quality of Growth for Whom?
Kraay, A. 2006. “When is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from a Panel of 
Countries.” Journal of Development Economics 80 (1): 198-227.
McKay, A. and D. Lawson. 2002. “Chronic Poverty: A Review of Current 
Quantitative Evidence.” CPRC Working Paper No 15. Manchester: 
Institute of Development Policy and Management University of 
Manchester.
Ravallion, M. 2004. “Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3242, Washington DC: World Bank.
Ravallion, M. and S. Chen. 2003. “Measuring Pro-Poor Growth.” 
Economics Letters 78 (1): 93–99.
Shaffer, P. 2013. “Q-Squared – Combining Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches in Poverty Analysis.” Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Shepherd, A., Lucy Scott, Chiara Mariotti, Flora Kessy, Raghav Gaiha, 
Lucia da Corta, Katharina Hanifnia, Nidhi Kaicker, Amanda 
Lenhardt, Charles Lwanga-Ntale, Binayak Sen, Bandita Sijapati, 
Tim Strawson, Ganesh Thapa, Helen Underhill and Leni Wild. 
2014. The Chronic Poverty Report 2014-2015: The Road to Zero Extreme 
Poverty. London: Chronic Poverty Advisory Network, Overseas 
Development Institute.
Tong, K. 2012a. “Analysing Chronic Poverty in Rural Cambodia: 
Evidence from Panel Data.” Working Paper Series 66. Phnom Penh: 
Cambodia Development Research Institute.
—. 2012b. “Transient and Chronic Poverty in Nine Villages of 
Cambodia: Panel Data Evidence – Consumption Approach.” In 
Understanding Poverty Dynamics: Evidence from Nine Villages in 
Cambodia. Working Paper Series No. 69, 43-49. Phnom Penh: 
Cambodia Development Research Institute.
—. 2012c. “Transient and Chronic Poverty in Nine Villages of 
Cambodia: Panel Data Evidence – Asset Approach.” In 
Understanding Poverty Dynamics: Evidence from Nine Villages in 
Cambodia. Working Paper Series No. 69, 51-59. Phnom Penh: 
Cambodia Development Research Institute.
Wadugodapitiya, D. and B. Baulch, 2011. The Value of Panel Data in 
Chronic Poverty Analysis. CPRC Policy Brief 23. Manchester: 
Institute of Development Policy and Management University of 
Manchester. 
White, H. 2002. “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
in Poverty Analysis.” World Development 30 (3): 511-522.
114
Chapter 3
White, H. and E. Anderson. 2001. “Growth Versus Distribution: Does the 
Pattern of Growth Matter?” Development Policy Review 19 (3): 267-289.
World Bank. 2013. Where Have All the Poor Gone? Cambodia Poverty 
Assessment 2013. 
—. 2013. World Development Indicators. Accessed December 2, 
2013. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators 
Appendix 1. Macroeconomic and human development indicators
Macroeconomic Indicators 2004-2010
Agriculture, ave. annual growth (%) 6.81
Manufacturing, ave. annual growth (%) 7.96
Industry, ave. annual growth (%) 7.52
Services, ave. annual growth (%) 7.93
GDP, ave. annual growth (%) 7.74
GDP per capita, ave. annual growth (%) 6.17
Inflation, ave. annual change (%) 7.80
Human Development Indicators 2004 2010
Net enrollment ratio (ages 6-11) (%)* 75.98 85.60
Net enrollment ratio (ages 12-14) (%)* 16.37 30.80
Net enrollment ratio (ages 15-17) (%)* 8.53 17.50
Ever attended school (ages 5+) (%)* 75.92 81.70
Adult literacy (ages 15+) (%)* 69.78 76.28
Mortality rate, neonatal (per 1,000 live births) 27.2 19.7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 56.6 37.3
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) 70.3 43.8
Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI (World Bank 2013b) and CSES
Note: Education indicators (*) are calculated based on CSES.
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Appendix 2: Consumption growth between 2004 and 2010
Indicators Other Urban Rural Phnom Penh
Growth rate in mean (%) 1.05 7.23 6.31
Growth rate at median (%) 11.05 9.81 7.86
Mean percentile growth rate (%) 9.52 9.27 7.37
Consumption growth of the poor (%) 11.66 10.34 9.11
Corresponding poverty rate (%) 53.50 66.61 39.09
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
Note: The calculation is based on the method of Ravallion and Chen (2003). The growth rate is calculated 
in real terms. Aggregate consumption has been adjusted by Phnom Penh consumer price index. Growth 
incidence curves elaborate how much the actual consumption by the poor grew over time (Appendix 
3).
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Appendix 3. Growth incidence curve in Cambodia
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
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Appendix 4. Sensitivity to level of selected criteria
Possible combination
Region
(Rural Only)
CP Headcount Regional Share
Land Draft Animal
Farm
Tool House 2004 2010 2004 2010
1 ha One Low OR
Cambodia 11.53 11.34 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 11.04 12.24 54.80 56.19
Tonle Sap 13.63 10.25 30.45 24.53
Coastal 7.39 9.56 4.13 5.63
N. & NE. Mountain 11.64 10.98 10.62 13.64
1 ha One Low AND
Cambodia 5.66 4.38 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 5.15 4.36 52.09 51.85
Tonle Sap 6.74 4.53 30.65 28.07
Coastal 2.71 6.05 3.09 9.23
N. & NE. Mountain 7.63 3.37 14.18 10.85
1 ha One None OR
Cambodia 1.31 0.15 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 1.39 0.12 60.45 43.00
Tonle Sap 1.19 0.32 23.28 57.00
Coastal 1.04 0 5.12 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 1.39 0 11.16 0.00
1 ha One None AND
Cambodia 0.76 0.08 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 0.76 0.02 56.99 14.09
Tonle Sap 0.75 0.24 25.40 85.91
Coastal 0.41 0 3.49 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 1.02 0 14.12 0.00
1 ha None Low OR
Cambodia 9.32 8.95 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 8.57 9.29 52.65 54.06
Tonle Sap 11.7 8.74 32.34 26.49
Coastal 5.37 7.65 3.72 5.71
N. & NE. Mountain 10 8.73 11.30 13.74
1 ha None Low AND
Cambodia 4.67 3.61 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 4.1 3.55 50.27 51.24
Tonle Sap 5.83 4.01 32.11 30.17
Coastal 1.88 4.5 2.59 8.34
N. & NE. Mountain 6.67 2.62 15.03 10.24
1 ha None None OR
Cambodia 1.13 0.15 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 1.2 0.12 60.69 43.00
Tonle Sap 1.02 0.32 23.16 57.00
Coastal 0.75 0 4.28 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 1.28 0 11.88 0.00
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1 ha None None AND
Cambodia 0.66 0.08 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 0.68 0.02 58.86 14.09
Tonle Sap 0.63 0.24 24.39 85.91
Coastal 0.24 0 2.33 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 0.91 0 14.42 0.00
0.8 ha One Low OR
Cambodia 9.53 10.39 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 9.81 11.23 58.93 56.29
Tonle Sap 10.51 9.43 28.40 24.64
Coastal 6.17 8.65 4.18 5.56
N. & NE. Mountain 7.69 9.96 8.49 13.51
0.8 ha One Low AND
Cambodia 4.61 4.01 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 4.56 4.1 56.63 53.26
Tonle Sap 5.17 4.11 28.93 27.80
Coastal 2.06 5.14 2.88 8.56
N. & NE. Mountain 5.06 2.95 11.55 10.38
0.8 ha One None OR
Cambodia 1.11 0.15 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 1.24 0.12 63.89 43.00
Tonle Sap 0.81 0.32 18.74 57.00
Coastal 1.04 0 6.05 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 1.2 0 11.32 0.00
0.8 ha One None AND
Cambodia 0.61 0.08 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 0.64 0.02 60.10 14.09
Tonle Sap 0.47 0.24 19.96 85.91
Coastal 0.41 0 4.34 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 0.91 0 15.61 0.00
0.8 ha None Low OR
Cambodia 7.75 8.4 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 7.74 8.66 57.14 53.69
Tonle Sap 8.98 8.13 29.83 26.28
Coastal 4.82 7.65 4.02 6.08
N. & NE. Mountain 6.64 8.31 9.01 13.95
0.8 ha None Low AND
Cambodia 3.84 3.39 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 3.72 3.35 55.42 51.48
Tonle Sap 4.45 3.8 29.84 30.46
Coastal 1.59 4.5 2.67 8.89
N. & NE. Mountain 4.4 2.2 12.07 9.17
0.8 ha None None OR
Cambodia 1 0.15 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 1.1 0.12 63.36 43.00
Tonle Sap 0.74 0.32 19.14 57.00
Coastal 0.75 0 4.87 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 1.2 0 12.63 0.00
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0.8 ha None None AND
Cambodia 0.57 0.08 100.00 100.00
Mekong Plain 0.6 0.02 60.30 14.09
Tonle Sap 0.45 0.24 20.30 85.91
Coastal 0.24 0 2.70 0.00
N. & NE. Mountain 0.91 0 16.70 0.00
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
Note: The land ownership criterion varies between 0.8 hectares and one hectare; the draft animal 
criterion is one or none; the farming implements criterion is low productive implements or none; and 
the housing material criterion is walls or roof, or walls and roof.
Appendix 5: Sensitivity to selection method
2004
Headcount
(H)
Adjusted 
Headcount
(M0)
Deprivation
(A)
Contribution (%)
cutoff 
(k) Land
Draft
Animal Housing
Farm
Tool
Cambodia (Rural Only)
1 72.85 43.57 2.39 26.10 18.72 18.63 36.55
2 56.62 39.51 2.79 27.14 19.73 19.71 33.42
3 33.26 27.83 3.35 27.09 23.46 20.29 29.16
4 11.53 11.53 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Mekong Plain
1 71.18 43.02 2.42 29.07 18.94 17.39 34.59
2 56.79 39.42 2.78 29.36 19.80 17.94 32.90
3 33.08 27.57 3.33 28.09 23.77 19.06 29.09
4 11.04 11.04 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Tonle Sap
1 71.73 43.14 2.41 21.57 20.85 20.03 37.55
2 53.15 38.50 2.90 23.53 21.84 21.69 32.95
3 34.06 28.95 3.40 25.37 24.32 21.43 28.88
4 13.63 13.63 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Coastal
1 80.07 44.43 2.22 28.37 17.68 11.36 42.59
2 58.95 39.15 2.66 30.99 19.80 12.89 36.31
3 31.30 25.32 3.24 27.18 25.36 16.87 30.60
4 7.39 7.39 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
North and Northeast Mountain
1 80.20 47.04 2.35 20.16 13.47 25.84 40.53
2 62.80 42.68 2.72 21.76 14.66 28.13 35.46
3 33.50 28.04 3.35 26.03 18.61 25.90 29.47
4 11.64 11.64 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
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2010
Headcount
(H)
Adjusted 
Headcount
(M0)
Deprivation
(A)
Contribution (%)
cutoff 
(k) Land
Draft
Animal Housing
Farm
Tool
Cambodia (Rural Only)
1 66.68 40.53 2.43 25.77 20.89 19.43 33.91
2 52.06 36.87 2.83 26.38 21.43 20.38 31.81
3 32.02 26.85 3.35 26.72 22.71 21.88 28.70
4 11.34 11.34 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Mekong Plain
1 65.22 40.05 2.46 28.40 19.72 19.80 33.11
2 50.69 36.42 2.87 28.87 20.80 20.55 31.22
3 32.05 27.10 3.38 28.43 22.00 21.82 28.57
4 12.24 12.24 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Tonle Sap
1 66.20 39.02 2.36 22.89 24.27 16.94 32.89
2 50.22 35.03 2.79 24.59 23.93 18.52 31.45
3 29.43 24.63 3.35 26.38 23.85 21.33 28.27
4 10.25 10.25 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Coastal
1 70.24 42.10 2.40 27.53 19.40 13.76 37.93
2 56.86 38.76 2.73 27.53 19.80 14.59 34.32
3 31.75 26.20 3.30 25.00 24.12 19.83 29.47
4 9.56 9.56 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
North and Northeast Mountain
1 71.32 44.43 2.49 21.21 19.50 25.26 36.56
2 58.37 41.20 2.82 20.84 20.09 25.63 33.10
3 37.07 30.55 3.30 22.47 22.63 23.72 29.45
4 10.98 10.98 4.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Source: Author’s calculation based on CSES
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Does The Quality of Income Growth 
Affect Child Nutrition Status?
Lawrence Haddad, Edoardo Masset and Lisa Smith*
1� Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explore the relationship between the quality 
of income growth and child nutrition status. Understanding more about 
the relationship between income growth and nutrition status is 
important for a number of reasons. There are currently 162 million 
stunted children under 5 (Black et al. 2013). These children have 
standardized heath-for-age scores (HAZ) that fall below a threshold (i.e. 
they are stunted) for which there are serious consequences for them and 
their societies. In addition to the moral case for protecting and 
respecting children’s rights to food, care and a safe health environment, 
there are severe functional consequences of stunting. Black et al. (2013) 
estimate that 45 percent of child deaths under the age of 5 are due to 
child undernutrition. The economic consequences are also severe. 
Children who are stunted are more likely to learn less in school and to 
live in poverty as adults (Adair et al. 2013; Hoddinott et al. 2013). 
Knowing the features of income growth that make it more likely to 
improve child nutrition status helps to invest strategically in nutrition 
programmes to reduce undernutrition. The smaller the magnitude of 
the income effect, the more strategic and proactive the scale-up of direct 
(nutrition specific, such as breastfeeding promotion, Bhutta et al. 2013) 
and indirect (such as social protection, Ruel and Alderman 2013) 
nutrition interventions needs to be for a given nutrition reduction target. 
Estimating the relationship between income growth and nutrition 
status has a long history (Behrman, Deolalikar and Wolfe 1988, Strauss 
and Thomas 1998, Haddad et al. 2003, Headey 2012, Smith and Haddad 
2014). However, there is no literature assessing the quality of income 
* We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Any remaining errors are ours.  
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growth on nutrition outcomes (Gillespie et. al. 2013). This paper aims to 
make an early contribution. The main challenge the paper faces is how 
to define the quality of growth in an empirically practical way. To 
generate sufficient variation in the quality of growth, however defined, 
we opt for a cross-country descriptive approach. 
We explore the quality of growth in three ways. The first two ways 
assess the relationship between economic growth and nutrition under 
different contexts. First, we survey the literature for comparable 
country-level estimates of the relationship between income growth and 
nutrition outcomes. We then describe the magnitude of the estimates by 
the level of income inequality in each country at the time. The 
relationship between income growth and poverty reduction is 
moderated by income inequality – the higher the inequality the lower 
the poverty reduction for a given rate of economic growth (see Ferreira 
and Ravallion 2008 for a review) – and this provides a useful clue for our 
paper. Second, we build on Smith and Haddad (2014) and employ cross-
country econometrics to estimate the relationship between national 
income growth and stunting rates under different governance regimes. 
The third way of exploring the quality of growth uses measures of 
economic growth that fully embody some dimensions of quality. 
Unfortunately these data do not yet exist for many countries and so we 
are only able to undertake some preliminary descriptive analysis. 
The paper is organized into the following sections. First, the paper 
presents the results of a systematic search of the literature estimating 
the relationship between income growth and z-score of height for age 
(HAZ) of children under 5. We identify several estimates and explore 
the association with income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Second, we explore the role of governance in shaping the 
relationship between income and nutrition status using cross country 
regressions. Is the effect of income on nutrition larger (and therefore of 
higher quality) or smaller in different governance regimes? Third, for a 
small set of countries for which data are available, we compare the 
relationship between nutrition status and GDP per capita with the 
relationship between nutrition and the Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI). 
The IWI emerged from the post 2008 interest in measuring what matters, 
and represents an attempt to measure the quality of growth in terms of 
human development, equity and sustainable resource use (Smit and 
Steendjik 2014). The final section concludes with a discussion of the 
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results and suggestions for further research in this area.
2� Income and nutrition elasticity estimates: 
    do they vary by income inequality?
This section summarizes the findings of selected papers on the 
estimated magnitude of the relationship between height for age z-scores 
and traditional measures of income from household surveys. We 
searched the literature on income and nutrition, adopting the Rapid 
Evidence Assessment (REA) method1. This method applies simple 
exclusion criteria and circumscribes the limits of the reviewed literature 
in such a way that the process is conducted much more quickly than in a 
standard systematic review. The selection of the reviewed papers went 
through three stages.
In stage one, we searched the published literature on income and 
nutrition using the Citation Indexes at the Web of Science database (ISI) 
through Endnote software. This limited the search to papers that were 
published in peer-reviewed journals. We searched for all publications in 
English from 2000 to beginning of July 2012 using the following search 
strings: income OR expenditure AND nutrition OR undernutrition. This 
search delivered 1,836 papers. We then read all paper titles and removed 
all papers that were not from low and middle income countries by the 
World Bank classification, and that were not looking at the relationship 
between income and nutrition in an obvious way. This process reduced 
the number of publications to 307. 
In stage two, we read all 307 abstracts and removed all publications that 
did not estimate the relationship between income (measured by either 
household income or expenditure) and nutrition (measured by height 
for age Z-scores). At this point we increased the number of selected 
studies in two ways: (1) by back-referencing we included studies 
referenced by the latest publications that escaped our search, and (2) by 
consulting experts. In stage 3 we downloaded all studies and removed 
those whose methodology did not address fundamental issues for the 
correct “identification” of income elasticities (i.e. they did not allow for 
unbiased independent effects of the association between income and 
nutrition status). This left us with the 6 papers in the Appendix Table, 
1. UK Civil Service 2012. http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr/resources-and-
guidance 
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yielding 14 elasticity estimates which are presented in Table 1. 
The explanatory variable employed by the 6 studies reviewed is almost 
invariably the log of per capita expenditure. This specification allows for 
the calculation of a semilogarithmic elasticity that varies with the value of 
the dependent variable (various indicators of undernutrition). The outcome 
nutrition indicator used varied greatly by study. We chose standardized 
height-for-age Z-scores (HAZ) among under-5s (6 papers, 14 estimates) as 
the preferred indicator. We choose HAZ because we have the most 
estimates for this indicator and it has become the preferred nutrition status 
indicator, largely because it more accurately predicts long short and long 
term consequences of undernutrition (Adair et. al. 2013). 
From Table 1 the miroeconometric HAZ-pc income (or expenditure) 
elasticities range from 0 (not significantly different from zero) to 0.17. A 
doubling of income will, at most, raise height for age z-scores by 17%. 
For more detail on the studies and the calculations of the elasticities, see 
the Annex Table. 
 
Table 1� Summary of elasticities from the microeconometric and 
　　　   cross-country studies, by nutrition outcome indicator
Nutrition 
indicator Microeconometric studies
Z-score Height 
for age (HAZ level)
0 (n.s.) (China 1991-1993/Osberg et. al. 2009)
0 (n.s.) (China 1997-2000/Osberg et. al. 2009)
0 (n.s.) (China 1997/Chen et. al. 2007) 
0.063 (Ethiopia 1995-98/Christiansen et. al. 2004)
0.063 (Tanzania 1991-94/Alderman et. al. 2006)
0.07 (Vietnam 1993/O’Donnell et. al. 2009)
0.07 (China 1993/Chen et. al. 2007)
0.098 (Vietnam 1998/O’Donnell et. al. 2009)
0.12 (China 1989/Chen et. al. 2007) 
0.13 (China 2000/Chen et. al. 2007)
0.13 (Vietnam 1993/Wagstaff et. al. 2003)
0.14 (China 1993-97/Osberg et. al. 2009)
0.15 (China 1991/Chen et. al. 2007)
0.17 (Vietnam 1998/Wagstaff et. al. 2003)
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Figure 1 plots the elasticities by Gini coefficient in the survey year and we 
can see a downward slope: as inequality increases elasticities decline. Note 
that the R-squared is low at approximately 0.095 and that we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the estimated slope coefficient is zero. 
Figure 1� Elasticities (absolute values, vertical axis) for HAZ levels and PC  
                     expenditure by Gini coefficient in survey year (horizontal axis) 
Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=2
3� Does governance affect the nutrition-income relationship? 
Having too few elasticity estimates to explore conclusively the 
relationship between elasticities and the Gini coefficients, we turn to 
more plentiful sources of data, national level GDP per capita and 
stunting rates. The twist in our analysis is that we intend to explore the 
cross-country relationships between these two variables in different 
governance contexts.
In the past decade, governance more broadly has risen up the agenda in 
terms of both health (Halleröd et. al. 2013; Farag et. al. 2013) and 
nutrition (Nishida 2009; Pelletier et. al. 2012; Mejia-Acosta and Fanzo 
2012; Haddad 2012; Gillespie et. al. 2013). This reflects an increased 
recognition that the ability of governments to be responsive and 
responsible has a profound influence on a number of factors that 
determine nutrition status. Smith and Haddad 2014 found that nearly all 
the governance variables were associated with reductions in stunting, 
even when GDP per capita was included in the regressions. 
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To measure the quality of governance for the countries in our sample we 
employ International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators published by 
the Political Risk Services Group (PRS 2013). The indicators are indexes 
corresponding to five dimensions of governance: (1) bureaucratic quality; 
(2) law and order; (3) political stability; (4) restraint of corruption; and (5) 
democratic accountability.2 The data are available from 1982 onwards and, 
to render them comparable across countries and over time, are compiled 
based on PRS experts’ subjective analyses of political information 
organized on the basis of pre-specified “risk components”. 
How might these five dimensions be relevant to facilitate or impede 
efforts to accelerate reductions in child undernutrition? 3  Smith and 
Haddad (2014) briefly surveyed the literature and concluded the 
following:
 
・ Bureaucratic quality concerns the quality of public services and the 
civil service, including policy formulation and implementation, and 
regulation of the private sector. It is important for effectively 
providing public services and programs that support child 
nutrition status such as safe water, sanitation, education and public 
food safety net programs. Effective functioning of countries’ 
bureaucracies is particularly important to child undernutrition 
because addressing it requires a multisectoral effort and vertical 
integration of different levels of government. It thus puts strong 
demands on public agencies. Similarly, a strong regulatory 
environment is necessary as the private sector produces a number 
of products that if marketed irresponsibly can harm the nutrient 
consumption of children under two years of age—effective 
regulation and enforcement of that regulation is vital for the 
nutrition status of the most vulnerable.
・ A strong system of law and order is founded on a solid and impartial 
legal system in conjunction with popular observance of the law. 
・ Political stability rests on a government’s ability to carry out its 
declared programs when in office and to gain office and stay in 
office through constitutional and non-violent means. Both are 
2. The actual names of the ICRG indicators are: bureaucracy quality, law and order, 
government stability, corruption, and democratic accountability. 
3.  The definitions and descriptions of each dimension given here are from PRS (2013). 
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essential for providing reliable public services, creating an 
environment conducive to the economic stability of households, 
and the functioning of markets for essential nutrition inputs such as 
food. Much like natural disasters, violence due to conflict is 
estimated to have large and permanent effects on nutrition status. 
Both law and order and political stability allow governments to 
fulfill their role of protecting citizens from such violence. 
・ Restraint of corruption, that is, restraint of the exercise of public 
power for private gain, is important as many nutrition interventions 
involve the transfer of valuable commodities, such as food and 
drugs, at subsidized rates, which creates multiple opportunities for 
leakage.
・ Finally, democratic accountability, including respecting and protecting 
the rights and civil liberties of all citizens, represents how 
responsive a government is to its people. The irreversibility of early 
childhood undernutrition means that public responsiveness in 
supporting families to meet the needs of young children is vital. 
Democratic accountability and its herald, transparency, are 
particularly important for nutrition as most forms of undernutrition 
are invisible, both because the clinical signs are not obvious unless 
at their most extreme and because of infrequent collection of 
nutrition data. Hence public awareness of the magnitude and 
consequences of the problem is low, and voice is essential to 
stimulate timely action. In addition, nutrition resource flows, being 
fragmented across multiple authorities, are also notoriously 
nontransparent, undermining accountability mechanisms.
To test whether the relationship between income and stunting rates 
differs by governance indicator level, we estimate panel regression 
coefficients (using instrumental variables when necessary) for variants 
of the form:
Stunting = f (lnGDP per capita, governance indicator, 
                       lnGDP per capita*governance indicator, demographic variables)
While Smith and Haddad (2014) found that governance and income have 
separate effects on stunting, interactions were not explored. The five 
governance indicators are too correlated with each other to simultaneously 
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include all of them and their interactions within the regression framework. 
So first we include an aggregated governance indicator (of the five 
components) and its interaction with income. Then we include each of the 
five-component governance indicators and their interactions, one by one. 
 
We find that none of the interaction terms are significantly different 
from zero (regressions not reported). In other words, the governance 
variables we include do not seem to modify the relationship between 
stunting and income. This may be because the relationship does not 
exist, or the variables are too crude, or the model is incorrectly specified. 
To address the last possibility we conduct a range of specification tests, 
we use spline methods to detect any nonlinearities and we run the 
regressions for separate sets of observations described by different 
combinations of governance variables. Our specification tests do not 
signal misspecification and our spline and subset analyses yielded no 
significant estimates on the interaction terms. These results suggest no 
governance modification to the stunting-income relationship. Whether 
this signals an absence of a relationship or insufficiently refined 
indicators remains to be determined by future studies.  
4� Comparing stunting with GDP per capita and 
　the Inclusive Wealth Index
The Inclusive Wealth Index has been developed by UNEP and the UNU 
and comprises human capital, produced capital, natural capital and 
health capital. Prices are assumed to be constant so changes in wealth 
reflect real changes not short term price bubbles (UNU-IHDP and UNEP 
2012, Smits and Steendjik 2014). This stock of wealth is then adjusted by 
taking into account (a) carbon damages (estimated emissions multiplied 
by social costs), (b) oil capital gains (i.e. gains stemming from oil price 
increases into account and (c) total factor productivity—the gains in 
output that cannot be accounted for by increases in inputs. Comparisons 
of the growth of IWI per capita over the past 2 decades with GDP per 
capita growth show that IWI per capita does not grow as fast as GDP per 
capita and that the correlation between the two is low (UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP 2012). 
The IWI has only been calculated for 20 or so countries. Of these, only a 
few have significant undernutrition issues. Table 3 identifies these 
countries, and for the last two years in which they have had nutrition 
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surveys it matches stunting data with GDP per capita and IWI per 
capita. It is clear that the percentage change in IWI per capita is smaller 
than the percentage change in GDP per capita. It is also clear that in 
Nigeria, Colombia and Venezuela, all mineral extracting countries, IWI 
per capita actually declines despite increases in per capita GDP, 
indicating non sustainable growth.
 
Table 2� Stunting, GDP per capita and IWI per capita for countries 
                   with significant undernutrition
Country Year Stunting, 
(Countdown 
country 
profiles or 
WHO Global 
Database)
GDP/cap, 
PPP 
(World 
Bank, in 
000s)
Inclusive 
Wealth 
Index/cap 
(IWI 
report in 
0,000s)
% change 
in 
stunting
% change 
in GDP/
cap
% change 
in 
IWI/cap
Brazil 1996 14 5.11   3.449
Brazil 2006 7 5.79   3.806 -50.00 13.31 10.35
China 2000 18 0.95   1.203
China 2008 10 3.41   1.503 -44.44 258.95 24.94
Colombia 1995 20 2.53   2.707
Colombia 2005 16 3.39   2.6 -20.00 33.99 -3.95
India 1999 54 0.46   0.45
India 2005 48 0.74   0.483 -11.11 60.87 7.33
Kenya 1998 36 0.48   0.305
Kenya 2008 35 0.79   0.319 -2.78 64.58 4.59
Nigeria 2003 43 0.51   0.644
Nigeria 2008 41 1.38   0.592 -4.65 170.59 -8.07
South Africa 1999 30 3.1   3.64
South Africa 2008 24 5.6   3.743 -20.00 80.65 2.83
Venezuela 1996 19 3.03 10.99
Venezuela 2006 16 6.75 10.91 -15.79 122.77 -0.73
Table 2 calculates the arc elasticities for stunting with respect to GDP per 
capita and IWI per capita. The population weighted mean arc elasticities 
show that the stunting-IWI per capita elasticity is more negative than 
the stunting-GDP per capita elasticity. This suggests that when we 
measure economic growth more fully we are measuring something that 
is more strongly associated with undernutrition (specifically, stunting).   
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Table 3�  Arc elasticities, stunting, GDP per capita and IWI per capita
Country, time period arc elasticity, stunting/GDP 
pc
arc elasticity, stunting/IWI 
pc
Brazil 1996-2006 -3.76 -4.83
China 2000-2008 -0.17 -1.78
Colombia 1995-2005 -0.59 5.06
India 1999-2005 -0.18 -1.52
Kenya 1998-2008 -0.04 -0.61
Nigeria 2003-2008 -0.03 0.58
South Africa 1999-2008 -0.25 -7.07
Venezuela 1996-2006 -0.13 21.69
Arc elasticity, population 
weighted mean -0.38 -1.16
However, these arc elasticities are problematic for at least two reasons. 
First, while there is no nutrition component within IWI, there are health 
related components, so the stronger correlation might be driven by this. 
Second, the IWI per capita elasticities are higher because IWI per capita 
does not grow as fast as GDP per capita, but the effort of increasing GDP 
per capita and IWI per capita by the same percentage is not equivalent. 
So while intriguing, the IWI per capita arc elasticities need to be 
interpreted with extreme caution. Until we have IWI per capita for more 
countries, single country observations will continue to exert a large 
influence and we need to continue to rely on more convention measures 
to explore the relationship between growth and nutrition status.  
5� Conclusions
We have undertaken an exploratory analysis of the association between 
economic growth and its quality on nutrition outcomes. First, we 
conducted a systematic search for estimates of the elasticity between 
height for age of under 5s and income. We found several estimates and 
tried to identify pattern for their magnitude with reference to income 
inequality. Second, we explored the role of governance dimensions in 
shaping the relationship between income and nutrition status using cross 
country regressions to examine whether the effect of income on nutrition 
was larger or smaller under different governance regimes. Finally, for the 
same set of countries, we compared the patterns of changes in nutrition 
status and GDP per capita with those of nutrition status and the Inclusive 
Wealth Index per capita.
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Our conclusions are as follows: 
First, there are very few studies published in peer-reviewed journals, with 
good methodologies, estimating the relationship between nutrition status 
and income. This is a pity, because the lack of studies prevents some 
potentially interesting meta analyses, exploring an area that would be 
useful for policy making. Given only 14 elasticity estimates (from only 6 
studies and 4 countries) we were restricted to undertaking scatter plots 
with Gini coefficients. Elasticities do reduce in magnitude as inequality 
increases but the relationship is not statistically significant. 
Second, we find that different governance levels do not modify the 
relationship between GDP per capita and stunting rates. Income growth 
seems to be important in reducing stunting rates over a wide range of 
governance dimensions and levels.
Third, the arc elasticities between stunting and GDP per capita look very 
different when we substitute IWI per capita for the latter. The IWI estimates 
are much larger, but with so few country-level observations we are 
reluctant to draw any conclusion other than this is an avenue of analysis 
worth pursuing as more IWI per capita estimates become available. 
From these three different types of analysis, the relationship between the 
quality of income growth and child growth, at least in the ways we have 
defined quality, is weak. From the cross-country regressions, there is no 
indication that the relationship between economic growth and stunting is 
modified by governance. There may be some sets of observations where 
governance does modify the stunting-income relationship, but we have not 
been able to identify them in this paper. The other two avenues of analysis 
will become more revealing when the IWI is calculated for more countries 
and when more HAZ-income elasticities are generated. More research is 
needed along all three lines. 
One thing is clear from the wider literature, however, namely that 
economic growth as currently measured, on average, is not sufficient for 
rapid stunting reductions. Just as “zero poverty” targets will prove to be 
increasingly difficult to attain as poverty rates decline (Bluhm et. al. 2014, 
this volume), so too will “zero stunting” targets, because stunting has an 
even weaker relationship with GDP per capita than does $1.25 a day 
poverty rates (Ruel and Alderman 2013). Identifying which components of 
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growth are most important for stunting reduction, and the conditions 
under which they are most powerful, will be vital if the world is to meet 
and exceed the World Health Assembly target of reducing the number of 
stunted under 5s from 165 million today to 100 million in 2025. 
  
 
Annex Table� Microeconometric estimates of the relationship between HAZ 
                                and income
Study Country and 
year
Dependent 
and explana-
tory variable
Elasticity or other effect 
size
Other effects
HAZ levels
Alderman 
et al. (2006)
4 wave panel
Tanzania 
1991-92-93-94
Under 5 
height-for-
age Z-scores
Household 
per capita 
expenditure
The coefficient of log of per 
capita expenditure ranges 
from 0.1-0.2 depending on 
the specification. A dou-
bling of household income 
would produce increase in 
Z-score of 0.1-0.2 SD
Elasticity (OLS) =0.206/
mean HAZ (-1.64)=0.125
Elasticity of HAZ (pre-
ferred estimate)=0.103/
mean HAZ (-1.64)=0.063
In comparison 
the presence of a 
nutrition 
intervention in 
the communi-
ties increases 
the Z-scores by 
0.3 SD
Christain-
sen 
et al. (2004)
3 survey 
rounds
Ethiopia 
1996-97-98
Under 5 
Height-for-
age Z-scores 
Log of per 
adult equiva-
lent house-
hold expen-
diture
The coefficients of log of 
household income range 
from 0.16-0.19 depending 
on the survey round. 
Elasticity = 0.16/mean HAZ 
of 2.54 = 0.063
In comparison 
an additional 
year of educa-
tion of the most 
educated female 
household 
member in-
creases the 
Z-score by 0.03 
SD.
The community-
level ability to 
detect stunting 
increases the 
Z-score by .24 
SD
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O’Donnell 
et al. (2009)
2 cross 
sections
Vietnam 
1993-98
Under 5 
Height-for-
age Z-scores 
Log of per 
capita 
household 
expenditure
The coefficients of the log of 
per capita expenditure 
increase the HA Z-scores 
by 0.14 (1993) and 0.16 1998).
Elasticity1993=0.14/mean 
HAZ (-2.03) =-0.07
Elasticity1998=0.16/mean 
HAZ (-1.64)=-0.098
Decomposition 
analysis shows 
that 39% of the 
change in 
stunting occur-
ring between 
the two rounds 
was the result of 
an increase in 
household 
consumption. 
Changes in 
water and 
sanitation and 
household 
structure had a 
smaller impact.
Osberg et 
al. (2009)
Three wave 
panel
China 
1991-93-97
Under 5 
Height-for-
age Z-scores
Log of per 
adult equiv 
hh expendi-
ture
The coefficient of log of per 
capita expenditure ranges 
from 0.0 to 0.17 depending 
on the survey period.
Elasticity 1993-97=-0.17/
mean HAZ (-1.25) =0.135
Elasticities in 1991-93 and 
1997-2000 = 0 as a zero 
estimated coefficient 
cannot be rejected
Additional 
years of educa-
tion of mothers 
and fathers do 
not have a 
statistically 
significant 
impact
Chen et al. 
(2007)
5 survey 
rounds
China 1989 
19991-93-97 
2000
Height for 
age Z-score.
Log of 
household 
income
The coefficients of log of 
household income range 
from 0.09-0.19 depending 
on the survey round. 
Elasticity 1989 = 
0.157/1.315=0.12
Elasticity 1991 = 
0.192/1.315=0.15
Elasticity 1993 = 
0.085/1.218=0.07
Elasticity 1997 = 0
Elasticity 2000 = 
0.122/0.971=0.13
In comparison 
the coefficient of 
years of educa-
tion of the head 
of household is 
only 0.01-0.02.
Wagstaff 
(2003)
2 wave panel
Vietnam 
1993-98
Under 5 
Height-for-
age Z score
Log of per 
capita 
household 
expenditure
The coefficient of log of per 
capita expenditure is 0.26 
and 0.27 depending on the 
survey period.
Elasticity in 93= -0.26/mean 
HAZ (-2.036)=0.13
Elasticity in 98=0.27/mean 
HAZ(-1.608)=0.17
In comparison 
years of school-
ing of mothers 
and fathers & 
access to safe 
water do not 
have an impact. 
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Chapter 5 
Disability and Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
in a Developing Country 
 
Kamal Lamichhane and Damaru Ballabha Paudel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Growth as one of the central components for inclusive and sustainable 
development. However, developing countries are struggling to 
accomplish the goal of sustainable growth. Ensuring good quality 
growth covering all strata of the society is important for the reduction of 
poverty and the achievement of social inclusion. When marginalized 
people are not brought into mainstream development, it is unlikely that 
growth can be achieved and then made sustainable. For example, 
despite the significant progress on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the systematic exclusion of disability issues is likely to be one 
of the causes of the failure to achieve MDGs by 2015. This is a 
particularly important omission, as individuals with disabilities 
represent nearly 15 percent of the world’s population (WHO & WB 2011) 
and comprise not only one of the most marginalized but also one of the 
largest minority groups. As a result, people with disabilities are 
frequently left behind and remain the poorest among the poor. 
However, as we are heading for the post-2015 development goals, it is 
high time that we attempt to bring marginalized groups, including 
people with disabilities, into the mainstream of development in order to 
achieve quality growth, reduce poverty, and make development 
sustainable and inclusive. It has been said that if growth is distributed in 
an equitable manner, it helps reduce poverty. However, if the opposite is 
done, this simply increases inequality and may result in a need for 
redistribution (Besley and Burgess 2003). 
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authors would also like to thank Alberto Iniguez and Takayuki Watanabe for their research 
assistance. Additionally, we would also like to acknowledge support from the Research Institute of the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA-RI), the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of the 
University of Sussex, and the French Development Agency (AFD) for their helpful comments while 
presenting the preliminary draft in the joint workshop held by these three organizations in AFD Paris 
on February 2014. 
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Furthermore, recognizing poverty as a global threat, governments and 
international development agencies have been making efforts to reduce 
it. The MDGs have also focused on this as a priority issue by positioning 
“eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” as the primary goal. Despite 
governments and international development agencies investing their 
budgets in different sectors aimed at lifting people out of poverty, key 
questions still remain: why is progress so slow and how can we make 
growth more ‘pro-poor’? 
 
Most projects by international agencies have been aimed at the 
population nearest to the poverty line. It is likely that these agencies 
have an incentive to direct their focus toward this part of the 
population, as it is comparatively easier to show progress in poverty 
reduction if the transitory poor are able to rise out of poverty, even with 
a small push (Barder 2009). However, if the same trend continues, what 
will happen to the majority of the more marginalized population, 
including those with disabilities? In the absence of inclusive policies and 
strategies, the likelihood is that these people will remain below the 
poverty line and chronically poor. Therefore, if these groups are to be 
targeted, widening the efforts, increasing investment, and making such 
efforts more inclusive, is necessary. To do so, inclusive policies, institutions 
and growth are required. 
 
In this paper, based on findings on the growth elasticity of poverty 
between people with and without disabilities in Nepal, we  will 
explain why people with disabilities should be an important 
component in considering the quality of growth and inclusive 
development. In other words, this paper is a preliminary attempt at 
examining the impact of economic growth upon poverty between 
people with and without disabilities, using the nationally 
representative Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) conducted in 2010. 
 
Literature review 
Studies on disability and poverty are rare. Some have focused on the 
role of education through findings on high returns to education for 
persons with disabilities (Lamichhane and Sawada  2013),  while  others 
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have studied the employment gap and wage differential between 
individuals with and without disabilities (Mitra and Sambamoorthi 
2008), as well as the economic profile of persons with disabilities in the 
less-developed countries (Mitra et al. 2013). Lamichhane et al. (2014) 
studied the factors associated with poverty between people with and 
without disabilities in Nepal. Another study on Africa examined the 
living conditions of persons with disabilities (Loeb et al. 2008). However, 
none have focused on the growth elasticity of poverty for persons with 
disabilities. 
 
Among the 15% of people with disabilities in the world, nearly 80% live 
in developing countries (WHO & WB 2011). Additionally, it is also 
estimated that people with disabilities make up 15 to 20% of the poor in 
developing countries (Elwan 1999). This means that the worldwide 
population of people living with disabilities constitutes one of the 
poorest and most marginalized segments of society (ILO 2007; DFID 
2000). While there are multiple factors contributing to poverty among 
people with disabilities, unequal and poor access to education and 
employment, as well as the unequal distribution of other resources, are 
likely to be among the major causes of their poverty (Lamichhane et al. 
2014). While inequality, exclusion, and discrimination are widespread, 
the needs of people with disabilities are not yet considered to be an 
important component in poverty reduction strategies. 
 
In the literature that reflects on growth alone, the terms “inclusive 
growth”, “shared growth”, “broad-based growth” or “pro-poor growth”, 
are used to convey similar concepts. The World Development Report 
1990 (World Bank 1990) coined the concept of “broad-based growth” as 
growth that could reduce poverty in a rapid manner through the 
inclusion of all strata of the society. On the other hand, there is a 
relatively rich literature related to the growth elasticity of poverty, an 
important economic term that is strongly related to the above- 
mentioned concept of pro-poor (inclusive) growth. For instance, 
Ravallion and Chen (1997) estimated the growth elasticity of poverty for 
developing and transitional economies. Additionally, when looking at 
pro-poor growth, Ravallion and Datt (1996, 1999 and 2002) studied the 
growth elasticity of poverty in different states of India. Moreover, 
among the most recent studies on the growth elasticity of poverty, 
differing estimates of the elasticity of poverty have been presented for a 
great variety of developing countries when considered as a   whole 
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(Adams 2004; Bourguignon 2003; Ram 2006), as well as for individual 
country-level studies, such as India (Lenagala and Ram 2010; Ram 2011), 
and different regions of the world (Besley and Burgess 2003; Kalwiji and 
Verschoor 2007), by analyzing the growth-poverty relationship for 
different poverty lines and growth spells. 
 
Despite the large amount of research during the last decades on the 
growth-poverty issue, to our knowledge, none of the studies has 
touched upon the issue of disability and growth so far. The reason for 
this important gap in the literature may be attributed primarily to the 
lack of data on disability, as well as to the lower level of priority given 
to this issue by governments and development agencies. 
 
2. Dataset from Nepal 
 
The nationally representative data set (NLSS III) published by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics of the Government of Nepal, has been used 
(CBS 2011a). This household survey was conducted by CBS with 
technical assistance from the World Bank. The survey contains a wide 
range of information from sample households such as: demographic 
characteristics of the head and other members of the household; 
housing; access to facilities; education; health services; agriculture; 
consumption; income; and employment status. 
 
Altogether, information from 5,988 households was collected in this 
survey. In this paper, we use an adjusted sample of 4,840 households, 
with the household head having an economically active age of 15-59 
years. For the first time, NLSS has included questions that capture 
information on disability. First author of this paper met CBS officials 
twice when the survey was in the design phase. At this time the author 
requested that disability specific questions be included in the 
questionnaires. Nepal’s disability-related organizations also made an 
effort to include disability in the survey. Due to these collective efforts, 
the following two questions were included in the final version of 
survey: 1) whether participants have a disability or not, and 2) if yes, 
what type of disability. The types of impairments included in this 
survey were: physical impairments, visual impairments, hearing 
impairments, deaf blindness, speech problems, intellectual disability, 
and multiple disabilities. Based on this information on disability, it is 
possible to analyze growth elasticity of poverty between those with 
and without disabilities. 
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In this study, the consumption-based national poverty line calculated by 
the CBS is used. According to CBS (2011b), the national poverty line for 
Nepal is Nepalese Rupees (NRs) 19,261.18 – a figure based on the Cost of 
Basic Needs (CBN) approach. In this approach, the poverty line can be 
defined as the expenditure value (in local currency) required by an 
individual to fulfill his/her basic needs in terms of both food and non- 
food items. While the poverty line in the previous round of the survey 
(NLSS II), undertaken in 2003-04, was an update of prices for the same 
BNB previously estimated in 1995-96 (NLSS I), the poverty line for 2010- 
11 is based on a new BNB for the poor that reflects changes in well-being 
over time. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
For the analysis of poverty, we use the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
poverty measures (Foster et al. 1984), which are referred to as the head 
count index (P0), the poverty gap index (P1), and the severity of poverty 
index (P2). The generalized FGT poverty measures are defined as: 
(1)  
where y is the household per capita consumption expenditure, f(y) is its 
density (roughly the proportion of the population with a consumption 
level y), z denotes the poverty line, and α is a nonnegative parameter. 
For Nepal, the national poverty line, based on per-capita household 
consumption, is 19,261.18 NRs. Higher values of the parameter α 
indicate a greater sensitivity of the poverty measure to inequality 
among the poor or a greater emphasis to the poorest of the poor (Foster 
et al. 1984). We estimate poverty measures Pα for α = 0, 1, and 2, 
which define P0, P1 and P2, respectively. 
 
The growth elasticity of poverty is the total percentage change in 
poverty with respect to the total percentage change in per-capita 
income. In this paper, the analysis relies on per-capita consumption, 
instead of income, as preferred welfare indicator. According to the 
World Bank (2013), the growth elasticity of poverty is defined as: 
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(2) 
 
Since we do not have time series or panel data on poverty and growth 
focusing on disability, the methodology developed by Araar and Duclos 
(2013) to compute growth elasticity of poverty for household cross 
sectional data is used here. Based on this methodology, the elasticity of 
each FGT measure is estimated using DASP: Distributive Analysis Stata 
Package version 2.2. According to Araar and Duclos (2013), the overall 
growth elasticity (GREL) of poverty, when growth comes exclusively 
from growth within a group k (namely, within that group, inequality 
neutral), is given by: 
(3)  
whereas, similar to above, z is the poverty line, k is the population 
subgroup in which growth takes place, f (k, z) is the density function at 
level of income z of group k, and F(z) is the headcount index. The upper 
case of equation (3) is for the condition α = 0 and the lower is for the 
condition α > 0 (the values of α are 1 and 2). Moreover, this kind of 
growth elasticity of poverty is group-specific and can be applied to 
comparisons among categorical groups. This type of analysis is therefore 
useful in understanding the differing rates at which poverty is reduced 
among different, well-identified groups due to the particular growth of 
their incomes or consumption expenditures. Additionally, a study like 
this will allow us to identify how these specific groups could be better 
targeted for the purpose of improving their living or welfare condition. 
 
Definition and Mean of Variables 
Household per-capita consumption expenditure is used as the welfare 
indicator. The consumption aggregates are constructed by adding 
together the various goods and services consumed by each household 
over a period of 12 months. Various components of consumption are 
grouped into three main categories: consumption of food items; 
consumption of housing; and consumption of other non-food items. 
Household level consumption in monetary terms is divided by the size of 
the household to find the household per capita consumption expenditure. 
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Other variables are grouped into different categories such as sex of 
household head, age of household head (different age groups ranging from 
15 years to 59 years) grouped into five categories, education of household 
head (illiterate with 0 years to highest 17 years of schooling, split into three 
groups), region (rural or urban), land assets (landless to large household 
land size), a household’s access to facilities (roads, schools, the market 
center, hospitals, electricity, and piped water) and ethnicity. A detailed 
definition of variables is presented in Table 1. Although the definition 
presented in Table 1 is self-illustrative for most of the variables, I have 
further elaborated on the variable of ethnicity based on Nepal’s ethnic 
demographics, as the country has multiple and diverse ethnic groups. 
 
According to the National Population and Housing Census Report 2012 
(GON 2012b), the majority of Nepalese (81.3% of the population) are 
followers of the Hindu religion. Hindu societies are divided into a 
hierarchy based on the caste system. The same report further states that 
there are 125 caste/ethnic groups in Nepal. I have categorized these 125 
castes into five major ethnic groups for the purpose of this study. The 
first group is the so-called ‘high castes,’ including the Brahmin and 
Chhetri castes of both Hills and Terai areas. High caste people are 
scattered all over the country and they are considered to be the 
historically privileged caste. The second group is Mongoloids, which 
includes Magar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sherpa, Thakali, Jirel, Dura, 
Lepcha and Sunuwar castes. People from this group reside mainly in the 
Hills and Mountains area. The third group is Newar. Newar is the caste 
of people who are settled in most of the cities, including Kathmandu 
valley, and are engaged in trade and commerce. The fourth group is 
Madheshi, which includes the Yadav, Rajbanshi, Kalawar, Kanu, Tajpuria, 
Dhimal, Sudhi, Santhal/Satar, and Gangai castes but excludes the Brahmin 
and Chhetri from Terai. The last group is the low castes, which includes 
the so-called low castes of the Hills such as Kami, Damai, and Sarki, and 
the low castes of Terai such as Chamar, Dusad, Paswan, Musahar, Lohar, 
and Tatma. The so-called low caste people are historically the most 
discriminated against and deprived group in Nepal. People in this caste 
suffer from a lack of access to the benefits of development. Previous 
studies such as (Lamichhane et al. 2014) have also analyzed poverty in 
Nepal through a similar caste-based classification of the population. 
 
The last two columns of Table 1 show the mean values of the variables 
used for the growth elasticity of poverty estimates for persons with and 
without  disabilities.  Out  of  a  total  of  4,840  observations,  167      had 
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disabilities. The lower percentage of disability prevalence can be 
connected to factors such as failure to address disability-related 
components adequately in the survey questionnaires, problems with 
defining disability, and enumerators (interviewers) not having proper 
training on how to ask disability-related questions. Additionally, the 
possibility of poor understanding by enumerators of the disability issue 
may have caused them to cover only those people whose impairments 
are severe. Factors like these may exclude other people whose 
impairments may be moderate or mild. Although inclusion of disability 
in the survey is a very positive step, further improvement of the survey 
design is required so that many people with disabilities that are 
currently excluded can be covered in the future. A similar explanation 
may account for the 1.94% disability prevalence rate given by the 
Government of Nepal National Population Census in 2012. 
 
The average household per capita consumption is NRs 44,184.52 for 
persons with disabilities, whereas that is slightly higher (46,290.79 NRs) 
for their counterparts without disabilities. According to the census, the 
average household size is 4.21 and 4.39 respectively for persons with and 
without disabilities. In both cases, the vast majority of the households 
(84% and 90% respectively) are headed by a male, and the remaining 14 
and 10% are headed by women with and without disabilities. The 
majority of the household heads have a lower level of schooling of below 
5 years, with 84% and 81% of those with and without disabilities 
respectively falling into this category. Moreover, 10% of household 
heads have schooling of medium level (6-10) years and only 9% have 
schooling of higher level (11 years and above). Additionally, regardless 
of disability status, nearly two thirds (68%) are from rural areas. 
 
In relation to land assets, 10% of those with disabilities and 12% of those 
without are landless; another 12% and 14% have only marginal land 
(less than 0.15 hectares (ha); 10% of both groups have medium land 
ownership (1.00ha-4.00ha), which is not different from the percentage 
owned by marginal-land or the landless groups. When looking at 
households with larger amounts of land (above 4.00 ha), the percentage 
decreases by more than 20 points when compared to households having 
small land assets. With regard to having access to facilities, except for 
electricity, both groups of people still have low-level of access to vehicle 
roads, hospitals, primary schools, piped water and market centers 
within a thirty-minute walking proximity. 
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4. Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 shows estimations for poverty and inequality. It can be seen in 
the table that all poverty measures (P0, P1 and P2) are relatively higher 
for persons with disabilities than for their nondisabled counterparts. 
The figures, respectively, for those with and without disabilities are P0 = 
0.28 and 0.24; P1= 0.08 and 0.05; P2= 0.03 and 0.02. Furthermore, the Gini 
coefficient indicates that both consumption and land-asset inequalities 
are also higher for persons with disabilities than for persons without 
disabilities. However, the data shows that the distribution of land assets 
is particularly more unequal for persons with disabilities (0.77) than for 
their nondisabled counterparts (0.65). 
 
Table 3 shows calculations of the growth elasticity of poverty by 
different categories of people. For these groups, elasticity coefficients are 
presented based on all three measures of poverty: P0, P1 and P2. Row 1 
of Table 3 shows the results by sex. Growth elasticity based on P0 is -1.68 
and -1.08 for males and females with disabilities respectively. This 
means that a one percent increase in household per capita consumption 
will reduce poverty by 1.68 and 1.08% for males and females with 
disabilities respectively. The coefficients are -2.31 and -1.55 for males and 
females without disabilities. Similarly, the growth elasticities based on 
P1 are -2.92 and -1.21, respectively for males and females with 
disabilities, and -3.47 and -2.67 for males and females without 
disabilities. In the same vein, the growth elasticities based on P2 are 
-3.71 and -1.63 respectively for males and females with disabilities,  and 
-3.95 and -2.81 for males and females without disabilities. 
 
These results show clearly that the growth elasticities of poverty are lower 
for persons with disabilities regardless of the poverty measures used. 
Similarly, we can see in the same table, that the elasticities are also 
considerably lower for females in each of the two analyzed groups. Given 
that the growth elasticity of poverty is a decreasing function of the 
development level of a country and of the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of income/consumption (Borguignon 2003), the results 
indicate that the level of inequality facing individuals with disabilities 
and females is higher than the one that is present among people without 
disabilities and that of males. This means that regardless of the rate of 
growth in the country, the reduction of poverty will always be smaller for 
the   more   disadvantaged   groups,   including   those   with disabilities. 
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Consequently, in order to attain a higher level of poverty reduction for the 
whole Nepal, as well as for the more disadvantaged population, in this 
case for people with disabilities, and make development more sustainable 
and inclusive, public policies should strategically focus on improving the 
distribution of consumption further for these groups through specific 
targeted programs. 
 
Row 2 of Table 3 shows the results according to the age of the 
participants. For both of the analyzed groups, the growth elasticities 
differ considerably between them. For example, with regard to persons 
with disabilities, P0 is highest in the 24-32 year old age group and lowest 
in the 15-23 year old group. For persons without disabilities, it is highest 
in the age group of 51-59 year olds and lowest in the 42-50 year old 
group. The case is however, different for P1 and P2 indices. For persons 
with disabilities, the poverty condition of groups covering ages 15-23 to 
33-41 years old shows they are more sensitive to growth than the 
poverty experienced by other age groups, as their growth elasticities 
exhibit an absolute value equal or above 3.5 in all cases. However, for 
persons without disabilities, the growth elasticity of poverty does not 
show a clear pattern and is only higher than 3.5 in the case of the age 
groups 24-33 and 33-41 years old for P1 and P2, as well as the 51-59 years 
old group when the squared poverty gap is analyzed. 
 
The previous results suggest that the impact of growth on poverty is the 
highest among relatively young and middle-age people with disabilities, 
and therefore that the economic well-being of those individuals is 
improved the most as the economy expands. The reason for this to be the 
case is that, as shown in Lamichhane et al. (2014), the same age groups 
(15-23, 24-32 and 33-41) are those with the highest levels of poverty in 
Nepal – they are generally in school or have just completed their 
university education and are searching for jobs. Consequently, this 
implies that even a small growth of the Nepalese economy or small 
investments in the human capital of these people with disabilities, who 
are considered one of the disadvantaged groups, will bring about a 
greater economic benefit to them. Lamichhane and Sawada (2013), who 
analyzed the returns on investment in education for people with 
disabilities in Nepal, likewise estimated a two or three times higher 
return on education for these people. 
 
Comparing the growth elasticity of poverty between urban and rural 
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regions, we can see in Table 3 that the urban population without 
disabilities has a lower elasticity. Persons with disabilities in the urban 
population exhibit an elasticity of -0.81 and those in the rural areas have 
a -1.73 elasticity based on P0. The other two indicators also show a 
similar trend albeit with higher elasticities in absolute value. 
 
The results by region indicate that, regardless of disability status, 
reducing urban poverty through growth in Nepal is more difficult than 
improving the condition of the rural population by the same means. In 
other words, even a small amount of growth can help to reduce poverty 
in rural areas to a much greater extent than seems possible to achieve in 
the urban centers with a similar amount of growth. The main 
explanation for this growth-elasticity pattern may be the fact that 
poverty is much more prevalent and severe in rural than in urban areas 
as shown in Lamichhane et al. (2014). Consequently, it is likely that the 
poverty-reducing impact of growth will be stronger in the rural areas, 
where the majority of the total population resides, and a greater 
proportion is considered extremely poor and more disadvantaged than 
their urban counterparts. 
 
Row 4 of Table 3 shows the elasticity of poverty estimates based on the 
level of education. Years of schooling are grouped into three categories: 
lower level education (0-5 years); middle level education (6-10 years); and 
higher level education (11 years and above). According to the results, in the 
case of persons with disabilities, the growth elasticity of poverty (P0) for 
persons with 0-5, 6-10 and 11 and above years of education is -1.83, -0.69 
and -0.13 respectively. On the other hand, when analyzing P1 and P2 for 
persons with disabilities, it is possible to corroborate that the growth 
elasticity for people with more than 5 years of education is zero, while the 
one of individuals with an elementary level of schooling is -3.08 and -3.94 
respectively. The zero elasticity that was found for the more educated 
groups reflects the non-poor economic condition of the people with 
disabilities that was also mentioned by Lamichhane et al. (2014). 
Contrastingly, given the fact that the less educated groups are those with 
higher levels of poverty in Nepal (Lamichhane et al. 2014), the contribution 
of growth to achieve a permanent reduction in the poverty level is indeed 
crucial as implied by the high elasticities that were obtained. 
 
The results obtained for persons without disabilities with respect to P0 
resemble our elasticity estimates for persons with disabilities, according 
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to their educational status. Consequently, the growth elasticities of 
poverty are found to be higher the lower the level of education. These 
results are in line with the idea, supported by our previous results as 
well, that growth tends to have a stronger, positive impact on the 
economic well-being of people or groups whose levels of poverty are 
higher than the rest of the population. 
 
Moreover, row 5 of Table 3 shows the results according to different land 
asset categories. For persons with disabilities, the highest elasticity based 
on P0 is found for landless households (-1.9), followed by households with 
small land assets (-1.82), households with marginal land assets (-1.42), 
households with medium land assets (-1.02), and lastly households with 
large land assets (-0.74). In the case of persons without disabilities, 
households with marginal land holdings, followed by households with 
small land and the landless exhibit higher elasticities (-2.92, -2.57 & -2.56) 
than those in the other groups. We can observe a similar trend for the 
cases of P1 and P2, corroborating again our previous findings about the 
positive relationship that exists between higher levels of poverty and 
higher growth elasticities (in absolute value). The results imply that, 
irrespective of disability status, persons that possess no or few assets are 
the ones who benefit the most as the economy expands, given that their 
poverty condition is reduced faster with a given level of growth. 
Moreover, based on the particularly high elasticities obtained, the results 
suggest that landless persons with disabilities are more vulnerable to fall 
into poverty than any other group in Nepal and, therefore, that specific 
policies or programs directed to them should be implemented to improve 
their economic well-being. 
 
In row 6 of Table 3, results are presented based on individual access to 
various facilities that are within a 30-minute walking distance from 
their households. When analyzing P0, persons not having access to a 
vehicle road near their households have a higher elasticity (-1.63) than 
those who do have access (-1.2). In comparison, for those without 
disabilities, the figures are -2.26 and -1.87 respectively. A similar trend is 
observed for P0, P1 and P2 for most of the facilities in this analysis, 
except for the cases of vehicle road (P1 & P2) and school (P0, P1 & P2) in 
the case of persons with disabilities. These results are mainly related to 
the levels of poverty that were estimated for each particular group but, 
in general, they are in line with our general conclusion that when higher 
levels  of  poverty  are  observed,  the  absolute  value  of  the      growth 
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elasticity of poverty is higher too, indicating the potentially strong 
impact that growth has upon poverty and the more disadvantaged 
groups in Nepal. For instance, based on the growth elasticity of P2 for 
people with disabilities who do not have electricity at home, a one 
percent increase in mean consumption reduces the severity of poverty 
by around six percent (see Table 3, row 6, column 3), while, in contrast, 
the reduction of poverty is only 2% for all persons who do have access to 
electricity (see also Table 3, row 6, column 6). 
 
Finally, the last row of Table 3 shows the results by ethnic category. 
Regardless of disability status, all types of poverty (P0, P1 and P2) have 
the highest growth elasticity for households within the low caste. After 
the low caste households, Madheshi families have more elasticity, 
followed by Mongoloids, high caste, and Newar groups. Since 
households within the Newar ethnicity are generally less poor than 
households within the high caste, their corresponding growth 
elasticities are considerably lower. According to these results, 
households that belong to any of the ethnicity groups of low caste, 
Madheshi and Mongoloids should to be targeted in order to alleviate 
their poor condition faster through growth-redistributive programs. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Using a nationally representative dataset of Nepal (NLSS), growth 
elasticities of poverty were estimated for people with and without 
disabilities. Based on the results by disability status, it is not possible to 
identify a clear growth-elasticity pattern between the different analyzed 
categories. However, in some particular cases such as gender, education 
and land assets, growth elasticities for people with disabilities tend to be 
lower than those observed for their non-disabled counterparts. Given 
that poverty is determined by both growth and inequality (Datt and 
Ravallion 1992: Bourguignon 2003) and that, the higher the level of 
inequality that is prevalent in the economy, the lower will be the impact 
of growth upon poverty (Ravallion 1997), our results suggest that people 
with disabilities generally face higher levels of inequality in specific, 
relevant areas of development than the one experienced by people 
without disabilities. Consequently, it is advised that growth- 
redistributive programs, targeted to people with disabilities and other 
marginalized groups in Nepal, are implemented with the main purpose 
of reducing the persistent inequalities that are present between   people 
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with and without disabilities (see Table 2), so that the former of these 
groups can be equally benefited by the gains of growth, ultimately 
resulting in an increase in their economic well-being. 
 
Moreover, regardless of disability status, our findings indicate that the 
poverty-reducing impact of growth accruing to the poorest and most 
disadvantaged people in Nepal (like the less educated, the landless and 
the low caste groups) is considerably higher than that observed for the 
rest of the population. As explained in the previous section, higher 
elasticities are related to higher levels of poverty. Therefore, it may be 
possible to affirm that the benefits of growth are greater for the groups 
whose levels of poverty are higher in the economy, implying that the 
growth of the Nepalese economy is pro-poor generally speaking. 
 
Unfortunately, as explained above, pro-poor growth has not been 
reaching people with disabilities at the same pace. This seems to be 
essentially an equity matter, which, if properly addressed, will bring 
about important benefits not only to people with disabilities but to the 
economy as a whole. It should be fully acknowledged that every section 
of the society is equally important if the economy is to succeed in its 
path to development. Therefore, neglecting any population group is not 
only unfair but is also a threat to sustainable and inclusive development. 
Hence, it is of extreme importance that disability-inclusive poverty 
reduction strategies are implemented with the aim of achieving equity- 
based growth in the foreseeable future. Finally, as the inequality aspects 
of growth have not been analyzed in this paper, further research is 
needed to shed light on this issue. 
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Table 1. Definition and mean of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Persons 
with 
disabilities 
Persons 
without 
disabilities 
Per capita 
Consumption 
Household per capita consumption 
in Nepalese Rupees (NPR) 44184.52 46290.79 
Household Size Size of household. 4.21 4.39 
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.89 0.92 
Sex of HH    
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.86 0.90 
Female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.10 
Age of HH    
(15-23) years 1 if having age group (15-23) years, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.04 
(24-32) years 1 if having age group (24-32) years, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.20 
(33-41) years 1 if having age group (33-41) years, 0 otherwise 0.24 0.29 
(42-50) years 1 if having age group (42-50) years, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.26 
(51-59) years 1 if having age group (51-59) years, 0 otherwise 0.30 0.21 
Education of HH    
(0-5) Years 1 if HH having education of (0-5) years, 0 otherwise 0.84 0.81 
(6-10) Years 1 if HH having education of (6-10) years, 0 otherwise 0.10 0.10 
11 Years and above 1 if HH having education of 11 years or more, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.09 
Region    
Urban 1 if from urban region, 0 otherwise 0.31 0.31 
Rural 1 if from rural region, 0 otherwise 0.69 0.69 
Land Assets Group    
Landless(0.00 ha) 1 if having 0.00 hectare of land, 0 otherwise 0.10 0.12 
Marginal 
(0.00 ha-0.15 ha) 
1 if having 0.00-0.15 hectares of land, 
0 otherwise 0.12 0.14 
Small 
(0.15 ha-1.00 ha) 
1 if having 0.15-1.00 hectares of land, 
0 otherwise 0.49 0.44 
Medium 
(1.00 ha-4.00 ha) 
1 if having 1.00-4.00 hectares of land, 
0 otherwise 0.10 0.10 
Large 
(4.00 ha & above) 1 if having 4.00 & above hectares of land, 0 otherwise 0.20 0.20 
Access to facility    
Vehicle Road 1 if household has access to vehicle road, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.09 
School 1 if household has access to school, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.07 
Market Centre 1 if household has access to market center, 0 otherwise 0.02 0.06 
Hospital 1 if household has access to hospital, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.04 
Electricity 1 if household has access to electricity, 0 otherwise 0.66 0.75 
Piped water 1 if household has access to piped water, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.29 
Ethnicity    
High Caste 1 if caste is Brahmin & Chhetri, 0 otherwise 0.33 0.35 
Mongoloids 1 if from Mongoloids caste, 0 otherwise 0.32 0.29 
Newar 1 if caste is Newar, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.09 
Madheshi 1 if from Madheshi caste, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.15 
Low Caste 1 if from Low Caste, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.12 
Total Observations Persons with Disabilities + Persons without Disabilities 167 4673 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
Note: HH = household  head 
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Table 2. Poverty and inequality measures 
 
Variable 
(Mean Values) 
Persons 
with 
disabilities 
Confidence 
interval 
(95%level) 
Persons 
without 
disabilities 
Confidence 
interval 
(95%level) 
Per capita 
Consumption 
 
44,184.52 
 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
0.36 
 
46,290.79 
 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
0.26 Headcount index(P0) 
0.28 
(0.0383) 
0.24 
(0.0105) 
Poverty-gap index(P1) 
0.08 
(0.0128) 
0.05 0.10 0.05 
(0.0034) 
0.05 0.06 
Squared poverty-gap 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
index(P2) (0.0061)   (0.0016)   
Gini coefficient of 0.41 0.35 0.46 0.38 0.37 0.40 
per capita consumption (0.0286)   (0.0060)   
Gini coefficient of 0.77 0.67 0.87 0.65 0.63 0.66 
land-asset ownership (0.0521) (0.0085) 
Total Observations 167 4673 
Note: Standerd errors are shown in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
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Table 3.  Growth elasticity of poverty 
 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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Chapter 6  
Reflections on the Prospects for Pro-Poor 
Low-Carbon Growth
Dirk Willenbockel
1� Introduction
Eradicating extreme poverty from the face of the earth once and for all is 
set to be a central goal of the emerging post-2015 development agenda. 
Without a rapid transition of the world economy to a low-carbon growth 
path over the next few decades, this ambitious goal will remain elusive. 
Under current greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction pledges, the 
world is not on track to limit the average global temperature rise to +2℃ 
above pre-industrial levels. Failure to meet this agreed target threatens 
to impede future progress and roll back past achievements in poverty 
alleviation. Prospective impact assessments indicate that for poor 
populations in tropical and sub-tropical hotspot regions in particular, 
the combination of high direct exposure, dominance of climate-sensitive 
sectors in economic activity and low autonomous adaptive capacity 
entail a high vulnerability to the predominantly harmful effects of 
climate change on agricultural productivity, food security, water 
resources, health, physical infrastructure and ecosystems.
Irrespective of the responsibility of the “Global North” for the bulk of 
atmospheric GHG concentration levels accumulated in the past, most of 
the growth in energy demand and global GHG emissions over coming 
decades will arise from today’s developing countries. To avoid 
catastrophic climate change, a transition to a low-carbon growth path in 
today’s large fast-growing middle-income countries is imperative and 
mitigation efforts in other developing countries are also required. 
Yet developing countries are unlikely to adopt a low-carbon 
development strategy if such a strategy is perceived to be in conflict with 
domestic near-term poverty reduction aspirations. Thus, a better 
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understanding of the potential distributional implications of different 
conceivable pathways to low carbon development is required to ensure 
the social acceptability and political viability of low carbon policy 
reforms. The growing recognition that the aims of equitable or pro-poor 
growth and low-carbon growth need to be addressed together1 has led 
to efforts in the literature to identify potential synergies and trade-offs 
between pro-poor and low-carbon growth. This chapter provides a 
selective review of this literature along with some critical reflections.
To underpin the stated premises of this chapter concerning the need for 
climate change mitigation action in developing countries, the following 
section provides some quantitative background information about global 
GHG emission projections and targets, and about the geographical and 
sectoral composition of current emissions. A simple back-of-the envelope 
calculation is used to challenge the prevailing view that the emissions of 
today’s least developed countries are irrelevant from a climate 
stabilization perspective. Section 3 contrasts arguments in favor of an 
early adoption of low-carbon growth strategies in low-income countries 
put forward in the recent literature with the dominant notion that these 
countries should focus on achieving growth and poverty reduction along 
conventional lines first and start efforts at cutting carbon emissions at a 
later stage. Section 4 looks at the potential direct poverty implications of 
adopting low-carbon development strategies in energy, agriculture and 
forestry, and Section 5 draws conclusions. 
2� Some Unpleasant Greenhouse Gas Arithmetric
 
GHG Emission Projections and Targets
To maintain a reasonable chance of limiting the average global surface 
temperature rise to +2℃ above pre-industrial levels while keeping 
mitigation costs at manageable levels, annual global GHG emissions 
would have to peak before 2020 and then drop to around 44 gigatons of 
CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2020, 35 GtCO2e in 2030 and 20 GtCO2e in 
2050 (UNEP 2013; OECD 2012; Rogelj and Meinshausen 2010; Stern 2009). 
These figures are based on recent estimates of the least-cost emission 
trajectories consistent with the +2℃ goal, and are necessarily sensitive to 
assumptions about technical progress and learning effects in low-carbon 
technologies. They are also contingent on the current state of knowledge 
about climate sensitivity to atmospheric GHG concentrations. 
1. E.g. Stern (2009), Urban (2010a, 2010b). 
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Current global emissions are around 50 GtCO2e / year. A full 
implementation of present voluntary pledges for mitigation action 
submitted by developed and developing countries under the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord is projected to lead to 2020 emissions of 52-56 
GtCO2e in 2020, suggesting an emission gap of 8-12 GtCO2e in relation to 
the least-cost trajectory (UNEP 2013). In this case far higher rates of 
mitigation effort than implied by this least-cost scenario would be 
required beyond 2020, which – if technically feasible at all – will raise 
total mitigation costs substantially. As a case in point, about 80 percent 
of the power stations likely to be in use in 2020 are either already built or 
under construction (IEA 2010). A large fraction of these plants is fossil 
fuel powered and will continue to pour out carbon for decades. 
Prematurely closing or retrofitting such plants is a very costly option. 
Thus, a large fraction of the global energy-related emissions still 
permissible under a +2℃ scenario is already locked in by the existing 
infrastructure (IEA 2013b). Every year of delaying decisive mitigation 
action exacerbates this lock-in problem. Moreover, delayed action entails 
a higher reliance on the large-scale deployment of potentially risky 
negative emission technologies in the second half of the 21st century. In 
short, the door to achieving the required emission cuts at a manageable 
cost is rapidly closing. As a result, mitigation action needs to be stepped 
up without further delay in the run-up to 2020, the earliest date at which 
a comprehensive post-Kyoto climate agreement covering the major 
emitters might optimistically take effect, or we run the risk that the +2ºC 
goal is missed by a wide margin. 
A recent study by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research for 
the World Bank suggests that under the current mitigation 
commitments and pledges, there is roughly a 20 percent likelihood of 
exceeding 4°C by 2100, and if these pledges are not met, a warming of 
4°C could occur as early as the 2060s (PIK 2012). Similarly, the latest 
OECD Environmental Outlook baseline scenario, which likewise 
assumes no mitigation efforts beyond current pledges, projects increases 
in the global mean temperature of +2.0ºC to +2.8ºC by 2050 and of +3.7ºC 
to +5.6ºC by 2100 above pre-industrial (OECD 2012). The International 
Energy Agency’s new World Economic Outlook 2013 central scenario, 
which likewise takes account of mitigation measures already 
announced by governments, sees the world on a trajectory towards a 
long-term average temperature increase of +3.6 °C (IEA 2013a). 
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These projections are broadly in line with the synthesis of results across 
the whole range of state-of-the-art global circulation models reported in 
the new 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2013). For those two of the four representative 
concentration pathways (RCPs) that are consistent with low or moderate 
effective mitigation efforts considered in IPCC (2013), namely RCP6.0 
and RCP8.5, the report states: “global temperatures averaged in the 
period 2081–2100 are …likely to exceed 2°C above preindustrial for 
RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence). Warming above 4°C by 2081–2100 is 
unlikely in all RCPs (high confidence) except for RCP8.5 where it is as likely 
as not (medium confidence)”.2 The 5-95 percent range of across model 
projections towards the last decades of the century is +2.0 to +3.7°C 
under RCP6.0 and +3.2 to +5.4 °C under RCP8.5.
It is worth noting that projected temperature increases are not 
uniformly distributed across the globe. Projected increases for some 
regions are far higher than the global average. In view of these recent 
climate projections, scientists are starting to get serious about 
contemplating human development prospects in a +4°C world.3  
The Decomposition of Present GHG Emissions by Region of 
Origin and Sector
Table 1 displays global GHG emissions in 2010 by country or country 
group of origin and their shares of world emissions ordered by emission 
volume for the 21 top emitters (countries that account for 80 percent of 
total emissions and for 70 percent of the world population). Importantly 
for the purposes of the present chapter, the figures include emissions 
from agricultural activity and land use change. 
On a production basis, developed countries now account for less than 40 
percent of total emissions with a declining trend, while the four top 
developing country emitters - China, India, Brazil and Indonesia – alone 
account for 33 percent of global emissions with a rising trend. It is 
evident from the Table that a significant contribution to GHG mitigation 
efforts from these and other developing countries is required to bring 
2. In IPCC terminology, the terms very likely, likely, and as likely as not mean likelihoods of 
66-100, 33-66, and 0-33 percent respectively. Note that among all no-mitigation baseline 
scenarios reviewed in the AR5 “none is consistent in the long run with the pathways in the 
two most stringent RCP scenarios …, with the majority falling between the 6.0 and 8.5 
pathways” (Clarke and Jiang 2013, 17). 
3. See e.g. New et al. (2011), Thornton et al. (2011), PIK (2013). 
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emissions on a sustainable path. Even if the developed Annex I 
countries do hypothetically cut emissions to zero over night, the total 
would remain well above – and diverge further from – the least-cost 
sustainable path outlined above without further mitigation efforts 
beyond current developing country pledges. It is noteworthy in this 
context that the developing country origin share of cumulative GHG 
emissions (again including those from agriculture and land use change) 
since 18504 is now roughly equal to the developed country share, and it 
has been estimated by den Elzen et al. (2013) that this share will reach 
56% by 2020.
To avoid any misinterpretations here: this is not a normative discussion 
about climate justice. The sole purpose is to show where geographically 
a large portion of future mitigation action must necessarily take place to 
achieve the climate stabilization goal – it is not an argument about who 
is morally responsible to pay for such mitigation action.
Are LDC Emissions Really Irrelevant from a Mitigation Perspective?
The least developed countries contribute a small but non-negligible 5% 
(Table 1). However, this share is bound to rise significantly over the first 
half of the 21st century as a result of population and income growth, and 
more so if a carbon-intensive growth path is taken. This can be 
demonstrated with a simple back-of the-envelope calculation: Let E and 
N denote total annual LDC emissions and population respectively. 
Proportional differentiation of the accounting identity E = (E/N)∙N yields 
gE = gE/N +gN. Defining the elasticity of per-capita emissions with respect 
to per-capita income Y/N as ε = gE/N / gY/N, we obtain gE = ε∙ gY/N + gN. 
The latest UN medium-variant population projections see the total 
population of today’s LDCs grow from 832 (Table 1) to 1,726 million over 
the period 2010-50, which equates to an average annual growth rate of 
gN = 0.0184, i.e. 1.84 percent. With an assumed moderate annualized per-
capita LCD income growth of gY/N = 0.03 over the same period5 and 
setting ε to a moderate 0.36, the average annual emission growth rate 
4. Cumulative emissions are significant because they determine current atmospheric GHG 
concentration levels and hence climate change, 
5. Many LDCs reported far more impressive growth rates in recent years. 
6. Under this assumption, a one-percent increase in per-capita income is associated with a 
sub-proportional 0.3 percent increase in per-capita emissions. See e.g. Jobert, Karanfil and 
Tykhonenko (2013) for recent empirical evidence on the relation between income and 
emissions at low-income levels and further reference to the empirical literature. Estimates 
of ε vary widely across studies and countries.   
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would be gE = 0.0274. Thus, total LDC emissions would nearly triple 
from 2.3 (Table 1) in 2010 to 2.3∙(1+gE)40 ≈ 6.8 GtCO2e / year in 2050, even 
though emissions per head rise only moderately from 2.8 (Table 1) to 3.3 
tCO2e under these assumptions. With only a slight increase in ε to 0.4 
and in gY/N to 0.04, the same calculation would lead to LDC emissions of 
9.0 GtCO2e / year with per-capita emissions of 5.2 in 2050 - that is nearly 
half of the total global emissions permissible in 2050 under the least-cost 
mitigation path outlined above. 
These basic calculations indicate that the widely held view that LDC 
emissions are largely irrelevant from a global mitigation perspective 
does not hold up well to closer scrutiny. Moreover, the widespread 
perception that these countries must focus exclusively on the promotion 
of growth unconstrained by low-carbon considerations and on 
adaptation measures to bolster their future resilience to climate change 
impacts should also be reconsidered.
An even simpler way to demonstrate the basic problem with this is view 
is to just calculate the global average GHG emission levels per head in 
2050 consistent with the goal to reach 20 GtCO2e by then: with a 
projected world population of 9.3 billion (UNDESA 2011a; medium 
variant) that is 2.15 tCO2e / head. As shown in the last column of Table 1, 
the LDCs as a group are already slightly above that level, and any 
significant increase in that level would necessitate even deeper cuts by 
other countries and would further increase the likelihood that the +2°C 
goal is missed by a wide margin.
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Table 1� Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2010 by Region
 Emissions Share Cumulated 
Share
Population Share Emissions 
per capita
 Gt CO2e % % Mill % t CO2e/head
China 10.1 21.4 21.4  1,341  19.4 7.5
United States 6.8 14.4 35.7  310  4.5 21.9
European Union (27) 4.8 10.2 45.9  500  7.3 9.6
Russian Federation 2.3 4.9 50.9  143  2.1 16.2
India 2.3 4.9 55.7  1,224  17.7 1.9
Brazil 2.1 4.5 60.3  195  2.8 11.0
Japan 1.3 2.8 63.0  127  1.8 10.2
Indonesia 1.2 2.5 65.5  240  3.5 4.9
Australia 0.7 1.6 67.1  22  0.3 33.5
Iran 0.7 1.5 68.6  74  1.1 9.8
Canada 0.7 1.5 70.1  34  0.5 21.4
Mexico 0.7 1.5 71.6  113  1.6 6.3
South Korea 0.7 1.4 73.1  48  0.7 14.2
South Africa 0.6 1.2 74.3  50  0.7 11.2
Saudi Arabia 0.5 1.1 75.4  27  0.4 20.1
Argentina 0.5 1.0 76.4  40  0.6 11.3
Venezuela 0.4 0.8 77.2  29  0.4 13.3
Ukraine 0.4 0.8 78.0  45  0.7 8.5
Turkey 0.4 0.8 78.8  73  1.1 4.8
Malaysia 0.3 0.7 79.5  28  0.4 12.0
Pakistan 0.3 0.7 80.2  174  2.5 1.9
Sum (Average) 37.8 80.2  4,837 70.1 (7.8)
World 47.2 100.0 100.0 6,869 100.0 6.8
Annex  I Countries 17.7 37.5  1,207  17.5 14.7
Non-Annex I Countries 29.5 62.5 5,689  82.5 5.2
Least Developed 2.3 5.0  832 12.1 2.8
Source: World Resources Institute CAIT 2.0 Data Base (accessed January 2014).
Note:“Annex I” countries are the established  industrialized countries (i.e. OECD members as of 1992 
plus Eastern European economies in transition) with emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto 
protocol, while “Non-Annex I” countries are developing countries without such obligations.
The Decomposition of Present GHG Emissions by Sector
The two panels of Figure 1 show the 2010 GHG emission shares by broad 
type of activity for the world as a whole and for LDCs respectively. 
While on a global scale, anthropogenic emissions are dominated by 
energy-related activities, in LDCs as a group, agriculture and land use 
change account for nearly 80 percent of the total. It should be noted that 
emissions from agriculture and land-use change are more difficult to 
measure than energy emissions, and some estimates in the literature 
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record far higher global shares for the former than the World Resources 
Institute estimates reported here. The future evolution of these shares 
depends obviously on the qualitative features of the growth paths taken 
over the coming decades.  
Figure 1� Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Source 2010
(Percentage shares in total GHG emissions)
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Resources Institute CAIT 2.0 Data Base
              (accessed January 2014).
3� The Case for Low-Carbon Growth in Low-Income Countries
A key message of the previous section is the necessity to reconsider the 
dominant notion that poorer countries in general and LDCs in 
particular should focus on achieving growth and poverty reduction 
along conventional lines first and start worrying about cuts in carbon 
emissions at a later stage. This notion rests primarily on the argument 
that the adoption of low-carbon technologies raises costs and consumer 
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prices in relation to conventional alternatives, entailing adverse impacts 
on growth and hence poverty alleviation. A slow down in growth-
driven poverty reduction implies in turn a higher vulnerability to 
climate change impacts. Moreover, early mitigation action would divert 
attention, funding and scarce planning capacity away from more 
pressingly needed adaptation investments. Further arguments in 
support of the “grow first – decarbonise later” view are that low-carbon 
technologies can be expected to be available at lower costs in the future, 
and that on intertemporal equity grounds, the current poor should not 
be obliged to incur consumption sacrifices in favor of future, supposedly 
wealthier, generations.
However, this view requires qualification for a number of reasons. Most 
importantly, it violates basic economic efficiency principles – and in 
doing so ignores a potentially large source of gains from international 
exchange for low-income countries: to achieve a given global GHG 
emission target at minimum cost, the marginal GHG abatement costs 
would have to be equalized across all regions of the world. In plain 
language, it makes no sense to install low-carbon technologies in rich 
region A at a cost of $50 per ton of CO2e avoided as long as the same 
amount of emission reduction can be achieved at a cost of $10 per ton in 
poor region B. Such mitigation cost differences imply the presence of 
potentially large mutual gains from carbon credit transactions between 
developed and developing countries. Quantitative estimates show a 
huge potential for these mutual gains. A recent model-based global 
study by Akimoto et al. (2010) indicates a far larger near-term low-cost 
emission reduction potential up to 2020 in the developing non-Annex I 
countries than in the in the developed Annex-I countries (Table 2). This 
finding is consistent with the meta analysis of results from similar 
model-based studies with a time horizon towards 2030 by van Vuuren et 
al. (2009), which finds unanimous agreement among existing estimates 
that the largest mitigation potentials are in non-OECD countries. 
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Table 2� Estimated GHG Emission Reduction Potentials in 2020
(Deviations from 2020 baseline in GtCO2e/year at abatement costs <0 and <20 US$/tCO2e)
 < 0 $/tCO2e < 20 $/tCO2e
USA 1.7 2.4
EU27 1.2 1.8
All Annex-I 3.3 4.3
China 6.9 10.6
India 3.3 4.3
Brazil+Indonesia+South Africa 1.2 1.7
Other Non-Annex I 3.9 6.2
World 20.2 30.1
Source: Akimoto et al (2010: Table 4) and author’s calculation.
Notes:“Annex I” countries are developed countries with emission reduction obligations under the 
Kyoto protocol, while “Non-Annex I” countries are developing countries without such obligations. 
The baseline assumes constant emission intensities.
In the absence of a full global cap-and-trade system, the Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as 
well as the upcoming REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Degradation) scheme are in conception key devices for the 
realization of the mutual gains arising from abatement cost differences 
across regions and must be scaled up significantly under the emerging 
post-Kyoto climate finance architecture. As far as the envisaged new 
market-based mechanisms that will supersede or complement the CDM 
provide full funding and technical assistance for early mitigation action 
in poorer countries from developed country sources, domestic growth 
prospects need not be adversely affected, and the recipient regions may 
benefit from additional ancillary benefits as elaborated below. A 
sufficiently high carbon price is a necessary precondition for the 
effectiveness of any such market-based mechanism in mobilizing low-
carbon investment flows from richer to poorer countries at scale. This in 
turn will require a global climate agreement with stringent binding 
targets for the major emitters. Proposals favoring a system of voluntary 
pledges are in this respect “about as useful as a chocolate tea pot”, as 
former UK Climate Secretary Chris Huhne has put it.7 
Taken at face value, the presence of mitigation options with a negative 
abatement cost in Table 2 would mean possibilities for immediate 
mitigation measures with positive net gains even in the absence of 
payments flows from rich countries. The presence of such negative-cost 
mitigation options in poor countries undermines in itself the basic 
7. Cited in Harvey (2011). 
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premises of the “develop first – decarbonize later” position.8 
A further argument in favor of the early adoption of a low-carbon 
growth path – that applies specifically to the least developed regions 
with a rudimentary present energy infrastructure, emphasizes the 
benefits of avoiding a high-carbon technology lock-in right from the 
start. Given the long-lived nature of energy plant and infrastructure 
investments and the associated high cost of premature scrapping, 
choosing low-carbon modes of development now will reduce the 
economic burden of GHG gas mitigation in the future (OECD 2013; 
Byrne et al. 2011; Bowen and Fankhauser 2011).9 Moreover, as technical 
progress in the energy sector will shift to low-carbon technologies, once 
a global climate deal is eventually reached, LDCs that have embarked on 
a traditional high-carbon development trajectory will be stuck with a 
stagnant type of technology and will not be able to benefit from this 
technical progress (Bowen and Fankhauser 2011).
Another economic reason for embracing a low-carbon growth strategy is 
the avoidance of prospective adverse impacts on future export growth 
performance. Such adverse trade impacts would arise if countries with 
strong mitigation efforts impose border tax adjustments on carbon-
intensive imports from countries on a high-carbon growth path, or if 
better-off consumers – including households belonging to the growing 
middle class in developing countries – switch their preferences to green 
low-carbon alternatives (e.g. Rowlands 2011; Bowen and Fankhauser 2011).
The literature identifies a further range of co-benefits for countries 
adopting a low-carbon development strategy. Such ancillary benefits 
include the effects of reduced air pollution on mortality and morbidity, 
greater energy security and the relaxation of foreign exchange due to 
reduced dependence on fossil fuel imports, and potential positive net 
employment effects that arise if “green” low-carbon job creation in the 
8. Economists tend to be sceptical about models and arguments that suggest the existence of 
unpicked dollar bills on the sidewalk. Capital market imperfections and incomplete 
information are among the most obvious explanatory factors for the presence of 
unexploited negative-net-cost investment opportunities, given that upfront investments 
are required to reap the stream of future net negative operating costs (that arise, for 
example, due to large fuel cost savings as a result of investments in energy efficiency or a 
switch to renewables). 
9. Essentially the same lock-in argument applies to non-energy infrastructure investments 
and planning decisions with a largely irreversible character such as in the areas of transport 
and urban development– see Pye et al. (2010). 
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course of the low-carbon transformation exceeds “brown” job 
destruction.
Such co-benefits figure prominently in the existing literature on pro-
poor low-carbon development. Indeed much of this literature appears to 
be entirely fixated on the identification and propagation of win-win 
measures that promise the simultaneous achievement of mitigation and 
poverty reduction objectives by co-incidence.10 From a political economy 
perspective, this fixation is understandable, given that prospects for 
double or triple wins open up opportunities for the formation of 
alliances among multiple policy actors with differing priorities in 
support of such measures. However, an exclusive focus on such 
synergetic measures unduly narrows the space of potential policy 
options by ignoring a basic insight from the theory of economic policy in 
the tradition of Jan Tinbergen (1952), joint winner of the first Nobel Prize 
in Economics back in 1969: the best possible achievement of multiple 
policy objectives generally requires the combination of multiple policy 
instruments. 
In the present context, this means that a narrowly conceived pro-poor 
low-carbon growth strategy that rules out policies with a high 
mitigation potential but without co-incidental pro-poor benefits - or 
with adverse primary distributional side effects - is likely to generate 
inferior outcomes compared to a strategy that combines such mitigation 
policies with the application of feasible redistributive measures.
 4� How Pro-Poor is Low-Carbon Growth? A Closer Look
Poverty Implications of Low-Carbon Growth in the Energy Sector
Any consideration of the poverty implications of low-carbon growth 
must start from the fact that presently some 1.3 billion people lack access 
to electricity (IEA 2013a), another billion people only have access to 
unreliable electricity (Casillas and Kammen 2010), and about 2.6 billion 
people rely on traditional biomass, such as wood, dung and charcoal for 
cooking and heating purposes (IEA 2013a).
Given that achieving universal access to modern energy services is a co-
10. Proponents of “climate-smart” development strategies go one step further by 
promoting the pursuit of “triple win” policies that generate adaptation co-benefits on top of 
mitigation and poverty reduction benefits. 
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requisite for the eradication of extreme poverty, these figures might at 
first sight suggest a fundamental conflict between the global climate 
stabilization and poverty elimination goals. However, a recent scenario 
analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010) suggests that it 
is technically and economically feasible to reach universal access to a 
basic level of modern energy services by 2030 with an increase in CO2 
emissions of merely 0.8 percent relative to a 2030 baseline scenario in 
which 1.2 billion remain without electricity access.11  
In the IEA universal access scenario all urban and peri-urban 
households are connected to the national grid by 2030, while in rural 
areas 70 percent of the new access is provided via decentralized mini-
grid and off-grid systems including solar photo-voltaic, mini-hydro, 
wind, biomass and geothermal systems. In the recent low-carbon 
development literature, the deployment of such decentralized 
renewable energy systems is widely seen as a promising and 
economically viable approach to reduce energy poverty in remote rural 
areas. Apart from the direct poverty reduction impacts associated with 
electrification in general (such as the extensions of hours available for 
income generation and education activities), the provision of these 
systems is seen to generate further pro-poor growth benefits by creating 
local jobs in related hardware manufacturing, distribution, installation 
and maintenance.12 
A recent study by Deichmann et al. (2011) for Ghana, Ethiopia and 
Kenya uses spatial modeling in combination with engineering cost 
estimates to determine where stand-alone renewable energy generation 
is a cost-effective alternative to centralized grid supply. The results 
indicate that decentralized renewables are competitive mostly in remote 
11. Global electricity generation rises by 2.9 percent and oil demand by one percent relative 
to the 2030 baseline levels. In the baseline scenario, global CO2 emissions in 2030 are 21 
percent higher than in 2008. Chakravarty and Tavoni (2013) consider a more ambitious 
global energy poverty eradication scenario that includes the provision of electricity and 
fuels to increase productivity in agriculture, commercial activities and transport to 3.4 
billion energy-poor people, in addition to universal access to basic energy services to satisfy 
basic human needs for 1.8 billion people by 2030. In this scenario, global final energy 
consumption rises by 7 percent relative to the baseline.  
12. See e.g. UNEP/UNCTAD/UN-OHRLLS (2011), World Bank (2012), UNDESA (2011b), 
Casillas and Kammen (2010), Grantham Institute (2009). Of course, the extent to which such 
green job creation is directly pro-poor depends in particular on the skill intensity of these 
jobs and the empirical evidence for developing countries is weak in this respect (Dercon 
2014). For a detailed systematic review of the empirical evidence on the benefits of increased 
renewable energy capacity for poor people see Pueyo et al. (2013). 
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rural areas, while grid-connected supply is the cheaper option in more 
densely populated areas where the majority of households in these 
countries reside. These findings confirm that decentralized renewable 
energy can play an important role in expanding rural energy access in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), but the results also underscore the need to pay 
attention to the evolution of the fuel mix for centralized power generation. 
As Collier and Venables (2012) point out in this respect, Africa is well 
endowed with potential for hydro and solar power, but lacks capital, 
skills and governance capacity. Since distributed solar power is very 
capital and skill-intensive, the authors conclude that the international 
community must provide support by increasing Africa’s supply of these 
scarce factors. In line with the argument in section 2, the CDM is seen as 
one of the appropriate instruments to provide this support.
Timilsina et al. (2010) investigate the potential of reducing energy-
related GHG emissions via the CDM across 44 countries in SSA through 
the CDM. The study looks at a wider range of low-carbon technology 
options and finds that over 3,200 CDM projects that meet the eligibility 
criteria could be developed in the region. The cumulated GHG 
mitigation potential over the 10-21 year CDM project cycle is estimated 
to amount to 9.8 GtCO2. However, the realization of this potential is 
contingent on effective assistance in overcoming a range of 
implementation barriers that partly explain the very low number of 
CDM projects in the region up to the present. The barriers to 
implementation identified in this study include inter alia lack of 
infrastructure, institutional capacity and local skilled labor as well as 
potential foreign investors’ perceptions of SSA as a high-risk region. 
In addition to electrification, the IEA (2010) Universal Access Scenario 
also envisages the provision of access to clean cooking facilities (in the 
form of LPG stoves or advanced biogas/biomass stoves) for the 2.8 
billion people still relying on traditional biomass in the 2030 baseline 
scenario. Recent estimates suggest that the associated emission 
reductions could exceed 1 Gt CO2e per year (Lee et al. 2013) – that is a 
significant figure in relation to the global emission targets outlined in 
Section 2. The pro-poor co-benefits of a suitably subsidized roll-out of 
clean efficient stoves is evident. According to World Health 
Organization estimates, currently in-door air pollution causes 2 million 
premature deaths per year (WHO 2011), or more annual deaths than are 
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caused by malaria, tuberculosis or HIV (UNDESA 2011b). In addition to 
the direct health impacts and health-related productivity gains, the pro-
poor ancillary benefits include fuel collection and cooking time savings. 
A global cost-benefit analysis of a hypothetical intervention that 
provides access to clean stoves for 50 percent of the population lacking 
such access in 2005 by Hutton, Rehfuess and Tediosi (2007) reports a 
benefit-cost ratio on the order of sixty.
Distributional Implications of Fossil Fuel Subsidy / Tax Reform 
To achieve the transition to a low-carbon growth trajectory in market-
based economies, relative prices between fossil fuels and low-carbon 
energy sources play a decisive role. It is critical that the fossil fuel prices 
faced by market participants reflect the long-run marginal social costs 
associated with GHG emissions in order to incentivize the required 
structural transformation of the energy system as well as to induce 
energy efficiency investments and shifts to less carbon-intense demand 
patterns. Fossil fuel subsidies distort relative prices and pervert 
incentives exactly in the opposite direction. Their swift phasing-out 
must be part of any effective low-carbon growth strategy. 
According to the latest IEA (2013a) estimates, fossil-fuel consumption 
subsidies worldwide amounted to US$544 billion in 2012, a large portion 
of which is attributable to developing and emerging countries. Separate 
estimates for OECD countries based on a different methodology suggest 
indirect public support measures for fossil fuel production and use in 
developed countries on the order of US$45-75 billion per annum in 
recent years (OECD 2011). At a global scale, fossil fuel subsidies are six 
times higher than the financial support given to renewables (IEA 2013b). 
Phasing out these subsidies could provide around half the emissions 
reductions needed over the next decade to reach a trajectory that would 
limit global warming to +2°C.
Fossil fuel subsidies in developing countries are commonly justified as a 
means to make modern energy services affordable to the poor, and their 
removal is widely seen to hurt poor households disproportionally. Fact is, 
however, that fuel subsidization is a grossly inept instrument to target the 
poor. Using data for a sample of 20 developing countries, Arze del 
Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012) show that on average across 
sample countries, households in the top income quintile receive 42.8 
percent of the benefits from fuel subsidies while the bottom quintile 
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receives only 7.2 percent. This implies that the average burden to 
government budgets of transferring one dollar to the poor quintile is a 
mindboggling US$13.89, as nearly 93 percent of the subsidy leaks to the 
higher quantiles.13 
This is not to deny that the direct impacts of fuel subsidy cuts on fuel 
prices and on the prices of other goods via input-output linkages viewed 
in isolation will hit the poor, along with better-off households and 
production sectors intense in the use of fossil fuels or fossil-fuel-based 
power. But the ultimate distributional impact of such cuts, as well as 
their political feasibility, depends crucially on how governments use the 
additional fiscal space created by the reduced burden on government 
budgets.
As illustrated by a recent background study by Willenbockel and Hoa 
(2011) for UNDP (2012), adverse distributional and growth side effects of 
fossil fuel subsidy cuts are by no means inevitable. A dynamic scenario 
analysis based on a general equilibrium suggests in particular that 
adverse impacts on poor households can be neutralized (or turned into 
pro-poor impacts) by using part of the government savings arising from 
the subsidy cut for compensating cash transfers. Using the additional 
fiscal space to foster additional productive and more energy-efficient 
investments may actually raise income and consumption for all 
households in the medium run. The same argument applies to the 
hypothetical introduction of a carbon tax, also considered in this study, 
as the direction of the first order effects is essentially equivalent to that 
of a fossil fuel subsidy cut. The general tenor of these findings is broadly 
in line with the results of similar ex-ante general equilibrium simulation 
studies surveyed by Ellis (2010) and Boccanfuso et al. (2008). In short: 
fossil fuel subsidies are definitely not pro-poor – their elimination can 
be.
Poverty Implications of a Low-Carbon Transition in the Agriculture
 and Forestry Sector
Direct GHG emissions from agriculture (Figure 1 above), exclusive of 
13. The average figures mask even more extreme cases of bad policy targeting (taking the 
pro-poor motive for such subsidies at face value) that become apparent by looking at the 
disaggregated results for country groups and fuel types in Arze del Granado, Coady and 
Gillingham (2012: Table 12). E.g. in Africa, only 2.2 percent of gasoline subsidies reach the 
bottom quintile, implying a budgetary burden of over US$45 to transfer a single dollar to 
the poorest quintile through this instrument. 
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forest conversion into agricultural land, consist primarily of N2O 
(nitrous oxide) associated with fertilizer use, MH4 (methane) associated 
with enteric fermentation emissions from livestock and emissions from 
rice paddies and manure, and to a lesser extent, of net CO2 fluxes to the 
atmosphere associated with degradation of organic soils in tropical 
regions (Smith et al. 2008, 2013; Olander et al. 2013).
Potential mitigation measures include various changes in land and 
livestock management practices as detailed in Smith et al. (2008; 2013) 
and Lal (2011). As far as adverse direct and indirect land use change 
effects that could lead to a net increase in emissions can be avoided, 
biofuel production may be seen as a further option for mitigation action 
in the agricultural sector.
Smith et al. (2008) estimate the technically feasible global technical GHG 
mitigation potential from agriculture excluding fossil fuel offsets from 
biofuels by 2030 to be in the order of 5.5 to 6 Gt CO2e per year with 
economic potentials of 1.5 to 1.6, 2.5 to 2.7 and 4.0 to 4.3 at carbon prices of 
up to US$20, 50 and 100 per ton of CO2e respectively. The additional 
economic mitigation potential of replacing fossil fuels by biomass 
energy from agriculture is estimated to be 0.64, 2.24 and 16.0 Gt CO2e per 
year for the same three marginal abatement cost ranges.
However, any consideration of the potential contributions of agriculture 
in developing countries to GHG mitigation must take into account that 
the combination of population growth and rising per-capita incomes that 
will be accompanied by a shift towards more livestock-intense diets in 
parts of the world will translate into a substantial increase in the demand 
for agricultural output between now and the middle of the century. 
These demand-side drivers are bound to intensify the competition for 
land and water, particularly in low-income regions with high population 
growth and a high present incidence of undernutrition.14 
The need to adapt to the emerging impacts of climate change that are 
already locked into the system even under the most optimistic 
assumptions about future mitigation efforts adds to the pressure for 
low-income regions. Long-run agricultural productivity trends as well 
as short-run yield variability are directly affected by climate change and 
the associated expected increases in extreme weather events. A growing 
14. Government Office for Science (2011); Godfray et al. (2010). 
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number of studies suggest that climate change may well reduce the 
productivity of farming in precisely those regions of the world where 
undernutrition is already most prevalent.15 
Moreover, climate change mitigation policies aimed at the energy sector 
that raise fossil fuel prices would drive bioenergy demand upwards 
even in the absence of biofuel mandates and further intensify the 
competition for land. An extensification response in the form of 
converting forestland to farmland is obviously not a sustainable option, 
as net forest conversion would further add to emissions and reinforce 
the problem. 
It is precisely this confluence of pressures on agricultural systems that 
led the UK Government Foresight Report on the future of food and 
farming (Government Office for Science 2011) to the conclusion that the 
increase in the global food supply must be based on sustainable 
intensification. Sustainable intensification means simultaneously raising 
yields, increasing the efficiency with which inputs are used and 
reducing the GHG emissions associated with food production. It is a 
core principle of the wider notion of a climate-smart agriculture (CSA) 
that seeks to “(i) sustainably intensify production systems to achieve 
productivity increases, thereby supporting the achievement of national 
food security and development goals; (ii) increase the resilience of 
production systems and rural livelihoods (adaptation); and (iii) reduce 
agriculture’s GHG emissions (…) and increase carbon sequestration 
(mitigation)” (Branca et al. 2012).
A gradual move to a growth path based on this conception in the rural 
areas of SSA and South Asia with support from developed countries is 
in principle a pro-poor strategy, as it would raise returns to agricultural 
labor over time and speed up the structural transformations required to 
achieve the longer-term aim of eradicating extreme poverty. Pretty, 
Toulmin and Williams (2011) review 40 sustainable intensification 
projects with a coverage of 12.8 million ha of land across 20 African 
countries. They report an average yield increase across these projects by 
a factor of 2.13, benefiting 10.4 million farmers and their families.16  
15. See Willenbockel (2014) for further reference. See also Nelson et al. (2014). 
16. For further reference to empirical case study evidence on yield improvements and 
poverty impacts associated with the adoption of sustainable intensification practices see 
inter alia UNEP (2011), Cooper et al. (2013), ILO (2012: Ch.2), World Bank (2012: Ch.5), 
Shames et al. (2012). 
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The potential role of biofuel production within pro-poor low-carbon 
growth strategies remains a highly contested issue. The suitability of 
traditional food-crop-based first-generation biofuels, except for sugar 
cane based fuels, for the achievement of significant net GHG reductions 
is increasingly being called into question. However, various recent 
global scenario studies exploring feasible emission pathways to achieve 
the +2℃ goal see an indispensable role for second-generation ligno-
cellulosic biofuels in the future energy mix.17 These emergent advanced 
second-generation biofuels are based on non-edible inputs, including 
crop and forest residues, grasses (switchgrass, miscanthus) or fast-
growing trees (poplar, willow, eucalyptus) that can be grown on 
marginal and degraded land not suitable for food crop production and 
are expected to have a far higher net GHG reduction potential than 
conventional first-generation bioenergy feedstocks (Lotze-Campen et al. 
2014; OECD 2013). 
For parts of SSA in particular, the hope is that a carefully regulated 
allocation of marginal land to next-generation bioenergy production 
could avoid the risks of harmful effects on poor people widely 
associated with a large-scale conversion of land for commercial first-
generation biofuel production.18 This includes risks such as the 
uncompensated loss of access to land for smallholders with precarious 
customary land tenure rights and adverse food security impacts. Lynd 
and Woods (2011) envisage a large future potential of pro-poor benefits 
for Africa offered by an integration of second-generation bioenergy 
conversion technologies into agricultural value chains and outline the 
requirements for a realization of these benefits.
Through their implications for land use and access to land, mitigation 
measures in agriculture are closely interconnected with measures to 
achieve reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD), and the potential poverty impacts of the latter are likewise 
subject to controversial debate. A major bone of contention in the 
voluminous pertinent literature is how alternative design options for the 
REDD+ carbon finance scheme under a global post-Kyoto climate 
agreement affect the livelihoods of poor forest users. There are concerns 
as to how safeguards can be established to ensure that the interests of 
national elites and international investors do not override the rights of 
17. See Lotze-Campen et al. (2014) for reference to these scenario studies. 
18. See e.g. Cotula, Dyer and Vermeulen (2008) and Mitchell (2011). 
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local forest communities and that an equitable share of the REDD+ 
benefits reaches the poorest members of these communities.19 
Meanwhile, the UNFCCC 19th Conference of Parties in December 2013 has 
agreed upon the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which specifies the key 
design features of the future scheme that would take effect if a global deal 
is reached in 2015. The Framework includes safeguard clauses that aim to 
ensure that REDD+ is implemented in equitable ways and in accordance 
with a country’s sovereignty. Notably, it contains a requirement for 
recipient countries of carbon finance to publish periodic information on 
how these safeguards are being addressed and respected.
5� Concluding Remarks
The point of departure and motivation for this chapter is the joint 
proposition that there will be no lasting global poverty eradication 
without low-carbon growth and no global low-carbon transition 
without poverty reduction. Or as Nicholas Stern (2009) has put it 
emphatically, “(t)he two defining challenges of our century are 
overcoming world poverty and managing climate change. If we fail on 
one, we fail on the other.” Thus, the aims of equitable or pro-poor 
growth and low-carbon growth are intrinsically linked and need to be 
addressed together.
A closer look at the basic merciless algebra of global GHG emissions and 
low-cost mitigation pathways reveals an important message: the 
prevailing view that the emission paths of today’s least developed 
countries are largely irrelevant from a global mitigation perspective is 
demonstrably mistaken. In fact, average LDC emissions per capita are 
already higher now than the maximum average global per-capita 
emissions permissible in 2050 if the +2°C target is to be reached at 
manageable mitigation costs. Thus, the widely held view that over the 
next few decades these countries should focus exclusively on the 
promotion of growth unconstrained by low-carbon considerations and 
on adaptation measures to bolster their future resilience to climate 
change impacts, needs to be reconsidered.
19. E.g. Brown, Seymour and Peskett (2008) and Funder (2009) fur further elaboration. For 
alternative critical perspectives see Leach and Scoones (2013) and Fairhead, Leach and 
Scoones (2012). 
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Fortunately, there are a number of good economic reasons why it could be 
in LDCs’ own self-interest to adopt a low-carbon growth strategy at an 
early stage. In particular, (i) the large potential for low-cost mitigation 
measures in the developing world including LDCs provides opportunities 
for substantial mutual gains from carbon credit transactions between 
developed and developing countries; (ii) choosing low-carbon modes of 
development now will reduce the economic burden of GHG gas mitigation 
in the future by avoiding a high-carbon technology lock-in; (iii) the 
avoidance of potential adverse impacts on future export growth 
performance in the case of border tax adjustments and shifts in consumer 
preferences to low-carbon varieties in other countries; (iv) the realization of 
gains from lower outdoor / indoor pollution; and (v) improvements in 
energy security and the relaxation of foreign exchange constraints due to 
less dependence on fossil fuel imports.
But how pro-poor is the transition to a low-carbon growth path? The 
existing literature on pro-poor low-carbon development identifies a 
range of clear synergies between mitigation and poverty reduction 
objectives, but as the selective discussion of the prospects for the 
transition to a pro-poor low-carbon path in the agriculture, forestry and 
energy sectors of low-income countries in this chapter indicates there 
are also trade-offs. A narrow conception of pro-poor low carbon growth 
strategies that focuses exclusively on the implementation of coincidental 
win-win measures aims too short, if redistributive measures are feasible 
that could reverse the ultimate equity outcomes of policies with high 
mitigation impact but adverse primary impacts on poverty. The removal 
of fossil fuel subsidies and the introduction of a carbon tax discussed in 
this chapter illustrate the point. The direct price impacts of these 
mitigation policies are bound to hit the poor along with the better-off, 
but the joint use of distributive measures could in principle generate a 
positive net impact on the poor. More generally, multiple policy 
objectives call for the use of multiple policy levers. 
The key message of this chapter is that a success of the adoption of pro-
poor low-carbon strategies by low-income countries with significant 
mitigation potential along the lines outlined above requires 
development cooperation efforts between high- and low-income 
countries on an unprecedented scale. This includes the completion and 
implementation of a comprehensive global climate agreement with 
binding targets and effective and sufficiently funded mechanisms for 
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the transfer of carbon finance flows as an essential prerequisite.
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Chapter 7 
Structural Transformation, the Quality of 
Growth and Employment Outcomes
Xavier Cirera1 
1� Introduction
The emphasis in economic growth as the main driver of economic 
development has been shifting in the last decade to include a more 
nuanced view of the characteristics of the economic growth process. As 
a result, more attention is being paid to understanding the “quality” of 
economic growth in terms of facilitating development outcomes. Chief 
among these elements is the impact of economic growth on the quality 
of employment.
Traditional economic development models a-la-Lewis (1954) link the 
process of economic development to the type of economic growth 
experienced, which translates into changes in standards of living 
through a process of structural change. In these models, economic 
development can be characterized by the reallocation of employment 
from low productivity “traditional” sectors, such as agriculture, to high 
productivity “modern” sectors, such as manufacturing. As productivity 
growth in agriculture accelerates, labor is transferred from agriculture 
to industry. Accordingly, when the share of employment in higher 
productivity sectors grows, more people are employed in higher wage 
sectors and enjoy better labor conditions. Structural change, therefore, 
allows the linking of economic growth to the quality of employment by 
looking at the type of sector productivity growth and reallocation of 
factors of production that drives the economic growth process.  
One critical driver of economic growth in the last decade in developing 
countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, has been the large export 
boom in primary commodities. This has resulted in further specialization 
1. I would like to thank Antonio Martuscelli for superb research assistantship, an 
anonymous referee for useful comments, and JICA and AFD for financial assistance. 
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of the production base of these countries in natural resources and 
agriculture. One risk of this pattern of growth is that it potentially locks 
employment in some of the poorer countries into low productivity sectors, 
minimizing the transformational potential of employment growth in 
reducing poverty and vulnerability. This type of “negative” structural 
change has been documented empirically by some authors (see for example 
McMillan and Rodrik 2011 for Latin America and Africa).
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the link between 
structural change and employment outcomes, such as unemployment and 
some indicators of the quality of employment. We complement the 
existing literature by analyzing structural change beyond the reallocation 
of employment across sectors and investigate the impact of structural 
change on different labor outcomes. Specifically, we focus on two key 
elements. First, we test whether the pattern of growth in developing 
countries is one of “jobless” growth. Second we analyze one dimension of 
labor quality where there is data available, security of tenure and career 
prospects (UNECE 2010), using indicators such as unemployment, 
informality of employment or vulnerability of the labor force.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes some of 
the literature on structural change and the links to labor outcomes. 
Section 3 describes the dataset used. Section 4 describes the evolution of 
several indicators of employment quality and based on the results, 
estimates a measure of structural change. Section 5 empirically analyzes 
the link between the type of growth pattern and employment quality 
indicators. The last section provides some brief conclusions.
2� Structural transformation, economic growth and 
    labor outcomes
Several studies have analyzed the process of structural change in 
developing countries. These are mainly motivated by a concern about 
the patterns of production common in some developing countries that 
are based on primary commodities and low sophistication/
technological intensity products. Key among these concerns is the 
continuous decline in the importance of the manufacturing sectors in 
the economy in some countries. 
Growth in the manufacturing sector is credited with having significant 
positive economic and social spillover effects into other sectors and the 
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entire economy. Kaldor (1967) stated through his “growth laws” that 
growth in the industrial and manufacturing sector is correlated with 
larger economy-wide growth. Increasing returns to scale and learning 
by doing imply that growth in the manufacturing and industrial sector 
translates into significant productivity growth (Kaldor 1967). In 
addition, other authors have suggested that manufacturing employment 
growth helps to create a middle class that forces institutional 
improvements, resulting in further growth and better living standards. 
As a result, a strand of the development economics literature has 
emphasized the importance of the manufacturing sector as the critical 
element for structural change and a key engine for the improvement of 
labor standards and institutions. 
Szirmai (2012), for example, looks at the issue of structural change across 
regions. The author suggests that Africa and some Latin American 
countries have become an exception in terms of structural change. 
While between 1980 and 2005 the share of manufacturing in total output 
continued to increase in many Asian economies, there has been a 
process of deindustrialization in Latin America and Africa. Concretely, 
in the 22 African countries for which data was available, manufacturing 
output ranged between 8.5% and 13.3% of GDP, with an 11% average for 
the continent. Memedovic and Lapadre (2010), focusing mainly on sub-
Saharan countries, identified three different periods of structural 
change. The first, in the 1970s, corresponded to strong increases in value 
added, extractive industries. The second occurred in the period 1980-
1995 with a large expansion of the services sector, which was later 
negated after 1995, as regional specialization in raw material production 
deepened, to the detriment of manufacturing and services.
In a recent study McMillan and Rodrik (2011) have empirically analyzed 
the issue of structural change for a sample of developing countries. The 
authors calculate labor productivity changes for a set of countries with 
available information for the period 1990-2005. The authors follow the 
standard decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth in two 
components (see Section 3 for a detailed explanation). The first 
component is the growth that is accounted for within-sector 
productivity growth, which is related to increases in sector efficiency 
over time and rationalization of productive units as countries face, for 
example, more competition from opening up markets and integration 
into the world economy. 
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The second component, between-sector growth, is related to the 
contribution of labor productivity growth that corresponds to labor 
shifting to higher productivity sectors – the structural change component. 
This labor reallocation measure is the critical element in understanding 
the direction of labor flows and the potential impact on labor outcomes. 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) find a negative contribution of the structural 
change component - the between-sector measure- to average labor 
productivity growth in Latin America and Africa, while this relationship 
is found to be positive in Asia. This would suggest that labor reallocations 
in the Latin American and African regions are mainly directed to less 
productive sectors. The authors show that the main factors that determine 
this “negative” structural change pattern are high commodity prices and 
the pattern of comparative advantage in these regions. 
These findings are, however, contested by other authors. While there is a 
significant amount of evidence indicating the loss of importance of the 
manufacturing sector in most economies, other studies suggest that the 
structural change component is positive, although small, in most 
developing countries. Regional aggregate results mask significant 
differences across countries. For example, the estimated structural 
change component in McMillan and Rodrik (2011) for Africa is positive 
in four out of the nine countries of the sample. More recently, Kucera 
and Roncolato (2012) estimate the structural change decomposition for a 
sample of countries and find that the structural change component has 
contributed positively to labor productivity growth in most countries. A 
similar result is reached in the World Development Report (World Bank 
2013), which implies that some of the regional average results might be 
driven by a few large countries. Kucera and Roncolato (2012) re-estimate 
the labor productivity growth decomposition with the McMillan and 
Rodrik (2011) dataset adding an interactive term, “within*between” 
components, to capture whether the reallocation of labor happens to 
sectors with declining or growing labor productivity. The results 
suggest that with the interaction term, the negative structural change 
finding in McMillan and Rodrik (2011) is significantly reduced.
In addition to whether the structural change component is positive or 
negative, it is important to compare its contribution to the within-sector 
growth component. This is especially important when considering 
potential labor outcomes. Kucera and Roncolato (2012) emphasize that the 
within-sector component tends to be larger for most countries than the 
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structural change component. This finding is also corroborated 
empirically by Ocampo et al. (2009) as well as Timmer and de Vries (2009). 
The relevance of these results is related to the fact that often within-sector 
productivity growth is explained by a significant adjustment of operating 
firms in the sector. More productive firms expand and less productive 
firms exit the market (Foster et al. 2008). This is translated into significant 
reallocation of workers, with some exiting the labor market or becoming 
employed elsewhere. The total net effect is unclear, and when 
employment creation is low in most productive firms, the resultant 
pattern of productivity growth is one of potential “jobless” growth.
The hypothesis of “jobless” growth has been analyzed in the literature, 
but it does not appear to be supported by the evidence, which finds a 
positive correlation between output growth and employment growth. 
Nevertheless, Kucera and Roncolato (2012) find a weaker relationship 
between output growth and employment growth and a negative 
relationship between productivity growth and employment growth in 
developing countries. The authors suggest that “jobless” growth may be 
a problem for some developing countries, especially in Asia.
One problem with some of this literature is the fact that the dichotomy 
between manufacturing, modern sectors, and agriculture, natural 
resources assumed in some studies, has become blurred in the last 
decades with the emergence of services. The services sector is the largest 
sector in terms of creating added value and employment in almost all 
developed and developing countries, and only in some countries with 
large agriculture and natural resource sectors such as DRC, Ethiopia or 
Liberia, does the services sector not dominate. In addition, the services 
trade has expanded significantly in recent years in line with the 
emergence of global production fragmentation. This implies that when 
analyzing structural change, rather than looking at manufacturing 
shares only as the “modern” or high productive sector, one must 
consider more generally the reallocation of employment from low to 
high productivity sectors. Including services makes the analysis 
challenging, because some knowledge services are highly productive 
while some other sector services are likely to have low productivity. 
Overall, this literature suggests that there is a link between the pattern of 
economic and productivity growth and labor outcomes. Most of the 
studies, however, focus on the impacts on employment creation. One 
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assumption when it comes to considering the quality of employment is 
that employing more people in higher productivity sectors not only 
creates employment and raises wages but also reduces vulnerability or 
informality by strengthening labor market institutions. In addition, 
employing more people in natural resource-related sectors might increase 
worker vulnerability and adversely affect labor institutions in the 
medium run by for example increasing income inequality and reducing 
the size of the middle class. The final labor outcome, however, depends on 
the interaction between labor sector changes and labor institutions.
When thinking about labor outcomes it is important to consider quality 
attributes. Employment changes can have different implications 
depending on whether they are based on bad working conditions, lack 
of security or child labor. Therefore, it is important to analyze whether 
the impacts on labor outcomes from structural change translate into 
better or worse labor quality indicators. 
Defining labor quality, however, is a complex task since it has many 
dimensions. UNECE (2010) defines seven dimensions of the quality of 
employment: 1) safety and ethics of employment, 2) income and benefits 
from employment, 3) working hours and balancing work and nonworking, 
4) security of employment and social protection, 5) social dialogue, 6) skills 
development and training, and 7) workplace relationships and work 
motivation. Although, including most of the potential dimensions are 
necessary in providing an overall picture of employment quality, the main 
difficulty of implementing this framework is the lack of available 
indicators, especially for developing countries. In addition, one 
additional dimension of quality that also needs be considered is the (lack 
of) opportunities in the labor market for new entrants.
In this paper we operationalize the concept of labor quality by using a set 
of available indicators for developing countries produced by the ILO: 
specifically youth unemployment, informal employment and vulnerable 
employment. These correspond mainly to elements of job security and job 
opportunities, although they also have embedded some elements such as 
social protection. In the next sections we look empirically at this issue and 
analyze the impact of different growth patterns on labor outcomes 
associated to unemployment and these quality of employment indicators.
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3� Data and evolution of labor outcomes indicators
3.1 Data sources
We use two main sources of data for the empirical analysis. Labor 
outcomes data is from the ILO Key Labor Market Indicators (KLMI) 
available at LABORSTAT.2 We focus on four main indicators: 
unemployment, youth unemployment, employment in the informal 
sector and vulnerability of employment. 
The first indicator measures the unemployment rate and helps to test the 
hypothesis of “jobless” growth: whether the impact of productivity 
growth is mainly in reducing labor intensity with an overall zero or 
negative effect on employment. The second indicator is the youth 
unemployment rate, those unemployed between 15 and 24 years old, 
which we use to analyze whether certain patterns of economic growth 
are more conducive to allowing entry for younger people into the labor 
market. The third indicator, which we use to analyze the impact on the 
quality of employment, is the number of people employed in the 
informal sector.3 This allows us to analyze the effect of growth on 
reallocating labor from the informal to the formal sector. The last 
indicator used to measuring the quality of employment is the share of 
vulnerable employment in total employment. Vulnerable employment is 
defined as those self-employed without employees and those 
contributing to family labor. Although self-employment should not 
necessarily be considered a more vulnerable category of employment, 
especially in developed countries, the evidence suggest that as countries 
develop, fewer people are self-employed in traditional activities or 
employed in helping with family activities, and more are employed in 
industry and services.4 As discussed above, while this set of indicators is 
not a comprehensive list of proxies that could capture all dimensions of 
the quality of employment, they measure some of the most important 
dimensions around the quality of employment, and more importantly, 
provide enough data to allow some empirical analysis.
Table 1 tabulates basic statistics for unemployment and the quality of 
employment variables in the dataset by income group as determined in 
2. www.ilo.org/kilm 
3. The ILO defines informal employment as “the estimated number of persons in informal 
employment to the total number of employed persons in the non-agricultural sector”. 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/informal_economy_E.html 
4. www.ilo.org/kilm 
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2010. The most complete series for a larger number of countries are 
unemployment rates, followed by youth unemployment. Data for 
vulnerable employment is available for 162 countries. In the case of 
informal employment, data is scarce and only available for 41 countries, 
15 of which have more than one observation over time and only three of 
which are high-income countries. Some of the data for low-income 
countries is rarely available and in some cases presents quality problems. 
As a result, in the empirical analysis we use one low-income group that 
includes low- and low-middle income countries. Also, one important 
element to clarify is the need to contextualize some definitions of the 
variables. For example, low unemployment rates in low-income countries 
are more the result of having fewer people satisfying the definition of 
being formally unemployed, while being underemployed in rural areas. 
While unemployment is not likely to be a good measure of 
underemployment, it is a critical measure to test the hypothesis of 
“jobless” growth and the transition of employment to the formal sector. 
    
Table 1� Basic statistics on quality of employment variables
Income group Stats unemployment Youth 
unemployment
Informal 
employment
Vulnerable 
employment
High income Mean         7.69     16.62   32.96   12.07
N 1046  932   15 778
std. Dev         4.26       8.81   10.98      7.05
Low income Mean         4.95     10.06   67.08   79.30
N       78     42     6   51 
std. Dev         4.25       9.46   10.50   13.83
Low middle 
income
Mean       10.57     20.82   56.27   49.36
N    403   241   41 287
std. Dev         9.13     13.98   13.68   15.78
Upper middle 
income
Mean       11.29     23.43   46.49   30.46
N    635  449   85 448
std. Dev         7.21     13.37   12.85   13.12
All Mean         9.19     18.90   48.67   26.37
N 2162 1664 147 1564
std. Dev         6.60      11.53   14.83   20.51
Source: Author’s own elaboration from KILM (ILO 2013)
Data on value added, labor shares, GDP, population, endowment and 
sector shares has been obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2013). We use data for the period 1990-2011, covering a 
period of more than two decades and all countries. Data on employment 
shares by aggregate sector is very limited to a few observations and not 
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for all countries, which makes estimating measures of structural change 
very challenging. All GDP variables are in 2005 US$ prices. In order to 
capture endowments we use population, for labor endowments, and 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, for natural resource 
endowments.
Since labor market outcomes also depend on labor regulations, we use 
the rigidity of the labor market regulations index developed by the 
Fraser Institute as part of the Economic Freedom Indicators (Gwartney 
et al. 2012). This indicator ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores 
indicating less rigidity of labor regulations. The index is a composite 
that includes rigidity in hiring regulations and minimum wage, hiring 
and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, working hour 
regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal and conscription. 
Unfortunately the dataset is available year by year only from 2000. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis using this variable uses mainly data 
from 2000 onwards.
    
3.2  Evolution of labour outcome indicators
Table 2 shows the incidence of the quality of labor indicators in terms of 
top and bottom countries, while Table 3 shows the evolution over time of 
these indicators by income level group. Regarding unemployment rates, 
these appear above 30% in a few developing countries from all regions. 
However, when looking at countries with the lowest unemployment 
rates the data indicates that Gulf States and some low-income SSA 
countries have rates close to zero. While this is likely to reflect the reality 
for Gulf States; for low-income SSA countries this suggests the extent of 
unemployment discussed earlier. This makes comparisons between 
countries in this region difficult, suggesting a need to focus on changes 
over time of these indicators. When looking at evolution over time, we 
find that unemployment rates are larger in the last five-year period than 
in the first five-year period for high-income and upper-middle countries. 
This is largely related to the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, but it also 
shows significant weaknesses of the growth pattern in these countries in 
relation to employment creation. 
In regard to vulnerable employment, this is concentrated mainly in low-
income agriculture intensive countries in SSA, where most people do 
not have access to formal employment and work in subsistence 
agriculture. On the other hand, it is lower in Gulf States where most 
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people are formally employed by companies. Vulnerable employment 
rates are low in high-income countries and very high, more than 50% in 
low-income countries, suggesting that as countries develop 
vulnerability of employment decreases. Looking over time, vulnerable 
employment rates have decreased across countries at all income groups, 
however, this reduction has been disappointing, especially for low 
income countries with a modest weighted average decrease of 1.18 
points. Youth unemployment follows a similar pattern to 
unemployment rates in terms of country incidence. Youth 
unemployment tends to be larger than adult unemployment. It also has 
increased in high-income countries as compared to the second part of 
the 1990s.
Table 2� Top and bottom 5 countries based on selected labor indicators
Unemployment (%) Informality (%) Vulnerable 
employment (%)
Youth 
unemployment (%)
Djibouti
Kosovo
Macedonia
Armenia
Solomon Islands
51.50
47.43
33.93
32.33
31.90
India
Mali
Bolivia
Madagascar
Peru
83.50
81.80
75.10
73.60
73.33
Burundi
Chad
Burkina Faso
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
94.40
93.70
93.03
92.50
92.40
Kosovo
Marshall Islands
Macedonia
Guadeloupe
Bosnia
72.64
63.40
60.25
56.49
55.38
Benin
Rwanda
Kuwait
Chad
Burundi
  1.10
  1.05
  0.98
  0.70
  0.50
Timor-Leste
Moldova
Macedonia
Poland
Serbia
17.80
15.90
12.60
10.95
  6.10
Bahrain
Kuwait
Tuvalu
U. A. E.
Qatar
  2.11
  2.10
  2.00
  1.40
  0.43
Nepal
Qatar
Benin
Burundi
Rwanda
  3.00
  1.45
  1.25
  0.70
  0.70
Source: Author’s own elaboration from KILM (ILO 2013)
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Regarding informality of employment, this is very large especially in some 
middle income countries such as India or Peru and other low income 
countries across all continents, suggesting that informality might be 
embedded in particular institutional contexts. In terms of low-informality 
for the countries with data available, which mainly excludes high income 
countries; this appears low in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
republics. Figure 1 shows the evolution of informality for those countries 
with more than one observation over time. Interestingly, informality 
appears to have increased or stayed at similar levels in most countries.
These indicators suggest that the pattern of economic growth has not 
resulted in substantial improvements in the quality of employment 
indicators used in this analysis. This is likely the result of the recent 
financial crisis, but also it suggests that some of the high growth in 
developing countries have perhaps not had the full transformative 
potential desired for these countries.
  
4� Quality of labor and structural change across developed and
    developing countries
4.1 Measuring Structural change  
In order to characterize structural change we calculate direct measures 
of structural change following the decomposition of labor productivity 
growth suggested in the literature (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). The 
decomposition separates the aggregate growth in value added per 
worker into two components (equation 1); where VL is value added per 
worker in sector i and year t and s is the employment share in sector i 
and year t. The first component, the within-sector productivity growth, 
captures the part of value added growth per worker that corresponds to 
sectoral productivity growth. The second component, the between or 
structural change growth, captures the part of the productivity growth 
that corresponds to labor shares being reallocated to higher or lower 
productivity sectors. When the structural change component is 
negative, labor is being reallocated into lower productivity sectors.
    
　　　　　　　　　
(1)
A critical element in calculating the decomposition in (1) is the choice of 
sectors. Data on sector employment share is very scarce. Some studies 
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use a sample of countries with detailed sector data from existing input-
output tables (McMillan and Rodrik 2011; Kucera and Roncolato 2012; 
Timmer and de Vries 2009). The advantage of using more sectors is that it 
allows a more nuanced description of the productivity growth pattern. 
However, it restricts the analysis to a very small number of countries, 
usually larger and higher income countries.5 Therefore, in order to have 
a measure that we can extend to as many countries as possible and can 
be used in the econometric analysis, we estimate a simpler version of the 
decomposition based on only two sectors, agriculture vs. non-
agriculture. This reflects a more traditional structural change measure 
of reallocation away from agriculture, but also implies masking large 
within-sector heterogeneity in the non-agriculture sector. 
To estimate equation (1) we use sector employment shares and value 
added for the agricultural and other sectors available in WDI (2013). We 
use those countries with at least two years of information available. In 
total we have information for 117 countries, 41 high income, 37 upper 
middle-income, 28 low middle-income and 11 low-income countries. The 
period analyzed varies country by country, but in around 70% of cases 
we are able to measure value-added peer worker change from late 1990s 
or early 2000s to the period 2007-2011.  
 
4.2 Structural change measures 
Table 4 shows the results aggregated by income group of applying the 
decomposition proposed in equation (1) to the dataset. For the analysis, 
we have excluded outlier countries with very low or very large 
components – values below the 1st percentile and above 99th percentile 
since these are likely to indicate the bad quality of the data.6 The 
estimates are a weighted average using country GDP as weights.
5. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) carry out the analysis for 11 countries, primarily middle-
income countries. 
6. Almost all of these outliers are in the low-income group and therefore only affect the 
results for this group. When including outliers, the results for the low-income group 
suggest a structural change component of 5% and within growth of 6.25%.  
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Table 4� VA decomposition by income groupa (GDP weighted)
VA/L% within structural
High income   1.54%   1.65% -0.11%
Low income 11.94%   4.24%    7.70%
Low middle income 15.57% 12.30%    3.28%
Upper middle income   4.78%   3.41%    1.37%
a Excludes outliers defined as those countries with structural change component in the 1st and 99th 
percentile. Source: Author’s own elaboration from WDI.
Value added per worker increased very modestly in high-income 
countries and very significantly in low middle-income and low-income 
countries. In general within-sector productivity growth is larger than 
structural change, with the exception of low-income countries. The size 
of the structural change coefficients is consistent with economic 
development models where structural change components are larger at 
lower levels of development, since more people are reallocated to higher 
productivity sectors outside agriculture. In the case of high-income 
countries the structural change term is even negative. These results are 
different than McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and more in line with Kucera 
and Roncolato (2012) aggregates. In both cases, these use a more 
disaggregated sector dataset, although for a smaller set of countries. 
Structural change estimates are also positive for SSA in our dataset, 
where value added per worker increased by 3.18%: 2.45% corresponding 
to within-sector growth and 0.72% to structural change.
Individual results are plotted in Figure 2 above, excluding countries with 
extreme values, and the results for top and bottom performing countries 
are summarized in Table 5. India is the country with the largest value 
added per worker growth, mainly explained by high productivity growth 
of the non-agricultural sector, services. A similar pattern, although with 
lower growth is followed by Maldives. In terms of structural change 
Cameroon, Bhutan, Ethiopia, Nepal and Oman are the countries with 
larger positive structural change; and the Dominican Republic, Morocco, 
Korea, Zambia and Brunei the ones with the larger negative structural 
change. In 47 countries structural change is negative, while in the 
remaining 64 structural change is positive, which suggest large diversity 
of results regarding structural change. Finally and in line with the 
literature, within productivity growth is the main driver of value added 
per worker growth. In 97 of the 117 countries with data available, within 
productivity growth is larger than the structural change component.
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Table 5� Top and bottom countries’ VA decomposition
 VA/L% within Structural change
India  31.53% India  25.53% Cameroon 20.65%
Burkina Faso  17.65% Maldives  13.65% Bhutan 12.64%
Maldives  15.53% Zambia  12.83% Ethiopia 10.64%
Cambodia  13.11% Armenia  11.07% Nepal 10.45%
Tanzania  12.79% Senegal  10.57% Oman 10.33%
Ukraine   -0.69% Bhutan - 2.15% Dominican Rep.  -1.77%
Kyrgyz Republic   -1.52% Ukraine  -3.79% Morocco - 2.10%
Brunei   -8.09% Belarus  -8.82% Korea, Rep.  -2.43%
Belarus   -8.37% Gabon -17.15% Zambia  -2.77%
Gabon -10.30% Cameroon -19.68% Brunei  -6.42%
Source: Author’s own elaboration from WDI
These results suggest significant heterogeneity of experiences regarding 
structural change. This tends to be larger in low-income countries, but 
within each income group there are significant differences. More 
importantly, within-sector productivity growth tends to be the main 
driver of productivity growth.  
4.3  Unemployment, quality of employment and economic growth
Before looking more formally at how different patterns of economic 
growth affect the quality of employment, we briefly explore whether 
countries changes in labor outcomes indicators are highly correlated 
with economic growth. Figure 3 shows non-parametric plots of changes 
in the four labor quality indicators and the average rate of growth. 
Specifically, we compute the year-to-year rate of change of the four 
variables average in the 1990s and the 2000s, and plot these rates against 
the average rate of growth for the period for each country. This allows us 
to explore whether it is likely that economic growth is the main driver of 
the path in these variables.
Panels (a) and (c) show the plots for unemployment rates and youth 
unemployment rate changes. Although, some of the points lie outside 
the confidence interval, the plots depict a potential negative 
relationship, and suggest that economic growth might be an important 
driver in reducing both types of unemployment. Panels (b) and (d) for 
informality and vulnerable employment, on the other hand, show no 
clear relationship between economic growth and changes in these 
variables. This suggests that other factors might be important drivers of 
change in these labor outcomes.
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Figure 3� Non-parametric plots
(a) Unemployment rate change 
        and GDP growth
 
(b) Youth unemployment rate change 
        and GDP growth
(c) Informality rate change and 
      GDP growth
(d) Vulnerable rate change and 
        GDP growth
 
The relationship between growth, structural change and labour 
outcomes are further explored in the next section.   
5� Growth pattern, structural change and labor outcomes
5.1  Specifications
In this section we examine empirically the impact of the pattern of 
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growth and structural change on different quality of labor outcomes. 
We use a two-stage methodology. In the first stage, we estimate a 
reduced form equation where labor market outcomes are a function of 
income per capita, income growth and structural characteristics of the 
economy. In the second stage we analyze directly the impact of 
structural change measures on labor outcomes. 
Specifically in the first stage we estimate equation (2) below:
 　　　　(2)
Each labor outcome (L) in country i in year t is explained by a set of 
variables. We proxy structural characteristics of the economy (Str) using 
labor endowments (population), rents from natural resources as a share 
of GDP, manufacturing value added as a share of GDP and agriculture 
value added as a share of GDP. These variables attempt to capture how 
differences in the pattern of sectoral growth (i.e. growth via 
manufacturing sector or agriculture) impact quality of labor outcomes. 
We also use an augmented specification that takes into account the degree 
of flexibility of the labor market as defined in section 3. Unfortunately, for 
this variable we only have data available from 2000, which represents a 
significant drop in the number of observations. This augmented 
specification also includes an interactive term between GDP growth and a 
dummy for SSA and a dummy for the Latin America and the Caribbean 
Region. This interactive term aims at capturing whether the effect of 
economic growth is different in these regions given the more natural 
resource-based economic growth prevalent in these economies.
The final dataset covers the period 1990-2001 and includes more than 160 
countries. Data availability for labor outcomes is, however, problematic 
for many low income and developing countries, limiting, therefore, the 
size of the dataset to be used for the estimations. Equation (2) is 
estimated in logarithms and using country fixed effects and year 
dummies. In order to estimate directly the impact of structural change 
on labor outcomes in a second stage we average the dataset and add as 
regressors the different structural change components estimated from 
equation (1). The advantage of this approach is that it allows the use of 
direct structural change measures. The main disadvantage, however, is 
the significant loss of observations since we lose the panel structure and 
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rely only on a cross-section of countries. 
Specifically, we estimate equation (3):
   (3)
We use different proxies for economic growth and sources of growth. 
The first specification uses GDP growth, the second value added per 
worker growth; then we use the measure of structural change calculated 
above and the measure of within-sector productivity growth. These two 
decomposition measures are then interacted with a dummy for low-
income countries to test whether their effects on labor outcomes are 
different at lower levels of development. All variables are averaged for 
the period 1990-2011. In total, we have data for around 100 countries, 
with the exception of informal employment that given the low 
availability of data, only 36 observations, we omit from the analysis in 
this section.
5.2 Results
Table 6 shows the main results for the four types of labor outcomes. 
Looking at the estimates of the base line specification that maximizes 
the number of observations (odd columns), both the level of GDP per 
capita and the rate of economic growth reduce unemployment and 
youth unemployment. Interestingly and in line with the non-parametric 
plots in the neither previous section, neither income per capita nor GDP 
growth appear to be robust predictors of employment in the informal 
sector or vulnerable employment.
The results regarding the structure of economic growth and 
endowments are also interesting. Countries with larger labor 
endowments measured by population appear to have larger 
unemployment, youth unemployment, informal employment and 
vulnerable employment; although for youth unemployment and 
vulnerable employment the estimated coefficients are only marginally 
significant. The coefficient on natural resource rents to proxy for the size 
of the extractive sector is positive but only marginally significant for 
youth unemployment. A more puzzling result is related to the impact of 
manufacturing value added. The estimated coefficients are positive and 
marginally significant for unemployment and youth unemployment. 
This would suggest that increases in manufacturing productivity might 
reduce labor intensity and generate unemployment, although the low 
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significance of the coefficients suggests that we should interpret the 
results with caution. Finally, agriculture value added does not appear to 
explain any of these labor outcomes.
Looking at the augmented specifications (even columns) allows us to 
analyze the impact of different labor institutions, proxied by the labor 
regulations freedom index. Including this variable, however, reduces 
significantly the number of observations to half of the sample. The labor 
institutions index does not appear to be a significant predictor of these 
labor outcomes; and it is only negative and marginally significant for the 
unemployment rate specification, suggesting that more flexible labor 
markets have lower unemployment rates. 
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The impact of the interactive GDP growth*region dummies does not 
appear statistically significant for unemployment and non-
unemployment rates. In the case of informal employment the SSA 
interactive term suggests that, at least in SSA, economic growth reduced 
informal employment. Similarly, economic growth appears to reduce 
vulnerable employment in Latin America. Finally, manufacturing value 
added growth reduces informality when we reduce the sample to the 
2000s.
Overall, these results suggest that economic growth does not result in 
“jobless” growth since on average it reduces unemployment rates. This 
is in line with recent evidence for East Asian countries (Hanusch 2012) 
and consistent with recent estimates of the elasticities of employment to 
economic growth in OECD countries (Cazes et al. 2011). It is possible, 
however, that when TFP growth in the manufacturing sector is large, 
this results in fewer jobs. On the other hand, large agriculture value 
added or dependency on natural resources does not seem to impact 
unemployment rates. Informal and vulnerable employment does not 
seem to be determined by income growth or income per capita; only by 
the population size.
Tables 7 to 9 show the OLS estimates for each labor outcome separately. 
Starting with unemployment rates in Table 7, the results suggest that, as 
expected, countries with larger income per capita tend to have lower 
unemployment rates. Interestingly, growth rates do not significantly 
impact unemployment rates, which is likely the result of growth rates 
tending to be more extreme, both positive and negative, in developing 
countries with larger unemployment rates. On the other hand, countries 
with larger TFP growth tend to have lower unemployment. When we 
look at the decomposition of this growth, the results suggest that 
countries with larger positive structural change tend to have lower 
unemployment rates, while countries with larger within-sector 
productivity growth tend to have more unemployment; with the 
exception of low-income countries where both components reduce 
unemployment. This suggests that when most of the productivity 
growth is not reallocated to higher productivity sectors, the 
unemployment outcomes are worse. Finally, the labor freedom index is 
positive but only statistically significant in the specification using value 
added per worker.
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Table 8 shows the estimates for youth unemployment. The results are 
somehow similar to total unemployment. Countries with higher income 
per capita and TFP growth tend to have less youth unemployment. The 
structural change coefficients are not statistically significant, which 
suggests that youth unemployment depends on other factors not related 
to structural change. The interactive term suggests that structural 
change and within-sector productivity reduces youth unemployment 
only for low-income countries, but this could be explained by other 
factors. One potential explanation is the fact that population growth and 
new entrants to labor markets are much larger in low-income countries, 
and this is being captured by the interactive term.
For the case of vulnerable employment in Table 9, the results are more 
puzzling to interpret. As expected countries with lower income per 
capita tend to have more vulnerable employment, but countries with 
larger GDP, TFP growth and within-sector productivity growth tend to 
have more vulnerable employment. This may be related to the definition 
used of vulnerable employment - those self-employed, without other 
employees, and those contributing to family labor – where growth 
processes are increasing self-employment and, therefore, the measure of 
vulnerability. Structural change does not appear to impact vulnerability 
of employment.
Overall, these results suggest that productivity growth is likely to be the 
critical element to reduce unemployment. More importantly, a growth 
pattern of productivity growth based on positive structural change, 
reallocation of workers to more productive sectors is also key in 
reducing unemployment rates, while within-sector productivity 
appears positive for low income countries only. On the other hand, the 
type of structural change does not appear to be a relevant element 
affecting the quality of labor indicators used in the paper. 
 
6� Conclusions
This paper has analyzed one important aspect of the quality of growth; 
its capacity to deliver higher quality of employment. One key element 
arising from traditional development economic theories is the 
importance of structural change and the reallocation of workers from 
low to high productivity sectors in explaining improvements in labor 
markets and standards of living. The concept of structural change is 
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significant in the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity 
sectors. Given the observed pattern of commodity-based economic 
growth in many countries in the developing world in the last decades, 
especially in Africa and Latin America, some concerns about how this 
type of growth has been impacting employment in developing countries 
and the possibility that these countries experience “jobless” growth 
have emerged. 
Our findings suggest that economic growth might not result in “jobless” 
growth since, on average, it appears to reduce unemployment rates over 
time. As expected, countries with larger income per capita tend to have 
better quality of labor outcomes. More importantly, TFP growth and 
positive structural change appear to be critical elements in reducing 
unemployment, while within-sector productivity might increase 
unemployment in higher income countries via reducing labor intensity, 
but decreasing unemployment in low income countries. 
In addition, the paper complements the existing literature on structural 
transformation by analyzing an unexplored dimension of structural 
transformation, the impact on labor quality indicators such as youth 
unemployment, informality and vulnerability. The important result of 
the paper is that while the effect of the growth process on employment 
levels is significant, the impact on vulnerable and informal employment 
does not appear to be explained by the type of economic growth pattern. 
This suggests that other unexplained factors, such as the quality of labor 
institution, might be a more important factor explaining the quality of 
employment than economic growth.
In terms of policy implications, the findings emphasize the importance 
of productivity growth in reducing unemployment and the significant 
contribution of structural change, which suggests the importance of 
guarantee labor opportunities in higher productivity sectors. This can 
be problematic in countries with large comparative advantages in terms 
of primary commodities. In terms of the quality of labor indicators, 
more empirical work is necessary to fully understand these 
determinants and the role of labor market institutions. 
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Chapter 8 
The Elusive Quest for Inclusive Growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Regional Challenges and Policy Options
Bruno Losch
1� Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) exemplifies the issue of the quality of growth. 
While the sub-continent has been under the spotlight for several years 
for its strong recovery and dramatic growth rates, persistent poverty - in 
spite of real progress - and growing social and political risks highlight 
the fragility and the uncompleted nature of the growth process. SSA is a 
case of economic growth without structural transformation, 
productivity advances and effective human development. 
The paper recapitulates first the reasons for new narratives about sub-
Saharan Africa; it is a reminder that the fragility of current narratives  is 
due to poor analytical perspective and limited evidence. It then reviews 
the main characteristics of the diverse African trajectories and their 
common challenges related to an incipient economic transition and a 
strong on-going demographic transition. The remarkable boom of the 
labor force currently underway questions the absorption capacity of the 
sub-Saharan countries’ economies within the highly competitive 
context of globalization and under the constraints of climate change and 
resource depletion. The paper finally addresses possible options for an 
inclusive and sustainable process of change and reaffirms the 
importance of investing in development strategies.
2� Changing narratives and blind spots about growth in SSA
From the “hopeless continent” to a “rising Africa”?
In 2011 and 2013, within a period of fourteen months, The Economist 
published two special issues devoted to Africa, under the titles, "Africa 
Rising" and "Aspiring Africa," thereby apologizing for having run “The 
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Hopeless Continent" as a headline a decade earlier.1 Without ignoring 
the difficulties still to be overcome and differences between countries, 
this optimistic view was based on the sustained growth rate of the 
region following the long recession of the 1980s and 1990s. Over the last 
ten years, average per capita income grew by 30 %, as the region resisted 
the global crisis. Six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world 
during the 2000s were in SSA (Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda), all above a 7% annual growth rate – meaning a 
doubling of the GDP within 10 years. This expansion is expected to 
continue for the next decade.
While this performance is, in part due to the price of raw materials, this 
was not the only factor, as some countries did also progress rapidly 
without the benefit of resource extraction. This economic growth has 
been accompanied by some improvement in other indicators of human 
development (such as secondary education, life expectancy) and the 
liberalization of political life marked by regular elections in many 
countries. Other drivers of change are a strong urban growth, a 
booming young population, a rising middle class, and the rapid 
adoption of mobile telephony, accompanied in some countries by a 
revolution of credit. These are all the ingredients of a "new Eldorado for 
investors": after admiring the growth of Asian dragons and tigers, and 
Latin American jaguars, an enthusiastic literature has been brimming 
with "Lions on the Move" and an "Emerging Africa" where "Poverty is 
Falling... Much Faster Than [we] Think." 2 
However, sub-Saharan Africa’s realities also display otherwise mixed 
pictures: while many conflicts came to an end during the last decade 
(Liberia, Sierra Leone) or more recently (Côte d'Ivoire), the fragility of the 
Sahel has been highlighted by the war in Mali. Other "smoldering" 
conflicts continue or have been developing in Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, 
CAR, the Horn of Africa and Kenya, DRC. Several countries face 
political stalemates that paralyze progress in implementing changes 
(Madagascar, Zimbabwe), while others are “vitrificated” by “big men”: 
presidential monarchies (Burkina, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Uganda) or 
even hereditary presidencies (Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Gabon). Even in 
rapidly growing countries, the widening inequality leads to economic, 
1. Respectively, December 3, 2011, March 2, 2013, and May 13, 2000.
2. Respectively in Le Monde, January 1, 2013, and titles of books published by the McKinsey 
Global Institute (2010), Radelet (2010), and Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010).  
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social and political tensions: in 2013, 39 of the 49 SSA countries are 
situated in the last 50 places in the UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2013), and only four SSA countries are among the 80 countries 
"where it is better to be born" – apart from South Africa (which came 
53rd), they were in the last places.3 This situation is reflected in the 
distress experienced by African youth, plagued by unemployment, 
underemployment, and despondency (Solignac-Lecomte 2013).
A debate obfuscated by the GDP ideology
The overall discussion on African growth, rising middle classes and 
“emergence” is based on the GDP paradigm that says little about the real 
wealth and health of an economy and its sustainability in the long run 
(Fioramonti 2014). GDP growth does not mean structural transformation 
and welfare improvement for the majority of the population, i.e. a 
virtuous process of economic and social change.
In SSA, among the main issues contributing to the mystification of the 
debate is the tragedy of African statistics (Devarajan 2013). The collapse 
of statistical systems (national accounts, sectorial data and even 
population censuses), their many biases (e.g. spatially blind 
information), and the importance of the informal economy, which 
largely escapes reporting, leads to poor and misleading numbers (Jerven 
2013), incorrect knowledge bases and high risks of inappropriate policies 
targeting inadequate objectives. 
Additionally, GDP statistics fail to report the depletion of energy, 
minerals, forests, soil fertility (etc.), which are critical components of 
sustainability. This perspective requires specific attention to the case of 
SSA due to the importance of extractive resources and agriculture as 
well as their contribution to GDP. The World Bank adjusted net savings 
statistics show that African countries have been depleting their wealth 
over the last twenty years in an unsustainable way, with resource-rich 
countries being the main contributors to this negative trend (World 
Bank 2011; AfDB et al. 2013; Aglietta in this volume).
3� Many national trajectories but common challenges
The challenges for Africa are very specific because its structural 
3. The “where-to-be-born” index is prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In 2013, 
Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria are respectively ranked 77th, 79th and 80th. 
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transformation has been lagging in comparison to other regions of the 
world. The process of structural transformation refers to the change in 
the sectorial and spatial distribution of economic activities illustrated by 
the evolutionary pathway followed by European economies (and 
countries of European settlement) and replicated in several other parts 
of the world. 
Based on statistical evidence (Johnston and Kilby 1975; Timmer 2009), a 
stylized summary of this process and its main determinants shows the 
gradual transition from an agriculture-based economy to one based on 
industry and then on services, in conjunction with a shift from rural to 
urban areas. This was made possible by the energy shift to fossil fuels 
that started at the end of the 18th century. The shift was indeed the cause 
of profound technological changes and impressive productivity gains, 
which led to wealth accumulation and then the transfer of labor and 
capital from one sector to another. This process was accompanied by an 
increase in income and demand and its diversification. It benefited from 
the demographic transition4 at the origin of an improved ratio between 
the working and non-working population, i.e. less dependent and more 
economically active people. In this process of change, agriculture played 
an initial role and was the first driver of accumulation. Productivity 
gains have been accompanied by a massive exit of workers from 
agriculture, their migration to the cities, to other regions or to other 
countries.
The evolutionary vision, which was formalized after the Second World 
War (Rist 2003), is the source of mainstream thinking on development. It 
is based on the idea of a step-by-step catching up (Rostow 1960) with the 
most advanced countries in terms of technical, economic and social 
progress (generally and prosaically reduced to per-capita GDP); and it is 
reinforced by the similarities observed in the trajectories of some Latin 
American and Asian countries. 
An incipient economic transition
Compared to this reference pathway, sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced rapid changes characterized by huge process towards 
urbanization and a rapid economic growth in the last decade; but it 
4. The demographic transition is the result of improvements in health and lifestyles, 
facilitated by mass education, which lead to the reduction in mortality and birth rates. 
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remains, with South Asia, the poorest region in the world. The "African 
lions" of McKinsey (2010) are deprived of 35% of their GDP when North 
Africa is subtracted. Moreover, SSA only represents 45% of the total 
wealth of the continent when South Africa (20% of the overall GDP) is 
withdrawn. However, together, it comprises 75% of its population (see 
Map 1). 
Map 1� African countries weighted by population (2010) and GDPs (2009)
 
Source: Losch 2013b and Cirad Cartography Unit, based on World Population Prospects 2010 and World 
Development Indicators
Note: In this cartogram, sizes in km2 are replaced by population and GDP values; colors correspond 
to UN regional groupings for Africa.
Current GDP per capita is very low: in 2010, 27 of the 49 countries in SSA 
were in the low-income countries group according to the World Bank 
(<$1,025/person/year), including 13 countries with per capita income 
under $500. Thirteen others were in the lower middle-income group 
(between $1,025 and $4,035), seven were in the upper middle income 
group (between $4,035 and $12,475); and the oil-booming Equatorial 
Guinea, with only 700,000 inhabitants, has been propelled into the high-
income countries group (with $20,700/person/year, equivalent to South 
Korea or Portugal). 
Nevertheless, when looking at the major economic aggregates, SSA 
structurally changed little over the last fifty years and remains 
permanently marked by the weight of its primary sector and the 
exploitation of its natural resources (Magrin 2013). Agriculture, mining 
and energy account for over 50% of GDP for 17 countries, between 40 
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and 50% for nine countries and between 30 and 40% for nine others. The 
manufacturing sector is extremely limited: only 18 countries have an 
industrial added value exceeding 10% of GDP and seven countries reach 
the threshold of 15%. These results show a deep structural inertia, where 
only services and construction, driven by urban growth, have 
developed. SSA is a region of urbanization without industrialization, a 
very specific situation in the economic history of the world.
This African exception is explained by the historical conditions of the 
integration of the continent into the global economy (Grataloup 2007), 
with a late and restrictive colonial rule resulting in young and small 
states. When they were only entering their twenties, and before they had 
the opportunity to consolidate their institutions or to implement 
modernization policies, these new countries were simultaneously 
projected into the international competition of globalization and 
submitted to the sharp constraints of structural adjustment.
In comparison, several Asian countries, which had the same level of 
relative wealth fifty years ago but another historical background, grew 
steadily and rapidly, despite pessimistic perspectives.5 Their growth 
process was characterized by a sharp decrease of agriculture and the 
development of manufacturing (see Figure 1). Over the same period, 
African growth was much lower, and especially marked by its volatility 
(see Table 1), which raises the question of the sustainability of the recent 
growth trend (Devarajan and Fengler 2013), characterized by the 
position of raw materials, construction and services, and the relative 
weakness of investment (Ali and Dadush 2010).
Table 1� Regional dynamics of GDP per capita growth (1960-2007)
% variation
per year coef.
North Africa & Middle East 2,06 1,68
Sub-Saharan Africa 0,72 3,10
Latin America & Caribean 1,73 1,38
East Asia & Pacific 5,44 0,76
South Asia 2,72 0,99
Source: Arbache and Page 2007
5. See Myrdal’s "Asian Drama" (1968) 
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Figure 1� Evolution of GDP structure: 
                     SSA versus East and South-East Asia (1965-2005)
Source: Losch et al. 2012 based on World Development Indicators
However, if the prices of mineral resources or agricultural products 
have played a clear part in the recent trend, they do not tell the whole 
story. Among the 49 SSA states many differences exist (highlighted 
above), which relate to resource endowment, access (landlocked 
countries), colonial legacies, post-independence history, institutions and 
governance. If many oil-exporters à-la-Equatorial Guinea are heavily 
dependent on international markets and little diversified, some 
countries, especially in East Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda), are 
progressing rapidly without benefiting from extractive resources. 
Processes of structural change are even more uneven. Reliable data are 
missing but, when looking at reallocation of labor within or between 
sectors (McMillan et al. 2013), a couple of countries show a progressive 
shift due to the development of more diversified exports with higher 
value and technological contents (Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, but also 
Senegal or Nigeria - see Figure 2).
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Figure 2� Structural change in SSA: 
                     Focus on labor movement in 19 countries (2000-2005)
Source: based on McMillan et al. (2013)
Nevertheless, these slight changes in the labor force structure of SSA do 
not modify, in absolute terms, the remaining importance of agriculture 
in the economically active population. With the exception of South 
Africa, where employment in agriculture is marginal, for reasons 
related to the very specific history of the country, agriculture still 
occupies 50-60% of the labor force in the vast majority of SSA. This rate 
rises to 75% and higher in some countries (Sahel, East Africa). The broad 
definition of agricultural employment,6 however, does not signify 
exclusive occupation in agriculture: multiple activities are a 
characteristic of rural households (Losch et al. 2012). Other sectors of 
employment are mainly services (trade and transport first and, 
marginally, government, banking), construction and public works 
boosted by urban growth, and handicrafts. Employment in 
manufacturing remains extremely low - a few hundred thousand jobs in 
most countries (and often less). 
6. According to the FAO, the economically active population in agriculture corresponds to 
the number of all employed and unemployed persons engaged in or seeking work in 
agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry. 
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A cross-sectional feature of this employment structure is the 
importance of what is commonly called the informal economy or 
sometimes the popular economy. There is no standardized definition 
and the notion of the informal is disputed, but the informal economy is 
generally defined in the negative, that is, by saying what it is not 
(Charmes 2011). The informal economy is businesses that are not 
declared or registered with the tax authorities, do not apply accounting 
rules or economic and social labor standards (such as regulations related 
to hiring, firing, minimum wage and working conditions). 
This informal sector corresponds with the bulk of sub-Saharan African 
economies because it includes agriculture, comprised almost exclusively 
of family farming,7 and also because urban employment happens 
mainly through self-employment activities or small businesses (Beaujeu 
et al. 2011). Thus the informal economy supposedly employs 75 to 95% of 
the sub-continent's workers (Jütting and Laiglesia 2009), with the 
exception of South Africa, where the rate would be only 50%. The 
specificity of this informal economy is its great flexibility, which gives it 
a strong resilience against hazards, a situation that is balanced by high 
risks, low to very low levels of remuneration and underemployment 
(low number of hours worked per worker). These features explain the 
very low quality of African growth: the high rates of the 2000s do not 
translate into inclusive forms of employment. 
An on-going and delayed demographic transition
These low-transforming African economies are facing a unique 
demographic reality characterized by unprecedented growth and the 
lasting importance of their rural population. SSA is the last region of the 
world to be engaged in the process of demographic transition and the 
process is far from complete: the population growth has been strong over 
the past four decades (more than 2.5 % per year) and it has lasted longer 
than originally projected due to continued high fertility rates in many 
countries, leading the United Nations to revise their latest projections 
upward in 20128 : in 2050, SSA’s population should reach a total of slightly 
above 2 billion people, with the population continuing to grow until after 
7. There is a limited business/corporate sector, mainly for agricultural exports (agro-
industrial plantations, large mechanised farms). It represents little in terms of jobs and even 
less in relative terms: in countries where such agricultural businesses are best established 
(in East and Southern Africa in particular), the numbers rarely exceed 100,000 jobs 
compared to the millions of family farms. 
8. By nearly 10% for the medium fertility variant. 
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2100. SSA will overtake China and have two and a half times more people 
than Europe (a reversal of the relative weights of Europe and Africa in less 
than a century). 
This population growth will also be accompanied by a change in the age 
structure of the population, with strong growth of the labor force - and 
therefore of the demand for jobs - and a gradual change in the activity ratio 
(active/inactive people). With one inactive for every active person in the 
1980s and 1990s, this ratio was close to one, reaching a “record” in world 
history. It was a major economic disadvantage for Africa, which was hit at 
the same time by the impact of structural adjustment policies, and it led to a 
significant increase in poverty (see Figure 5). Over the same period of time, 
China had two active for every one inactive person (and has a 2.5 ratio 
today), which is a radical difference in terms of productive capacity and 
possible increase in individual wealth and living standards (see Figure 3). 
The progressive improvement of the activity ratio in SSA will be a major 
advantage in terms of growth and the region will progressively reap its 
“demographic dividend.”9  However, the convergence with the rest of 
the world in terms of fertility reduction is lagging (Guengant and May 
2013) and the ratio of two active for one inactive person should only be 
reached after 2050.10 Most importantly, this improvement in the activity 
structure of the population will only play its leverage role if it is 
combined with adequate public policies and a favorable economic and 
institutional environment (productive investment, capacity building, 
innovation and productivity enhancement). If not, the demographic 
bonus (many workers) could turn into a "penalty" (many jobless), and 
result in major social and political tensions. 
The other feature characterizing African demographic changes is the 
spatial distribution of the population. The gradual shift of the global 
population to the cities is a major phenomenon in world history, with 
the tipping point reached at the end of the 2000s. SSA did not escape this 
process with the urban population increasing tenfold since 
independence. But the subcontinent is still mainly rural, with around 
9.   The demographic dividend constitutes a unique moment in the dynamic of a population. 
After this window of opportunity (also named the “demographic bonus”) the ageing of the 
population leads to a progressive decrease of the activity ratio – a process broadly at play in 
China and Europe. 
10. SSA is the only region in the world where the labor force will continue to significantly 
increase after this date. 
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65% in 2010, and it will remain rural until the mid-2030s due to a slowing 
down in the pace of urbanization – a consequence of limited labor 
opportunities and low paid informal jobs. Above all, SSA is the only 
region of the world, along with South Asia, where rural population will 
continue to grow – a consequence of today’s spatial distribution and 
strong birth rates – and it is the only one where this growth will 
continue after 2050 (Figure. 4). With 300 million additional rural people 
by that date, the sub-African rural population will increase by 57%.
Figure 3� Activity ratio by major countries and regions (1950 – 2050)
 
Source: Losch 2013a, based on World Population Prospects, 2010 Revision
Figure 4� Expected rural population by major countries and regions (2010 – 2050)
 
Source: Losch 2013a, based on World Urbanization Prospects, 2011 Revision
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The “African Equation”
With a fourfold increase of the population over the last fifty years, the 
economies of the sub-continent were able to absorb a huge demographic 
push. However, because of the recession of the 1990s and of an 
insufficient and volatile economic growth process over the long run, 
living standards have been stagnating and massive persistent poverty 
remains: on average most people (70%) remain below the threshold of $2 
PPP per person per day, and 50% of the population are under the $1.25 
poverty line – a major difference with China and also with India where 
progress has been significant – notably in terms of extreme poverty 
reduction (Figure 5). 
Figure 5� Poverty headcount ratio (in $ PPP)
Source: World Development Indicators
The burning issue here is the continuing population growth and the 
massive change in scale: while SSA’s population increased by 560 million 
people between 1970 and 2010, it will increase by 1.1 billion over the same 
time period between 2010 and 2050 (and possibly more). This means a 
dramatic “job challenge” for Africa (Bhorat and Naidoo 2013), which can 
be more accurately described when considering the yearly cohort of new 
workers entering the labor market.11 For a medium-sized country such as 
Senegal, almost 300,000 young people reach working age every year, or 5 
million over 15 years (two and a half times the population of a city like 
Dakar today). Seen at the level of the whole of SSA, this means a yearly 
cohort of around 17 million, which will increase and add up to 330 
million by 2025 (i.e. nearly the current population of the United States). 
11.   The annual cohort of workers entering the labor market, or reaching the age of finding 
an income-generating activity, is 1/10 of the 15-24 year age group. This is a flow instead of a 
change in the total number of workers, which takes into account people moving from the 
15-64 age group to the supposedly inactive 65+ group (a disputable criteria in countries 
without a formal labor market and generalized pension system – the case of SSA). 
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These are not projections: on a 15-year time period, these new workers 
have already been born. Based on the existing distribution of population 
and trends in migration to cities, two-thirds of these new workers are 
likely to be in rural areas (Losch 2012). 
These magnitudes in numbers allow an articulation of the African 
equation: with their undiversified economic structure, where the weight 
of primary and especially agricultural activities is dominant, and where 
the weakness of industrialization does not offer mass employment 
alternatives, how will SSA economies absorb their booming labor force? 
What are the possible and realistic absorption sectors? 
Lessons from past transitions are especially instructive but they also 
help to point out differences: the “moment in time” matters and 
replication is not an option because economic, institutional, and 
geopolitical environments have changed.12 For sub-Saharan Africa, the 
challenge is to succeed in its structural transformation in the new 
international regime of a liberalized global economy. SSA also has to 
manage new constraints related to struggles over resources and the 
impact of climate change, as the region will be one of the most impacted. 
It will have to manage these challenges without benefiting from the 
same economic policy options that other countries before them did – a 
consequence of new international regulations.13 
4� Policy options for a sustainable and inclusive growth process
The question of the sectors of absorption of the new African workforce is 
therefore a real challenge for public policy, which must invest in public 
goods, facilitate and support private initiatives and promote the 
development of economic activities. This employment challenge is 
recognized by the international community, as evidenced by the recent 
publication of numerous reference documents, such as the World Bank’s 
12. For instance, the importance of European hegemony (colonization, imperialism) for 
European transitions, including mass migration of European settlers, or import-
substitution policies in Latin America based on protectionism, or state-lead development in 
Asia.  
13. Chang (2002) emphasizes the difference in status between countries according to their 
hegemonic or subordinate position. In particular, he recalls how the richest countries now 
wish to prevent others from applying the policies they had themselves implemented 
(especially those of protection and subsidies) and which they sometimes continue even 
today. 
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World Development Report (WDR) 2013 focusing on employment (World 
Bank 2012) or the African Economic Outlook 2012 (AfdB et al. 2012).14 The 
challenge is clearly to identify the most strategic policy options capable 
of transforming this workforce potential, and the possible demographic 
dividend,15 into a veritable engine of growth and development (i.e. an 
engine of economic and social inclusion). 
Reengaging in development strategy design
In order to meet the challenge of employment and inclusiveness, the 
imperative is to reinvest in development strategies, which articulate 
long-term visions and sectorial approaches based on a realistic analysis 
of the structural situation of every national economy, regional grouping 
and their international environment. Regional institutions and some 
African governments (like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya) are increasingly 
reengaging in such a perspective, given that it had been obscured by the 
limitations of structural adjustment and market-only policies. 
The need to address structural change and to implement transformative 
policies through willing developmental states is becoming a “credo” 
and “structural transformation” a buzzword. The African Union 
Commission engaged in the drafting of the Africa Vision 2063 with a 
transformative agenda as a guideline; the 2012 World Economic Forum 
for Africa focused on Shaping Africa’s Transformation; the African 
Development Bank’s new 10-year strategy puts Africa’s transformation 
at the center; the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) titled its 2011 
Economic Report on Africa, Governing Development in Africa: The Role of 
the State in Economic Transformation (UNECA 2011); and the African 
Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), an Accra-based think 
tank, is now publishing an African Transformation Report and has 
proposed an African Transformation Index (ACET 2014).
The common objective is undoubtedly to support and strengthen the 
process of change towards more diversified economies, with higher 
added value and qualified jobs – a prerequisite for improved living 
standards. It is clear however that this diversification is a gamble in an 
14. See also the ILO report on employment trends for youth (ILO 2012), the report of the 
Africa Commission on the potential of African youth (Africa Commission 2009), the work of 
the FAO on the employment of rural youth (van der Geest 2010) and the special report on 
African youth employment (Filmer and Fox 2014). 
15. It represents a limited window of opportunity because the dividend is only "distributed" 
over a few decades, until the ageing population reverses the active / inactive ratio. 
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increasingly integrated global economy. Globalization offers many new 
opportunities in terms of access to new markets. It also facilitates access 
to knowledge and technical progress, which the richest countries today 
did not have when they engaged in their transition. But globalization 
also means constraints, because of rising asymmetries in productivity 
and competitiveness.16 Local firms must compete with foreign 
companies - especially those from large emerging countries like China - 
on a “stormy open field” (Birdsall 2006) characterized by the instability 
of the world economic environment; and the challenges are rising, not 
only in international markets but also in domestic markets through 
imports. 
There is however a dead angle in this discussion on competition: if the 
existing asymmetries affect only the overall economic situation of a 
country, they also impact the local dimension of structural change, since 
international competition weakens local links between agriculture, 
industry and urbanization, which have contributed greatly to economic 
transitions in the past (UNRISD 2010). Easier access to imports has 
notably modified urbanization patterns because cities (especially large 
cities) often resort to imports rather than make use of local economic 
resources. There is therefore a spatial dimension in structural 
transformation and an issue of reconnecting places and urban and rural 
areas. Most of the efforts of policy makers are to identify the best 
possible sectors for diversification and the ones with a potential for 
competition, but a realistic assessment is most often missing about the 
priorities with regard to the job challenge. In order to define an adequate 
time sequence, public policies have to be based on regional and sectorial 
distributions of activities and people.
Sectorial priorities
The large majority of African economies is still defined by the weight of 
the primary sector (agriculture and mining), the population is still 
predominantly rural, and its activity structure is characterized by the 
overwhelming importance of the informal economy both in agriculture 
and the large range of urban activities (household enterprise sector). 
And yet, the debate is raging, with extremely contrasting points of view 
between proponents of industrialization and the strengthening of urban 
dynamics on the one hand, and proponents of "agriculture first" on the 
16. In the case of SSA, the difference in average productivity with other developing 
countries is 1 to 5, and 1 to 100 with OECD countries (UNCTAD 2006). 
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other hand. This debate is also blurred by aid agencies, which sometimes 
adopt contradictory positions, such as the World Bank, which developed a 
detailed argument on the central role of agriculture in development in its 
WDR 2008 (World Bank 2007), and then focused on the prominent role of 
the process of agglomeration and economic density brought about by 
urbanization in its WDR 2009 (World Bank 2008).
What are the major arguments? As far as the "industrialists" are 
concerned, only manufacturing can meet the scale of the challenges 
facing Africa: agricultural productivity is too low and the expected 
progress too slow to allow for a rapid escape from poverty; the solution 
for the future of the rural poor lies in the cities.17 The major arguments 
refer to the change in the international economic environment that 
would offer new opportunities for industrialization: an improved 
business climate in many countries, the gradual increase in 
manufacturing costs in Asia due to higher wages (especially in China), 
and the prospects offered by task-based production rather than the 
manufacture of end products (UNIDO 2008). This new type of 
industrialization, or light manufacturing (Dinh et al. 2012), is a 
consequence of the development of outsourcing and intra-firm trade 
that characterizes globalization. It is more accessible to late developers 
to the extent that it requires less capital and technical and managerial 
skills, and remains doable in a more fragile economic and institutional 
environment (AfDB et al. 2014). This approach could also develop in the 
service sector, based on the potential offered by new information and 
communication technologies, where outsourcing is developing quickly. 
There are undeniable areas of diversification and opportunities for SSA: 
its growing workforce and the increased costs of production 
experienced by its main competitors in the developing world will 
gradually strengthen its competitiveness; and it is not unrealistic, in 
absolute terms, to imagine a future Africa being the "factory of the 
world", that could take the place of China. Using this comparative 
advantage approach, ACET (2013) has already identified priority sectors: 
agroprocessing, the garment industry and component assembly. But it is 
important to take into account the necessary timeframe for an effective 
industrial development with regard to the current structural situation, 
lessons from the past, and the massive demand for jobs. There has not 
been significant industrialization in SSA over the last fifty years despite 
17. Several writings by Paul Collier illustrate this vision (Collier 2008, 2009).  
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formidable urbanization.18 Examples of industrial free trade zones have 
produced mixed results and, most importantly, they have only helped 
create, depending on the country, tens of thousands of jobs whereas 
hundreds of thousands of jobs or millions are required annually. It 
means that the possible new comparative cost advantages, which will 
arise very progressively, are insufficient.19 Heavy investments are 
needed in infrastructure, training and support for businesses; and even 
with such investments, it will be impossible to create millions of 
industrial jobs each year in the near future to meet the demand for 
jobs.20  These reminders show the importance of prioritizing support for 
existing activities, which are mostly those of the informal urban and 
rural sectors. This does not mean ignoring the necessary process of 
industrialization: governments must improve the business climate in 
order to facilitate private investment, but they must also deal with the 
overwhelming number of household enterprises. 
Regarding the informal urban sector, there is a certain shift in the view 
of policy makers, with greater consideration of the potential for 
modernization (Fox and Sekkel Gaal 2008, Beaujeu et al. 2011). If there is 
an informal (sponge-like) buffer-type sector characterized by very low 
productivity,21 there is also an informal sector with a great potential for 
modernization based on significant production factors and strong 
innovation dynamics (Ranis and Stewart 1999). This sector, which is a 
major provider of urban employment, should be supported. 
This discussion of the rural informal sector side, which includes the 
majority of the active population in most African countries, brings us to 
the second side of the debate on the sectorial priorities for action, ideas 
championed by the "pro-agriculture" group. The first argument is about 
the "basic arithmetic" of large numbers (Headey, Bezemer and Hazell 
2010) – even with another decade of growth as good as or even better 
18. Yet this urban growth offered all the economic benefits of density touted by the WDR 
2009 (World Bank 2009). 
19. Competitiveness cannot be reduced solely to costs; it includes product quality and 
production capacity (the volume of supply). 
20. In the case of China, the "township and villages enterprises" policy, which was the 
backbone of rural industrialisation, is an interesting yardstick. Between the 1960s, when 
the policy was initiated, and the 1990s a maximum of 135 million jobs were created 
(Vendryes 2012).  
21. This buffer sector absorbs surplus labor, especially related to rural depopulation. It 
represents many "odd jobs" and incomes can sometimes be lower than in rural areas.
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than the past one, structural transformation and the change in 
employment structure will be slow (Fox et al. 2013); and absolute 
number of workers in agriculture will not shrink but grow and continue 
to challenge the rural economy. 
The driving force of agriculture, its intersectoral effects, its role in rural 
poverty reduction and rural diversification are basics of the literature on 
economic development (Johnston and Mellor 1961, Johnston and Kilby 
1975), and on African development in particular (Delgado et al. 1998, 
Diao et al. 2007). Improving agricultural performance was a major factor 
in explaining the rapid progress achieved in East and South East Asia 
(World Bank 2007). Several recent studies have confirmed the 
comparative potential of agricultural growth with respect to urban 
development: Dorosh and Thurlow (2012) have shown, on the basis of 
growth models applied to Ethiopia and Uganda, that even if cities are 
still the unquestionable source of growth and structural change in the 
long term, it is actually agricultural activities that are likely to have the 
fastest impact on poverty reduction. 
The real strategic challenge today is to identify the right development 
model for agriculture in Africa. Because of a generally weak 
performance in the past (Benoit-Cattin and Dorin 2012), there is very 
significant room for improvement. However, new investments by new 
players promoting large-scale farming22 have reopened the old “small 
vs. large scale” debate about the relative merits of different sizes and 
types of farms (Losch and Fréguin Gresh-2013). This risky discussion, 
which could result in adopting inappropriate modernization pathways, 
tends to obscure a central issue: the need to increase production, while 
creating employment in agriculture, as well as in upstream and 
downstream activities, by strengthening value chains and improving 
the incomes of farmers - which are the levers of rural demand and 
economic diversification (Losch et al. 2012). 
In this context, and in order to secure the maximum impact, the primary 
target of public policy in this area should be the broad masses of farmers 
and family farms. They offer a great potential for the integration of 
22. These new investments were triggered by the fear of shortages of agricultural products, 
revived since the crisis of agricultural prices in 2008-2009, and by the new needs for biofuel. 
They are favored by the (debatable) reputation for available land on the continent and the 
willingness of many governments to attract foreign capital (Cotula et al. 2009). 
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young people (Brooks et al. 2013), provided that attention is paid to 
improving working conditions in order to make farming more attractive 
(Proctor and Lucchesi 2012; Sumberg et al. 2012). Agricultural 
development in other parts of the world demonstrated the true 
development capacity of family farms when they received the necessary 
support (Bélières et al. 2014). A recent comparison between African, 
Brazilian and Thai agriculture, whose successes are undisputed despite 
very different contexts, has shown that African producers are 
competitive at the farm-gate level, and would be competitive on 
international markets if recurring obstacles in supply and marketing 
were removed (World Bank 2009). 
Territorial priorities
Beyond sectorial discussions, there is a need to take into account the 
spatial realities of the continent. African rural areas have profoundly 
changed in recent decades due to demographic growth and increasing 
densification of population. They have also changed as a result of urban 
development itself that occurred not only through growth in numbers 
but also in terms of spatial dimensions: new urban areas have emerged 
as a result of the progressive development of rural towns, and this on-
going process is dramatically reshaping the territorial structure of many 
regions of the subcontinent. 
The Africapolis work (Denis and Moriconi-Ebrard 2012) highlights a 
large emerging megapolis in the Gulf of Guinea, rooted in Nigeria (the 
most populous country), and developing many offshoots along the West 
African coast and the Sudanese region, as well as demographic hotspots 
like the Nairobi – Kampala corridor, the northern part of the Great Lakes 
region, the Ethiopian highlands and, of course, the South African 
conurbation. In these regions, the vast majority of the rural population is 
located within 50 km of a city of at least 50,000 inhabitants. 
It is obvious that in this type of new configuration, where transportation 
infrastructure facilitate mobility and access to markets, the springs of 
economic dynamism and diversification opportunities are 
incommensurate when compared to more remote areas. This "new 
emerging rurality" (Losch, Magrin and Imbernon 2013) is completely 
invisible in the official statistical systems. However, beyond these 
analytical difficulties, another reality is emerging: poverty often 
persists, including in these highly populated and connected rural areas 
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(Losch et al. 2012). This raises the question of the quality of urbanization 
(i.e., the type of services and infrastructure provided by the city, the 
urban assets, without which urbanization cannot really play its driving 
and catalyst role for economic development) and rural diversification. 
The weakness of urban assets in secondary cities appears as a common 
feature of African urbanization. The urban framework is most often 
asymmetrical and features one big city – generally the capital city – 
provided with significant amounts of equipment and services on one side, 
and the many lagging regional cities and local towns, missing basic 
infrastructure, on the other side. Recent works on the relationship 
between type of urbanization, poverty and inequality have highlighted 
the importance of intermediate urbanization and the economic functions 
it provides (Christiaensen and Todo 2009; Christiaensen, de Weerdt and 
Todo 2013). In Africa, this “missing middle” is a major obstacle for an 
inclusive growth process: it accelerates concentration and spatial 
exclusion, and contributes to the growing costs of metropolization 
(Paulais 2012). This situation provides strong arguments for strengthening 
the development of intermediate cities and this territorial priority could 
contribute to the overall process of structural transformation. 
Breaking the rural-urban divide and decompartementalizing public 
policies
One of the major problems of development policies today is their highly 
segmented conception. Sectorial policies as well as urban policies and 
rural policies are siloed and this stove-piping results in a major obstacle 
to a spatially inclusive growth model. Beyond the need to develop 
regional integration leveraged by major infrastructure, which in the 
long term will also help to open up economic areas and to enhance 
domestic and continental trade, it is a proactive approach to territorial 
development that will produce the initiatives and innovations needed to 
boost economic and social development. 
As reminded by Rodrik (2013), in the new phase of the world economy, 
East Asian style growth rates will be difficult to sustain by Asian 
countries themselves and to attain by other developing countries, and 
growth will depend first “on what happens at home”. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, a proactive approach to territorial development means 
consolidating urban-rural linkages, and providing the network of 
medium-sized cities with the urban assets needed to foster local 
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dynamics and to facilitate their connection to metropolitan areas. 
Agriculture will have to play its role, taking advantage of the potential 
of the African domestic market and of external opportunities, since 
growth in agricultural incomes will reinforce rural demand that drives 
economic diversification at the regional level.
Therefore, public policies for structural transformation should combine 
territorial development tools and support for promising economic 
sectors, the construction of infrastructure, policy dialogue between 
actors at the local level, and the reinforcement of human capital. This 
integrated approach rooted in renewed development strategies should 
be a major attribute for consolidating the quality of growth. 
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Chapter 9  
What are the Macroeconomic Impacts of 
Natural Disasters? - The Impacts of 
Natural Disasters on the Growth Rate of 
Gross Prefectural Domestic Product in Japan 
Go Shimada
1� Introduction
Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest storms ever recorded, swept 
across the central Philippines with gusts of up to 200mph (320km/h) on 
November 8, 2013. It has been estimated that the cost of reconstruction 
will reach almost US$6 billion. Japan also suffered huge earthquake on 
March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake, the fourth largest in 
recorded history. The earthquake caused a major tsunami on a scale that 
occurs only once every few hundred years, claiming around 20,000 
lives. As the following figure shows, in the last two decades there has 
been an upward trend in the number of disasters.1  
Figure 1� Regional Distribution of the Number of Natural Disasters
 
Source: Author’s calculation (2014) based on the data by the EM-DAT/CREDS.
1. The EM-DAT database constructed and maintained by the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED 2010). The EM-DAT database is global, and contains 
natural disaster data (e.g., geophysical, meteorological and climatological natural 
disasters) from 1900 to the present. 
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As the frequency of disasters increases rapidly, the need to build social 
resilience becomes more and more important. 
So far, there has been widespread debate over the long-term economic 
and macroeconomic impacts of natural disasters (Skidmore and Toya 
2002). Economic analysis of natural disasters has only just started. In the 
past, only a small number of papers attempted empirical analysis, but 
the number has been growing over the last few years. There is no 
consensus as to whether natural disasters have positive or negative 
impacts. There is a strong need for more empirical studies. 
As we will see in detail in the next section, previous literature has failed to 
capture the heterogeneous characteristics of natural disasters. Most 
studies use the number of disasters occurring across countries as an 
explanatory variable. Considering the nature of most disasters, their 
direct impacts are local rather than national. Hence, for empirical study, it 
seems more appropriate to use disaggregated data to capture the 
heterogeneous nature of disasters. For example, in the case of Japan, 
prefectural data on disasters is available. Utilizing these data, we would 
be able to capture a better picture of the macroeconomic impacts. 
Furthermore, most studies analyse the correlation between economic 
growth and the number of natural disasters. Since natural disasters have 
different effects depending on various conditions (e.g. the impact of 
earthquakes is different depending on their magnitude), it seems more 
appropriate to use data such as the total amount of damage expressed in 
monetary terms and the number of victims (including both dead and 
injured), rather than the number of disasters, to capture the real impacts. 
To tackle these issues, this paper investigates the impacts of natural 
disasters on the growth rate of gross prefectural domestic product, 
utilizing the 47 prefectural governments’ unbalanced panel data for 
Japan for twenty years from 1975 to 1995.
2� The macro-economic impacts of natural disasters 
    in previous research
There is an on-going debate, as we will see, on whether disasters have 
positive or negative macroeconomic impacts. Some analysts have found 
that natural disasters are detrimental to economic growth, but others 
have found them to be a form of “Schumpeterian creative destruction.” 
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There is a need for more empirical study, and this paper aims to 
contribute to this debate. 
Disasters can be classified into three categories, according to the Center 
for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2010): natural 
disasters, technological disasters (e.g. industrial accidents), and man-
made disasters (e.g. war, financial crises). This paper focuses only on 
natural disasters. Macroeconomic impacts can be different depending 
on the time frame (short term or long term). This section reviews 
existing studies that classify these two frameworks. Many past studies 
have used cross-country panel data, which is available from EM-DAT. 
However, there are very few papers that examine the impacts on a 
specific country (e.g. Noy and Vu 2010, on Vietnam; Rasmussen 2004, on 
several Caribbean islands). This paper is an attempt to contribute 
further to the discussion.
2�1 Short-and middle-term impacts of disasters
The analyses of short- and middle-term impacts vary. The field of 
studies on the economic impacts of disasters started with the short-term 
effects on the economy. The growth model approach to natural disasters 
was first introduced by Dacy and Kunreuther (1969). They found that 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) tends to increase immediately after a 
natural disaster. This analysis was supported by empirical studies by 
Albala-Bertrand (1993a; 1993b). They developed an analytical model of 
disasters and response and collected data on disasters (28 disasters in 26 
countries during 1969–79). Using before–after statistical analysis, 
Albala-Bertrand found that the following variables increase: GDP, 
capital formation, twin deficits, and agricultural and construction 
output. He concluded that capital loss is unlikely to have a profound 
effect on growth and that a very moderate response expenditure may be 
sufficient to prevent the growth rate of output from falling.2 
Chaveriat (2000) and Hochrainer (2009), however, found a mixed 
picture. Chaveriat found a pattern of GDP decreasing in the year of the 
disaster, followed by growth over the subsequent two years. The growth 
2. He found no long-run effects in developing countries. His finding was that in developing 
countries aggregate negative effects lasted only two years. Hence, he concluded that 
natural disaster effects are primarily a “problem of development,” but essentially not a 
“problem for development.” Tol and Leek (1999) also found positive impacts on GDP in the 
short term following a natural disaster, explaining that the disaster destroys the capital 
stock and increases the flow of new production. 
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results from the high investment in fixed capital. The paper also argued 
that the short-term negative impacts depended on the scale of the 
disasters (e.g. the loss-to-GDP ratio). Hochrainer studied the 
counterfactual versus the observed GDP. He also examined the disaster 
impacts of factors such as vulnerability, hazard, and exposure of assets. 
He found that in the medium term (up to five years) natural disasters 
often lead to negative consequences. As these empirical studies show, 
views on the short- and middle-term impacts vary.
2�2 Long-term economic growth
Natural disasters can have long-term effects through various causal 
relations. Those causal relations include destruction of schools, the 
crowding out effect of reconstruction expenditure on private investment, 
worsening fiscal balance leading to inflation, and environmental damage 
to agriculture, fishing, and forestry (Rasmussen 2004).
Skidmore and Toya (2002) extended the short-term analysis to long-term 
economic impacts by examining the causal linkage among disasters. 
They counted the frequency of natural disasters from 1960-1990 across 
countries and pursued an empirical investigation.3 Their regression 
found that climatic disasters have positive and statistically significant 
impacts on the growth of TFP (Total Factor Productivity). On the other 
hand, geological disasters are generally statistically insignificant.
The findings of Sawada, Bhattcharyay and Kotera (2011) are in line with 
Skidmore and Toya (2002); that is, that disasters have positive effects on 
economic growth, especially climatic disasters. They quantitatively 
assessed and compared various natural and man-made disaster impacts 
using 189 cross-country panel data from between 1968 and 2001. The 
empirical findings were as follows. First, in the short term all disasters 
had negative impacts on GDP per capita. This is particularly true of 
climatological disasters, conflicts and financial crises. Second, in the 
long term natural disasters had very strong positive impacts on the 
growth of GDP per capita. Sawada, Bhattcharyay and Kotera (2011) 
3. They have three hypotheses. First, they stated that disaster risks could have both positive 
and negative ambiguous impacts. They argued that the impact could be negative by 
lowering the expectation on the rate of return on physical capital, but would also lead to 
increased investment to meet the needs of disaster management. Second, regarding human 
capital, they followed the endogenous growth theory (Lucas 1988; Azariadis and Drazen 
1990). They argued that a low expected rate of return on physical capital could shift to a 
human capital increase, then to a higher rate of economic growth. 
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argued that this counterintuitive positive growth effect was a result of 
the “Schumpeterian” creative destruction process.
Contrary to the findings of Skidmore and Toya (2002) and Sawada, 
Bhattcharyay and Kotera (2011), the results of the research by Cuaresma et 
al. (2008) showed a different picture. They argued that the view expressed 
by Skidmore and Toya on “Schumpeterian” creative destruction is 
different from that of Schumpeter himself (1950). Schumpeter’s view on 
creative destruction stressed the importance of “competition” in a 
perfectly functioning market as an engine for technological progress, but 
Skidmore and Toya use the same term as more literal interpretation only 
for technological replacement after a disaster. The paper tested the 
validity of the Schumpeterian view expressed by Skidmore and Toya by 
means of a gravity equation to examine the correlation between transfer 
of technology and disasters in developing countries in the long term. 
Cuaresma Hlouskova, and Obersteiner (2008) found that disasters are 
negatively correlated to the adoption of new technology from abroad, and 
only countries with a higher level of development benefit from the 
introduction of technology after disasters.
Similarly, Noy (2009) found that 1) the amount of property damage 
caused by disasters is a negative determinant of GDP growth and 2) 
there is no correlation between the number of victims (killed or affected) 
and growth of GDP. He studied the determinants of macroeconomic 
output decline, using a linear regression model approach, and found 
that countries with the following factors are resilient to initial disaster 
shocks and further worsening of the macroeconomy. The factors he 
discussed are 1) higher rate of literacy, 2) better institutions, 3) better per 
capita income, 4) higher degree of openness to trade, and 5) higher levels 
of government spending. 
The other empirical study that argues that natural disasters have negative 
impacts on economic growth in the long term is Benson and Clay (2003), 
while World Bank (2003) and Rasmussen (2004) found that natural 
disasters have no significant impact on economic growth. Rasmussen 
studied several Caribbean islands. He found that developing countries 
tend to be affected the most by natural disasters. Small island states have a 
high frequency of natural disasters. The paper identified a median 
reduction of the growth rate of 2.2 percentage points in the year of the 
event, but found that the long-term effect of natural disasters was 
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indeterminate.4 
From this review of previous literature, we see that there is no 
consensus as to the macroeconomic impacts of disasters. There is a 
strong need for more empirical studies on the consequences. 
Accumulating this knowledge will certainly contribute to policy 
planning for recovery after a disaster. One of the common problems 
with previous literature is the treatment of data. Almost all of the 
previous literature uses the EM-DAT database constructed and 
maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED).5 The EM-DAT database is global, and contains natural disaster 
data from 1900 to the present. It seems, however, that past literature has 
failed to capture the heterogeneous characteristics of natural disasters. 
Most studies use the number of disasters in a country as an explanatory 
variable. Considering the nature of a disaster, its direct impacts are local 
rather than national. For example, Okinawa is far to the south of the 
Japanese mainland and is prone to experience more hurricanes than 
Tokyo. The case is similar for Hawaii and the USA. Hence, for empirical 
study, it seems to be more appropriate to use disaggregated data to 
capture the heterogeneous nature of disasters. For example, in the case 
of Japan, prefectural data on disasters is available. Utilizing these data, 
we are able to capture a better picture of the impacts. 
Furthermore, most studies, like that of Skidmore and Toya (2002), 
analyse the correlation between the “number” of natural disasters and 
economic growth. Again, natural disasters have different effects 
depending on various conditions (e.g. an earthquake’s magnitude). 
Therefore, rather than the number of disasters, it seems more 
appropriate to use data such as the total amount of damage and the 
number of victims to capture the real impacts, because the number of 
people affected indicates the direct impacts of the disaster.6  
4. Rasmussen (2004) provides a box reviewing studies on the macroeconomic implications 
of natural disasters such as 1) an immediate decrease in economic output; 2) a worsening of 
external balance; 3) deterioration in fiscal balances; and 4) poverty increase. 
5. According to the CRED homepage, the database is compiled from various sources such as 
UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutions, and press agencies.
6. Noy (2009) disaggregated the EM-DAT data by region. He found that island countries are 
on average twice as vulnerable to disasters as other countries. 
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3� Initial evidence on disasters and economic growth 
Before going into detail, this paper will present an initial analysis using 
a simple correlation between disasters and long-term economic growth 
for the 47 prefectures of Japan using the same analytical framework as 
Skidmore and Toya (2002) (Figure 2). The vertical axis shows the average 
annual per capita growth rate over the 1970–98 period. The horizontal 
axis measures the likelihood of a natural disaster. Skidmore and Toya 
presented the relationship between the total number of disasters and 
per capita GDP growth. As discussed above, instead of the number of 
disasters, in this paper the natural log of the number of victims was 
used as a better indicator to grasp the impact of natural disasters.7 
This regression line shows a statistically significant negative correlation 
between the number of victims and economic growth. The coefficient is 
-0.069. This seems to be very small, but the absolute value of the 
coefficient is still greater than that of Skidmore and Toya (2002), which is 
0.0033. On the basis of this number they argued that disasters have 
positive impacts. Naturally, the impacts of a natural disaster on 
economic growth are small, but this estimate is statistically robust.
Figure 2� Per capita prefectural income growth and disaster
 
Source: Author’s calculation.
7. This paper uses absolute figures rather than relative figures. The previous literature uses 
both. This is because absolute figures sometimes capture the real impact of a natural 
disaster better. Furthermore, past studies, such as Skidmore and Toya (2002), examined the 
impact using both relative and absolute figures, and found the same results each time.
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 4� Data
For more detailed empirical analysis, this paper used the variables listed 
in Table 1. The definitions and data sources are also listed in Table 2. As 
discussed in the literature review section, this paper uses prefectural 
disaster data. The database is unbalanced panel data, covering all 47 
Japanese prefectures for twenty years from 1975–1995. The maximum 
amount of total damage is huge because of the Great Hanshin Awaji 
Earthquake in 1995.
On the other hand, there is no prefectural data available on the number 
of disasters to actually hit a prefecture classified into geophysical 
disasters, meteorological disasters, and hydrological disasters. 
Therefore, unlike other past studies, this paper will not compare the 
impacts of each class of disaster. Furthermore, past studies 
differentiated between rich and poor countries, but in the case of Japan 
the gap between prefectures is small, and in many cases people can 
easily move from one prefecture to another. Therefore, this paper will 
not classify prefectures into income groups.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GPDP 1128 7,560,000,000,000 10,900,000,000,000 667,000,000,000 86,100,000,000,000
Pgex 1360 656,000,000 761,000,000 46,600,000 7,030,000,000
Pgexrcv 1360 8365957 8,859,131 19,000 124,000,000
Tot_damage 1340 373,000,000,000 4,220,000,000,000 1,000,000 137,000,000,000,000
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 2: Definitions and sources of variables
Variable Description Source
GPDP_r Growth of gross prefectural domestic product (at current price) Cabinet Office, Government of Japan
Pgex_r Growth of prefectural government expenditure
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication 
(Chihou Zaisei Nenpou)
Privtcapstx_r Growth of prefectural private capital stock Takero Doi (2002) 
Tot_damage Total amount of prefectural damage in Japanese Yen
White paper by the Fire Defense 
Agency (each year)
Source: Author’s calculation.
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5� Methodology
In order to set the stage for the analysis, this section presents an 
analytical framework for empirical analysis, which modifies the model 
of Noy (2009) and Noy and Vu (2010). 
where Yi,t is the annual GDI (Gross Domestic Income) growth rate. i is a 
prefectural index to capture prefecture-specific effects, and t is the time 
index. Disi,t-1 is the measure for disaster magnitude, estimated by the 
amount of direct damage. Since disaster affects the following year, this 
is the disaster lag variable. is control lagged variables (such as 
growth of prefectural government expenditure and growth of 
prefectural private capital stock). This model includes a GDI growth lag 
following Islam (1995).
Islam (1995) also stated that a time span of just one year is too short 
because the short-term business cycle may influence the estimation 
results over such brief spans, so he proposed five-year time intervals. 
This is because his study focused on convergence. Unlike literature on 
convergence, the impacts of external shocks such as disasters differ year 
by year, especially during the first several years. Hence, instead of five-
year time intervals, this paper employs annual data.
The lagged dependent variable might correlate with the error term. If 
this is the case, the conventional panel data analysis methods (pooling 
cross-sections across time, fixed effects, and random effects) are not 
consistent. These estimators are consistent only when all regressors are 
not correlated to the error term. In order to correct for the bias arising 
from the presence of a lagged dependent variable, this paper also 
employs the Prais-Winsten estimation, PCSE (panel-corrected standard 
error), and the system General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
(Noy and Vu 2010; Roodman 2003). The Prais-Winsten estimation is a 
method of multiple linear regression with AR(1) and exogenous 
explanatory variables. The Prais-Winsten standard errors account for 
serial correlation; the OLS standard errors do not. The PCSE (panel-
corrected standard error) handles the issue of cross-section 
heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz 2004). The presence of 
heteroskedasticity makes the OLS standard errors inconsistent. PCSE 
improves on OLS standard errors with respect to panel 
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heteroskedasticity, but not other issues. The system GMM is used to 
tackle other possible biases by endogeneity and omitted variables in 
addition to the bias. Arellano and Bond (1991) first established the 
“difference-GMM” estimator for dynamic panels (Roodman 2003). 
Arellano and Bond’s estimation starts by transforming all regressors, by 
differencing, and uses the GMM. The method regards lagged dependent 
variables as not exogenous and predetermined. A problem with the 
original Arellano–Bond difference-GMM estimator is that if there is an 
issue of a random walk of endogenous variables, the estimation becomes 
a biased coefficient estimation. 
To tackle the above problem, Blundell and Bond (1998) articulated an 
improvement on augmented difference GMM by Arrelano and Bover 
(1995), adding more assumptions that the first difference of instrument 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, allowing more 
instruments to be introduced and making them exogenous to the fixed 
effects. The augmented estimator is called “system GMM.” The 
command xtabond2 implements both estimations by Stata. The major 
advantage of the system GMM estimation, compared with the 
difference GMM, is that this approach effectively controls for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
The system GMM estimation corrects for omitted variable bias by 
eliminating fixed effects through first-differencing, and for endogeneity 
bias using lagged endogenous regressors as effective instruments. In 
our system of GMM estimation, the lagged dependent variable is 
considered to be endogenous. This paper employs one-step estimation 
and implements the Hansen test to verify whether the instruments 
really satisfy the orthogonality condition (uncorrelated with the error 
term), and also implements the AR(1) and AR(2) test for autocorrelation. 
6� Estimation results: The impacts on economic growth
The results are presented in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Each table shows 
the results from a different time lag of tot_damage, starting from 1 year to 
20 years. As Table 3 shows, the F-test result (Prob>F=0.6189) indicates 
that the pooling model is more appropriate than the fixed effects 
estimation. Considering this, the Breusch and Pagan test and the 
Hausman test were implemented. The Breusch and Pagan test result 
(Prob > chibar2 =1.0000) indicates that the pooling regression model is 
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more appropriate than the random-effects model. The Hausman test 
result (Prob>chi2 = 0.0000) means the fixed effects model is better than 
the random effects model. These three tests confirm that the pooling is 
the most suitable.
According to pooling, random effect, and fixed effect estimates, the 
results became significantly negative in years 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 15. In 
these years, all three estimations returned the same results. In addition, 
fixed effect estimation returned statistically negative results in years 12 
and 14. In sum, the conventional panel data analyses show negative 
impacts of natural disasters not just in the short term but in the long 
term as well.
The results of the Prais-Winsten estimation agreed, finding statistically 
negative results in years 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 8. 9, 10, and 11.8 The negative 
impacts of natural disasters further were confirmed by the PCSE 
estimation. All estimated results became significantly negative. Due to 
the unbalanced nature of the panel, results were estimated until the 16-
year lag. The results of the system GMM confirmed the impacts. The 
results of the Hansen test, AR(1) and AR(2) imply that, in most cases, the 
instruments are orthogonal to the error term and the error term is not 
autocorrelated in the system GMM estimation. The system GMM results 
became negative and consistent all through the years.
7� Conclusion
This paper analysed the economic impacts of natural disasters by 
utilizing the 47 prefectural panel data of Japan for twenty years. What 
can we conclude from the empirical findings above? The initial 
empirical study of “average annual per capita growth rate over the 1970–
98 period” and “natural log of the number of victims” showed a negative 
and statistically significant relationship. In the following detailed study, 
this paper employed the conventional panel data analyses (pooling, 
fixed effects, and random effects), Prais-Winsten and PCSE and the 
system GMM. 
Unlike several previous studies, which found positive long-term effects 
of natural disasters, this paper found that the impacts of natural 
8. The Prais-Winsten estimation did not estimate in year 16 because convergence was not 
achieved. 
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disasters measured by total value of damage on economic growth are 
robustly negative according to our analyses. This study indicates that 
the impacts from natural disasters are long lasting. This conclusion is 
concurrent with what happened to the city of Kobe, one of major cities of 
Japan, after the earthquake in 1995 (Shimada 2014 and forthcoming). The 
economic gap between Kobe and the rest of Japan widened until 2003, 
and then after 2004, the economic trend in Kobe equalled that of the rest 
of Japan, but the city still has not totally ‘filled the gap’. As the impacts 
are long lasting, it seems necessary to consider proactive recovery 
policies, not only short-term but also long-term.
As we showed, most previous literature used cross-country data of the 
number of natural disasters, and failed to capture the heterogeneous 
nature. As this study showed, it seems to be more appropriate to use 
disaggregated data. The findings of this paper are specific to Japan. In 
the future, more analysis using this kind of disaggregated data will be 
necessary from other regions and countries especially in developing 
countries where natural disasters hit harder than in developed 
countries. Further, it will be desirable to control other factors, which 
effect on economic growth other than natural disasters. 
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Industrial Transformation and 
Quality of Growth
Akio Hosono
1� Introduction
The emphasis and priorities in international aid policy have changed 
significantly since the end of the Cold War. Even within the last two 
decades, dominant aid policy has shifted from macro-oriented 
structural adjustment to poverty reduction with concrete social sector 
targets, and subsequently to a search for a new source of growth (Ohno 
2013, 1). As the World Development Report 2013 (World Bank 2012, 87) 
reminds us, the conventional wisdom was then to focus on growth and 
assume that improved living standards will follow. This is the main 
tenet behind “growth strategies”, “growth diagnostics”, and “binding 
constraints analysis,” all of which aim to identify and remove obstacles 
to economic growth. (87)
More recently, increasingly greater attention is being paid to “quality” of 
economic growth, in terms of its relations with jobs, the environment, 
learning, accumulation of skills and capabilities, innovation, and so on. 
Quality of growth was featured in Vinod et al. (2000), which explored 
issues of faster and better growth. In Asia and the Pacific region, APEC 
leaders gathered in Yokohama in 2010, and agreed on an “APEC Growth 
Strategy.”1 The strategy stressed that “the quality of growth” needs to be 
improved, so it will be more balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative, 
and secure. Ten months later, the World Economic Forum’s Summer Davos 
in Asia held its annual meeting focusing on “Mastering Quality Growth,” 
where sustainability, inclusion, fairness, balance, and technology and 
1.   “The APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) Leaders’ Growth Strategy” was agreed 
on Nov. 14th, 2010. It is referred to here as the “APEC Growth Strategy.” APEC comprises 55% 
of real global GDP, 44% of global trade, and 40% of the global population. The APEC Growth 
Strategy mentions that APEC senior officials should report to leaders in 2015, for their 
review, on APEC’s progress in promoting APEC Growth Strategy (APEC 2010, 12). 
Regarding the 22nd. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration in 2014, see Section 2 of this 
paper. 
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innovation were highlighted (World Economic Forum 2011, 3).
On the other hand, in recent policy debates on growth and development, 
including the post-2015 discussions, structural transformation has been 
featured much more. The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent 
Persons on the post-2015 Development Agenda is titled “A New Global 
Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through 
Sustainable Development” (hereinafter referred to as “The Report of 
HLP on the post-2015 Agenda”). The panel concluded that the post-2015 
agenda needs to be driven by five big transformative shifts,2 including a 
call for the transformation of economies for jobs and inclusive growth. 
Likewise, focusing on economic transformation, the latest report of 
Asian Development Bank (ADB 2013a), mentions that development is 
distinct from aggregate growth, which can occur without significant 
transformation, as has happened in some oil-rich economies. This report 
highlights key components of structural transformation.3 
Therefore, there now seems to be more of a consensus on the importance 
of quality of growth on the one hand and structural/industrial 
transformation on the other. However, we need to recognize that there is 
considerable diversity between countries in the agendas in regard to 
both the quality of growth and transformation. In the former agenda, 
countries that depend a lot on natural capital 4, the focus of their quality 
of growth agenda could be sustainability. On the other hand, countries 
that are exposed to higher risk of natural disasters have to focus on 
resilience and human security. Some low income countries are strongly 
concerned with under-nutrition, which persists in spite of considerably 
high rates of growth as has happened in Sub-Sahara African countries.
There is also diversity in the transformation agenda. Challenges facing 
countries in terms of structural transformation are different as they move 
along the development path and changes in endowment. They could have 
different foci on infrastructure, human resource development, 
technological innovation and so on. In some countries, industrial 
2.The five big transformative shifts are: “Leave no one behind”, “Put sustainable 
development at the core”, “Transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth”, “Build 
peace and effective, open and accountable public institutions”, and “Forge a new global 
partnership” (High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda 2013, 7-12).
3. The five components are reallocation of factors of production; diversification, upgrading, 
and deepening of the production and export baskets; use of new production methods and 
processes and different inputs; urbanization; and social changes (ADB 2013a, 3-5). 
4. Regarding natural capital, see Section 5. 
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challenges are shaped by special circumstances affecting particular 
groups, such as resource-rich countries, land-locked countries, small 
countries, countries located close to large consumer markets, and so on 
(World Bank 2012, 190). Thus, a typological approach could be useful to 
address these diversities. JICA and JBIC (2008) distinguish, first of all, 
resource-rich countries and resource-poor countries. The World Bank 
(2012) identifies eight categories of “job challenges”, including resource-
rich countries, urbanizing countries and conflict-affected countries. 
Obviously, individual countries’ growth strategies need to address their 
own transformation agenda as well as quality of growth agenda.
The main objective of this paper is to obtain insights into the “quality of 
growth” in terms of the above-mentioned attributes, namely, balanced, 
inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and secure aspects of growth, as well 
as the relationship with “structural transformation,” drawing 
principally on selected outstanding cases of what we term “industrial 
development”5 that have resulted in a remarkable economic 
transformation and growth in a country or in regions of a country. These 
cases presented here are the automobile industry in Thailand, the 
transformation of the “Cerrado” in Brazil from barren lands to a source 
of high-productivity agriculture, the garment industry in Bangladesh, 
and salmon farming in Chile. 
The next section will discuss key issues and the analytical perspective of 
quality of growth and economic/industrial/structural transformation. 
Section 3 will review briefly the process of outstanding industrial 
development of the four cases. Then sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 will discuss 
interrelationships, synergies and trade-offs among transformation and 
each of five attributes of quality of growth drawing on experiences of 
the outstanding cases. The final section (Section 9) presents some 
concluding remarks.
2� Key issues and analytical perspective
The above discussion implies that the major challenge developing 
countries face is to transform their economies to achieve high-quality 
growth. 
5. As regards the definition of industry, see the last paragraph of this section. 
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Key issues of high “quality growth”
Concerns about quality of growth have been increasing especially in 
Asia Pacific region. The leaders of APEC gathered in 2009 to chart a new 
growth paradigm for the Asia-Pacific region and agreed to formulate a 
comprehensive long-term growth strategy (APEC 2009, 1; APEC 2010, 2). 
As mentioned above, APEC leaders agreed on the APEC Growth 
Strategy in 2010, which highlighted “five growth attributes” and 
affirmed that, “APEC aims to achieve balanced, inclusive, sustainable, 
innovative, and secure growth” (2). The report of the “World Economic 
Forum Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2011: Mastering Quality 
Growth” (Summer Davos in Asia) stated that the Chinese premier’s 
comprehensive plans underscored the many dimensions of the quest for 
quality growth, a concept with which the participants enthusiastically 
embraced. These included sustainability, inclusion, fairness, balance, 
and technology and innovation (World Economic Forum 2011, 3). 
Many of the Asia Pacific countries also emphasize the importance of 
quality of growth. The new generation of Chinese leaders and the 
government set out an ambitious and comprehensive agenda for 
structural reforms in the “Decision by the Third Plenum Session of the 
Chinese Communist Party” held in 2013 in which, in addition to 
rebalancing the economy, other goals such as mitigating social 
inequality, protecting the environment and addressing climate change, 
addressing rural urban divide, and improving the quality of growth, are 
placed high in the policy agenda (Wang, Wang and Wang 2014, xi). In 
Japan, the Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2012 
featured growth with “quality” (Japan. Cabinet Office 2012, 226). Some 
other countries of Asia including Malaysia, Thailand, India, Bhutan, and 
Vietnam, have been introducing a similar concept both explicitly and 
implicitly. For example, Malaysia launched a “New Economic Model”, a 
framework of both inclusive and sustainable growth in 2012 (UN-
ESCAP 2013, 8). Recently, in 2014, the Japanese Government posted a 
draft of the new “Development Cooperation Charter” to replace the 
“Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter” for public comment. 
It highlights one of the most important challenges of development: 
“‘high quality growth’ and poverty reduction through this growth,” in 
which inclusiveness, sustainability and resilience are stressed. 
Most recently, the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: Beijing 
Agenda for an Integrated, Innovative and Interconnected Asia-Pacific 
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(APEC 2014, 7) stated that, “We agree to strengthen macroeconomic 
policy coordination with a view to forging policy synergy, and creating 
a sound policy environment for the robust, sustainable, balanced and 
inclusive economic growth in the region.” The declaration emphasized 
especially innovative growth: “We recognize innovation as an 
important lever for economic growth and structural reform” (7).
In terms of enhancing the analytical perspective of quality of growth, a 
report published by Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UN-ESCAP), titled Shifting from Quantity to Quality: Growth with 
Equality, Efficiency, Sustainability and Dynamism (UN-ESCAP 2013), 
deserves special attention. The report presents a holistic framework, 
distinguishing three dimensions of quality of growth: environmental, 
social and economic. It highlights five key determinants of quality of 
growth: inclusiveness in relation to environmental, social and economic 
benefits, efficiency and productivity in the use of natural, human and 
manufactured capital, structural transformation that promotes social 
and economic values, balanced investment in all forms of capital, and 
limits in the economic, social and environmental spheres (UN-ESCAP 
2013, 7).
While all the above-mentioned documents emphasize the quality of 
growth, their foci are not necessarily the same. However, they 
commonly give a high priority to inclusiveness and sustainability. In 
addition, both APEC and Summer Davos documents refer to balanced 
growth and innovative growth. On the other hand, some aspects of 
secure growth of the APEC Growth Strategy, such as food security and 
food safety, infectious disease preparedness, control of non-
communicable diseases and strengthening health systems, are included 
in the concept of inclusive growth of other documents. Likewise, while 
resilience constitutes an attribute of quality growth in the Japanese 
Development Cooperation Charter, maximizing business and 
community resilience is included in the secure growth concept in the 
case of the APEC Growth Strategy. 
As such, in summary we could safely say that the cited documents 
coincide in the importance of inclusiveness and sustainability as high 
priority attributes of growth. They draw on outcomes of discussion on 
these attributes over a decade as reviewed in the following section. 
Innovative growth and balanced growth are attracting attention more 
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recently and have been included in the APEC Growth Strategy and the 
Summer Davos documents. APEC’s Beijing Agenda emphasized 
innovative growth especially. Secured growth and resilience are 
explicitly indicated in the APEC Growth Strategy and in Japan’s 
Development Cooperation Charter respectively, while they are included 
in the concept of other attributes of growth in other documents. We 
could conclude that, so far, APEC Growth Strategy could be considered 
as the most comprehensive and widely agreed framework for quality of 
growth. Accordingly this paper uses this framework as the principle 
reference for the quality of growth and focuses mainly on two aspects, 
inclusiveness and sustainability, paying due attention to other aspects of 
quality of growth as well.
Relationship between quality of growth and transformation
To start with, we summarize some of the basic aspects of economic/
industrial/structural transformation, on which there has been growing 
consensus in recent years. First, we understand that transformation is 
crucial and creates a virtuous circle of growth and further 
transformation, as the ADB’s report (ADB 2013a) envisages. The report 
argues that when structural transformation creates a virtuous circle, it 
leads to higher growth and higher income per capita, and these induce 
further changes in the structure of the economy. This implies that a 
transformation agenda features basically in the drivers of growth, while 
a quality of growth agenda focuses on the desired attributes of growth, 
which appear to be related to both means/process and ends of growth, 
as discussed later.
Secondly, there is no standard model for transformation. As mentioned 
above, the transformation agenda differs among countries: for example, 
countries with a very high proportion of the population living in rural 
areas, early-industrializing countries, urbanizing countries, countries 
that need transformation from a labor-intensive to a knowledge-
intensive economy, overcoming the middle-income trap. Figure 1 
roughly illustrates the diverse transformation agenda with examples of 
some selected countries. Hence, from this viewpoint, there is no “one 
size fits all”-type standard model for transformation, although the 
common denominator of transformation is industrial structural change 
of an economy that generates growth.
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Figure 1�  Diverse economic transformation agenda(Selected cases)
Source: Prepared by the author, GNI per capita (2012) from World Development Indicators  database, 
World Bank.
Thirdly, it appears that structural transformation is closely related to 
changes of endowments or assets and changes in comparative 
advantage, as well as higher efficiency of economy, innovation and 
technological progress. As Vinod et al. (2000) illustrate with the use of a 
framework of asset accumulation, growth, and welfare, “investments in 
physical, human and natural capital, together with many policy 
reforms, contribute to technological progress and the growth of total 
factor productivity (TFP), thereby boosting growth” (xxvi).
The nexus between changing endowments or asset accumulation and 
transformation could be more clearly explained by changing or dynamic 
comparative advantage. According to Noman and Stiglitz (2012), the 
“old” policies focused on improving economic efficiency within a static 
framework, “but the essence of development is dynamic. What matters, 
for instance, is not comparative advantage as of today, but dynamic 
comparative advantage” (7). Lin (2012), likewise, discusses ‘changing 
comparative advantage,’ arguing that “the more effective route for their 
learning and development is to exploit the advantages of backwardness 
and upgrade and diversify into new industries according to the 
changing comparative advantages determined by the changes in their 
endowment structure” (73).
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Among key components of structural transformation identified by ADB 
(2013a), are reallocation of factors of production, diversification, 
upgrading, and deepening of the production and export baskets, and use 
of new production methods and processes and different inputs. These are 
intimately related to the changing or dynamic comparative advantage.
As such, quality of growth needs to be discussed in the context of 
transformation, because it is a driver of growth and could be related to 
different attributes of growth. As discussed above, the most widely 
agreed on and one of the most comprehensive definitions of quality of 
growth appears to be that of the APEC Growth Strategy, namely, to 
improve quality of growth focusing on five desired attributes for 
economic growth. In the action plan of the Growth Strategy, structural 
reform, human resource and entrepreneurship development, green 
growth, knowledge-based economy and human security are mentioned. 
Figure 2 roughly illustrates diverse quality of growth agenda with some 
selected examples of concrete actions to address the agenda.
Figure 2� Diverse “quality of growth” agenda (selected cases):
                     Examples of concrete actions to achieve growth 
                     with different desired attributes
Source: Prepared  by the author, based on APEC Growth Strategy (2010) 
Therefore, the central theme could be to analyze the relationship 
between transformation and quality of growth, bearing in mind a 
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distinct transformation agenda with a specific industrial structure. This 
analytical approach could elucidate aspects that might be overlooked or 
be invisible when economic growth is discussed at a macro level, where 
industries are treated collectively at an aggregate level. The quality of 
growth agenda and industrial transformation agenda could be different 
among countries due to different combinations of industries or 
industrial structures they have or intend to have.
We use the term ‘industry’ very broadly to refer not only to the 
manufacturing sector but also agro-business, modern agriculture, 
aquaculture, transport, logistics, tourism and any other activities that 
produce goods and services that are new in the country and that require 
significant human (and social), physical, natural (and environmental) 
capital as well as accumulation of knowledge and capabilities.
3� Outstanding cases of industrial development and 
     transformation6 
This section consists of very brief thumbnail sketches of four 
outstanding cases of industrial transformation. More details in terms of 
the impact of transformation on quality of growth will be provided in 
later sections of this paper. These sketches stress the positive aspects of 
the cases, while some challenges will be mentioned later.
Thailand automobile industry
In 1995, Thailand’s annual automobile exports were less than half a 
billion US dollars, well below exports from India and Malaysia. In 2008, 
exports approached 28 billion US dollars, making Thailand the largest 
automobile exporter in the ASEAN region, and by 2012, Thailand was 
the seventh largest exporter in the world. Production of 1 million cars 
was achieved in 2005 and 2.5 million cars in 2012. 
It is estimated there were about 690 first-tier parts makers, 30 percent of 
them Thai majority joint venture companies, and 23 percent of them 
pure Thai companies, and 1,700 second- and third-tier parts makers, 
most of them locally owned small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
supporting the automobile industry in Thailand in 2010 (Natsuda and 
6. Analysis of these cases is based on another of the author’s papers (Hosono 2013). See the 
paper for details of these cases. In addition to these cases, the author also drew on nine case 
studies included in JICA/JBIC (2008). 
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Thoburn 2011, 8). At present, the automobile industry is the principal 
engine for growth in Thailand’s economy. “The Detroit of Asia” envisaged 
once by the Thai government is now a reality and an “automobile belt” 
has been established from Ayutthaya to the Eastern Seaboard. As 
Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2011) point out, “the automobile industry 
has been the target of industrial development in many countries as a 
driver of growth – a source of employment, technological expertise, and a 
stimulus to other sectors through backward linkages…. But only a 
handful of developing countries have managed to develop an 
internationally competitive automobile industry.” 7 
Development of an automobile industry requires skilled labor and 
supporting industries to provide up to 20,000 to 30,000 parts and 
components. Supporting industries and automobile assembly plants are 
closely related and provide externalities to each other. Furthermore, the 
development of supporting industries for automobile industries takes 
years because they need a prolonged process of accumulation of 
knowledge and capabilities, especially in the formation of human 
resources and learning about technology.
Brazil’s Cerrado agriculture and agro-industrial value chain
Starting from the mid-1970s, the tropical savanna of Brazil, called the 
Cerrado, transformed itself into one of the world’s most productive grain-
growing regions in just a quarter of a century, realizing modern upland 
farming in a tropical region for the first time in human history (Hosono, 
Magno Campos da Rocha and Hongo, forthcoming). This remarkable 
transformation has become known throughout the world as the ‘Cerrado 
Miracle’(The Economist, 2010). Today, Brazil is one of world’s major grain-
producing countries, and in 2012 exported the world’s largest volume of 
soybeans. Dr. Norman E. Borlaug, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for 
his work related to the Green Revolution, rated the development of 
agriculture in the Cerrado as one of the great achievements of agricultural 
science in the 20th century. This agricultural transformation not only 
increased the production of competitive commodities such as soybeans, 
corn, coffee, sugar, and cotton, but it also enabled the development of food 
value chains both inside and outside the Cerrado region. While the 
7. It goes without saying that the automobile is a complex product, consisting of a large 
number of parts and components that involve different production processes and factor 
proportions. Many of these parts and components are manufactured by independent 
suppliers in other industries such as textiles, glass, plastic, electronics, rubber products, as 
well as steel and other metals (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon 2011, 1) . 
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production of broiler chicken and pork had been growing steadily in the 
1990s, this growth accelerated at the end of the decade and resulted in a 
sharp increase in meat exports.
Bangladesh garment industry
In 1981, ten years after Bangladesh achieved independence, raw jute and 
jute goods were its major exports, corresponding to 68 percent of total 
exports. In 2011, garments and textiles constituted 85 percent of total 
exports, of which 76 percent corresponded to garments. These 
industries’ business entities amounted to 50 percent of all 
manufacturing establishments in the country (UNCTAD 2012, 11). 
Today, the garment industry has 5,000-6,000 factories with 7-8 million 
workers using the assembly-line method of production. The wages of 
the workers in these industries are around 35 percent higher than the 
national average (11). Exports as a percentage of GDP tripled between 
1990 and 2010, with much of the increase in the thriving ready-made 
garment industry, which is highly intensive in female labor (WB 2012, 
197). This Bangladeshi success story is remarkable because, as a recent 
World Bank study highlighted, “the country was often held out in the 
development literature as a hopeless case” (197).
Chile’s salmon industry
Aquaculture has been growing globally, and made up 49.4 percent of the 
global fish harvest in 2012, compared with 16.4 percent in 1990, in what 
is called the “blue revolution,” to draw a comparison with agriculture’s 
“green revolution” (“Aquaculture Satisfies the Demand for Fish” 2014; 
OECD 2008, 85). One of the most impressive cases of the blue revolution 
is Chile’s salmon farming and processing industry. Salmon did not exist 
in Chile four decades ago.
Now, Chile is one of the world’s top salmon-exporting countries, ranked 
on a par with Norway. It is no exaggeration to describe this as a 
“miracle.” Moreover, Chile is a resource-rich country highly dependent 
on copper exports. In 2011, exports of mineral ores and their refined 
products corresponded to more than 60 percent of total exports, 52 
percent of which are copper ore and refined copper. Creating a new 
industry in a highly mineral resource-rich country is considered to be 
difficult due to Dutch disease and other factors.
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Enabling factors of transformation
The four cases show how distinctive critical factors for industrial 
transformation identified by several recent studies interact in practice. 
Learning and accumulation of knowledge and capabilities are essential. 
Its process is gradual, incremental and, generally, path-dependent. 
However, the process is critical for changing the endowments to attain 
dynamic comparative advantage. In most of the cases, the government 
or public institutions facilitated the process. In all the cases, the constant 
improvement of the capabilities of those involved in the new industries 
was crucial.
Change of endowments is also attained by infrastructure construction 
and technological innovation. They often trigger or accelerate industrial 
development and transformation. In these cases, effective institutions 
accomplished the role of facilitator or catalyzer of transformation. First 
of all, many of them had been created for specific purposes and had a 
long-term vision and sense of mission. Second, most such institutions 
regarded public-private interaction, consultation or coordination to be 
of the highest priority. Third, most of these institutions adapted flexibly 
to changes in the global market and phases of industrial development. 
These findings generally confirm the conclusion of a report of JICA/JBIC 
(2008) regarding decisive factors of economic growth found in the Asian 
experience. They are the mid- to long-term vision for development and 
strategies, flexibility in responding to a changing environment, 
government’s close ties with the private sector, and harnessing the private 
sector’s capacity to the maximum. The report also highlights the 
following as growth-driving functions: development of infrastructure, 
human resource development and upgrade of the credit market. (11; 17-18)
4� Transformation and “inclusive aspects” of quality of growth
Key issues and analytical perspective
In recent years, “inclusive development” has attracted increasing 
attention in the international community. In 2007, the World Bank’s 
president declared the contribution to inclusive and sustainable 
globalization to be the vision of the World Bank group. The Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) incorporated the term 
“inclusive” into its vision in 2008. A year later, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) positioned inclusive growth as one of the three agenda 
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items in its long-term strategic framework of “Strategy 2020” (ADB 2009). 
As was mentioned, the APEC Growth Strategy was agreed in 2010 and 
“inclusive growth” was featured in the document as one of the five 
desired attributes for growth8. The close relation between transformation 
and inclusive growth was also highlighted in the Report of HLP on the 
post-2015 Agenda, which emphasizes the importance of transforming 
economies for jobs and inclusive growth as one the five high-priority 
transformative shifts.
The definition of inclusive growth in recent literature explicitly or 
implicitly explains the intrinsic relationship between transformation, 
and jobs and inclusive growth. In several studies, such as the ADB’s 
“Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators (FIGI)”, inclusive 
development is understood to include, among others things, three 
fundamental components (or pillars): development of productive jobs, 
equal access to economic opportunities by expanding human capacities, 
and social protection.9  
The first component refers to the creation of jobs, which in terms of 
transformation means a change of industrial structures through the 
creation of new industries, diversification of industries, and up-grading 
of industries with subsequent impacts on the creation of jobs or increase 
of demand in the labor market, particularly through good jobs. The 
second component, on the other hand, is related to the capacity of 
workers to be able to respond to new opportunities for jobs. Assuring 
equal access to opportunities by education, training and skill means 
improvement of the capacity to respond to demands in the job market. 
The third component is to strengthen the safety net to protect the 
chronically poor, or those who are not yet able to participate in the 
process (see Figure 3).
8.  As for definition of and recent discussion on inclusive growth, see Kozuka (2014). 
9.  This definition is based on ADB’s Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators (FIGI) (ADB 
2013b), which is similar to the definition of Ali et al. (2007) and Zhuang and Ali (2010). FIGI 
asserts that the outcomes of inclusive growth are achieved through the three policy pillars 
of (i) sustained economic growth and development of productive jobs and economic 
opportunities, (ii) social inclusion to ensure equal access to economic opportunity by 
expanding human capacities, and (iii) social safety nets to protect the chronically poor and 
to address the risks and vulnerabilities of the population. (3) 
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Figure 3: Relationship between transformation and inclusive growth
Note: This figure roughly illustrates the relationship between the main components of “inclusive 
growth.” Words in italic are added by the author. 
Source: Author. Based on discussion of main text, Hosono (2014) and ADB (2013: p.4). 
The Report of HLP on the post-2015 Agenda coincides with this view. It 
considers the creation of opportunities for good and decent jobs and 
secure livelihoods as the first priority in transforming economies for jobs 
and inclusive growth. The report also mentions that people need the 
education, training and skills to be successful in the job market and 
respond to demands by business for more workers (8-9). These two 
aspects precisely correspond to the first two components of the ADB’s 
FIGI. They are, so to speak, the two main wheels of “inclusive growth” 
that should be well articulated to become the driving force of the growth.
However the matching of these two components, creation of employment 
opportunities and enhancement of capacity of people to respond to the 
opportunities, is not always easy. FIGI’s second pillar, “social inclusion to 
ensure equal access to economic opportunity,” includes the directive 
“access and inputs to education and health.” This is a fundamental aspect 
of the pillar, because basic education is essential for human capital to 
enhance its capacity; however, in order for people to respond to changing 
demand in the process of industrial transformation, advanced capacity 
development is required and knowledge and capabilities need to be 
embodied in individuals and organizations. As Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz 
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(2009, 2) put it, “a ‘great transformation’ entails a major process of 
accumulation of knowledge and capabilities … Certainly, part of such 
capabilities builds on education and formally acquired skills. However, at 
least equally importantly, capabilities have to do with the problem-
solving knowledge embodied in organizations — concerning, for 
example, production technologies, marketing, labor relations, as well as 
‘dynamic capabilities’ of search and learning”.
In order to reflect this aspect, which is essential for the two pillars of 
inclusive growth to become well articulated or well matched, “capacity 
development and institution building to respond to opportunities 
(through learning, accumulation of knowledge and capabilities)” has 
been added by the author (in italics) into the second pillar of the Figure 3. 
Findings from case studies
In the four cases presented in Section 3, new industries that emerged 
from scratch created jobs and enabled people to participate in the 
growth. In this process, it was crucial there were people who were 
capable of responding to the new opportunities created. Through this 
process, transformation with inclusive growth took place. 
In the case of the Bangladeshi textile and apparel industry, the changes 
in rural society in this country have been profound and are related 
closely to the massive mobilization of female workers by the garment 
industry located mainly in two big cities: Dhaka and Chittagong. 
Generally speaking, urbanizing countries like Bangladesh are endowed 
with abundant unskilled labor and these countries’ integration into the 
world economy can lead to the development of light manufacturing 
industries (World Bank 2012, 197).
Several factors interacted in order for this change to take place. 
Modernization of agriculture, based on technology adoption, enabled 
farmers to shift from low-yield, single crop, deep-water rice to double 
cropping of short maturity, high-yield rice, as well as the well-known 
rapid spread of microfinance and construction of rural infrastructure, 
were among major factors that changed the rural society of Bangladesh 
(World Bank 2012, 197). More specifically, rural roads, irrigation, market 
facilities and other rural infrastructure, micro-credit, school education 
and so forth, provided by NGOs, central and local governments and 
donors, all together enabled the remarkable agricultural and rural 
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development of Bangladesh over the last three decades. In this process, 
the rural development programs of the government and donors were 
implemented effectively by the Local Government Engineering 
Department (LGED), which played a critical role in the provision of rural 
infrastructure.10 Micro-credit and related services were also effectively 
extended by NGOs including BRAC and Grameen Bank. The Jamuna 
Multipurpose Bridge, inaugurated in 1998, as the largest construction 
project in Bangladesh history, has been a major channel for integrating 
the lagging western region of the country with the leading eastern 
region, enabling cheaper transportation of gas, electricity and 
telecommunications, and enhancing the labor mobility of the western 
region (Hossein et al. 2012, 11).
This whole process enhanced the mobility and readiness of low-
opportunity-cost labor in rural Bangladesh and changed gradually, but 
steadily, the endowments of the country.11 The mobilization of this labor 
was triggered by the Desh-Daewoo garment project. As Rhee (1990) 
stated, “development is a dynamic process in which self-generating 
mechanisms may emerge once action is initiated…. To start on the path of 
development in an outward-oriented direction, a first spark must be 
created.” That spark was the collaborative effort of a domestic catalyst 
(Desh) that mobilized the necessary local resources and a foreign catalyst 
(Daewoo). It was a process in which the synergy between creation of jobs 
by development of a new garment industry and enhancement of capacity 
of people to respond to new opportunities took place.
In the case of the Thai automobile industry, engineers and skilled/semi-
skilled labor was crucial to making the industry viable, competitive and 
inclusive. Development of the car assembly industry by foreign direct 
10. The role of LGED in rural development cannot be overemphasized. LGED is one of the 
largest public sector organizations in Bangladesh, with a staff exceeding 10,000 and a 
development budget accounting for 14% (FY2009-10) of the total development budget of the 
government. For details of LGED, see Fujita (2011). 
11. We should remember that a pessimistic appraisal was common in regard to the role of 
women in the labor market in Bangladesh. This caused pessimism about the country’s 
growth, due to, among others, the fact that most East Asian countries had the advantage of a 
high initial female labor force participation rate at the start of the growth process (World 
Bank 2012 and other studies). As Hossain et al. (2012, 29) emphasized, none of the 
predictions were able to anticipate that women would offer the secret ingredients of success 
that was achieved in Bangladesh, in areas from exports to schooling to microcredit use. The 
dramatic nature of the increase in female participation in the growth of ready-made 
garment (RMG) workers is a case in point. 
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investment created employment opportunities in Bangkok and later in 
the newly developed Eastern Seaboard. As in the case of Bangladesh, 
this was enabled by a series of infrastructure projects. To make the Thai 
automobile industries competitive and at the same time inclusive, small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) were essential and they were 
encouraged by several policy measures. 
In order to develop supporting industries (SMEs) for the Thai 
automobile industry, one of the specific and very effective policies is 
considered to be the implementation of the LCR (local contents 
requirement) system. In order to comply with the LCR, automobile 
assembly companies in Thailand had to increase the local content of 
components produced by themselves, to ask their component suppliers 
in their countries of origin to invest in Thailand, or to support local Thai 
firms to produce components of a required quality standard.12 
Based on extensive field research, Yamashita (2004) concluded that, “the 
process of adaptation to the LCR enabled the accumulation of a very wide 
range of automobile parts industries and formation a pool of skilled 
technicians and engineers, both of which are indispensable for the 
development of the automobile industry” (5).13 Through this process, 
assembly companies have offered continuous technological support to local 
supporting industries. In addition to these specific aspects, it should also be 
highlighted that Thailand has been making efforts for years to strengthen 
education in engineering and training related to industrial skills.
In the case of the Cerrado development, employment opportunities 
were created first by the new agricultural development of soybeans, and 
other grains enabled by technological and institutional innovations as 
well as infrastructure development. However, massive employment 
opportunities have been further created by the expansion of the value 
chains around Cerrado agriculture, composed of agricultural and 
livestock processing activities.
Engineers and skilled workers as well as technology for agricultural and 
livestock processing had been accumulating over a long period in the 
12. The LCR encouraged car assemblers to produce parts locally by themselves or to 
purchase them from local companies. This was not easy because supporting industries in 
Thailand did not exist. Assembling companies had to start the process of localization from 
scratch. Following this, the LCR was raised incrementally through 1994 up to 60 percent for 
pick-up trucks with gasoline engines and 72 percent for those with diesel engines. 
13. Yamashita (2004, 5). Translation is by the author. 
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southeastern agricultural zone, and there was also access to an extensive 
labor force from all over Brazil. By accessing this labor force, including 
engineers and workers, the Cerrado region managed to build a 
competitive agricultural, livestock, and processing value chain, which 
has enabled high-value-added processed food to be produced and 
employment expanded in this region. 
There are many organizations participating in the value chain. For 
example, in the western Bahia, one of the typical Cerrado agricultural 
regions, the Western Bahian Technology and Research Center (CPTO) 
coordinated with a branch office of Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa) on testing, research, and technological 
development, and the resulting technologies were provided to 
producers through regional producer support organizations such as the 
Agricultural Cooperative of Western Bahia (COOPROESTE). 
This process produced a massive migration to inland states from all over 
Brazil, in particular, from southeastern and northeastern states, and 
contributed to inclusive development with expanded employment.These 
cases provide evidence regarding the necessity of advanced capacity 
development in order for people to respond to changing demand in the 
process of industrial transformation. In this regard, the APEC Growth 
Strategy indicates concrete actions to promote inclusive growth, such as 
promotion of SMEs, MEs and entrepreneurship development, 
promotion of more inclusive access to finance and financial services to 
facilitate access to finance for SMEs, MEs, women entrepreneurs, and 
vulnerable groups, as well as promotion of job creation, human resource 
development, and active labor market policies.14 These actions are 
considered to be effective based on the above case studies. 
5� Transformation and “sustainability aspect” of quality of growth
Key issues and analytical perspective
Transformation and sustainability is becoming one of the central themes 
of the development agenda. Generally, emphasis is put on the necessity 
of transforming the actual economic structure into a more sustainable or 
14. Other actions for inclusive development included the APEC Growth Strategy are 
enhancements of social resilience and social welfare through means such as improving 
social safety nets and supporting vulnerable groups, creation of new economic 
opportunities for women, elderly, and vulnerable groups, and the promotion of tourism.
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green one. “Green Growth” is a part of the “Action Plan for the APEC 
Growth Strategy” (APEC 2010, 10-11). Five years before this strategy was 
agreed on by APEC leaders in 2010, “green growth” was adopted at the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia 
and the Pacific (MCED) as a strategy for achieving sustainable 
development and for achieving Millennium Development Goals 1 
(poverty reduction) and 7 (environment sustainability) (UN-ESCAP 
2013, 26). The green growth approach adopted by the MCED sought to 
harmonize economic growth with environmental sustainability, while 
improving the eco-efficiency of economic growth and enhancing the 
synergies between environment and economy. As such, green growth is 
a concept that was coined in the Asia and the Pacific region in 2005.
Later, an OECD-DAC report, “Natural Resources and Pro-Poor Growth: 
the Economics and Politics,” focused on the economic dimensions of 
natural resource management and intended to encourage decision 
makers to recognize the contribution of natural resources to pro-poor 
growth and the importance of policies encouraging the sustainable 
management of these resources (OECD 2008, 26). Furthermore, a more 
recent OECD report titled Towards Green Growth provided the following 
definition of green growth: “Green growth means fostering economic 
growth and development, while ensuring that natural assets continue to 
provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-
being relies (OECD 2011, 4).
Finally at the worldwide level, the Rio+20 Conference in 2012 featured 
green growth. Its outcome document, The Future We Want stated that, “we 
express our determination to address the themes of the conference, namely 
a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
reduction, and the institutional framework for sustainable development” 
(United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 2012, 2) .
The concept of green growth has also been endorsed by United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP). Its recent document titled Towards a 
Green Economy (UNEP 2013) expounds the aims of transforming society 
into one that can grow economically while increasing environmental 
quality and social inclusiveness. UNEP defines a green economy as one 
that results in “improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” 
(UNEP 2010, quoted in UNEP 2013, 9). The UN-ESCAP document 
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proposes a “system change for quality of growth: turning tradeoffs 
between the three dimensions of sustainable development, into 
synergies” (2013, 16). In this document the three dimensions of growth 
qualities are ecological quality, economic quality and social quality.
Through this process since the MCED meeting of UN-ESCAP in 2005, 
the concept of green growth, has been increasingly mainstreamed in 
international debates on sustainable and inclusive development and is 
therefore closely related to the quality of growth, as the APEC Growth 
Strategy indicates. As in any process of development, although 
sustainability and environmental aspects should be fully taken into 
account as the above documents discuss in a general framework, special 
attention to these aspects is needed in cases of transformation in which 
“natural capital” is the essential endowment that enables the 
transformation.
While natural capital assets are not created by human activity, their 
quality and capacity to yield goods and services, and therefore their 
value as productive inputs, are affected by it (OECD 2008, 30). 
Understanding the synergies between the three dimensions of the 
growth qualities is normally the most difficult in the cases in which 
natural capital plays the crucial part of transformation. Analysis of these 
cases could give us a clue towards an effective approach to quality 
growth with sustainability and inclusiveness. 
Findings from case studies
Two of this paper’s outstanding cases, Cerrado agriculture and Chile’s 
salmon aquaculture, are cases in which human activity, particularly 
technological innovation or adaptation increased the value of natural 
capital: Cerrado land and southern Chile’s seashore. A remarkable 
transformation of a vast region of Cerrado and southern Chile took place 
utilizing natural capital, which was not necessarily used before as an 
input for production of goods and services. However, special attention 
has been needed to address the risk of sustainability due to the possible 
degradation of or other consequences to the natural capital. 
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind the potential value of 
natural capital. For example, the Cerrado has become known as the 
savanna zone with the world’s richest biodiversity (Brazil. Ministry of 
the Environment 2010). Plants in the Cerrado cope with the unique 
287
Industrial Transformation and Quality of Growth
stresses of extreme nutrient shortages, high soil acidity, and high 
aluminum saturation, and are believed to have evolved to protect 
themselves against damage from ants and wildfires, making them a 
valuable genetic resource.
In the case of the Cerrado agriculture, from the outset, active 
environmental conservation measures were implemented. As well as 
adhering strictly to the 20% legal reserve (50% in Tocantins and other 
states) in individual farms, to prevent the legal reserve areas from 
becoming a haphazard patchwork of points, efforts were advanced to 
create joint strengths of reserve land through a “condominium” model, 
as well as the formation of micro-corridors of reserve land made up of 
individual reserves. Moreover, measures to preserve agricultural 
environments have been actively promoted, such as the introduction of 
contour cropping, crop rotation, and no-till farming (direct planting).
The government of Brazil conducted a series of broad and varied 
initiatives aimed at environmental conservation. In the Cerrado region, 
the government especially pursued a balance between Cerrado 
agricultural development policies and environmental conservation 
policies. This could be considered as a pioneering initiative for 
sustainable transformation of unused land into fertile agricultural land. 
In 1998, Brazil enacted the Environmental Crimes Law, and in 2000 the 
Forest Code was amended to impose stricter legal reserve percentages 
on landowners and to enable the trading of reserve land with the land of 
other forested landowners. Also in 2000, the National System of Nature 
Conservation Units (SNUC) was established. This system was designed 
to organize categories for native reserves and both protect and restore 
the biodiversity found in their ecosystems.
The Environmental Conservation Expansion Program, which is meant 
to efficiently manage expansive areas of privately owned land using 
satellite imaging technology, was launched through Presidential 
Directive 7029 at the end of 2009, and the government also decided to 
introduce the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR, Cadastro Ambiental 
Rural, in Portuguese).15 In October 2012, the Ministry of Environment 
15. A registry that uses a GIS to determine the borders of each farm, as well as the legal 
reserve and preservation districts in each part of owned land. Upon the request of a farm, 
expert contractors prepare digitized drawings of the land usage status inside each farm 
area. These electronic data are incorporated into Integrated Environmental Monitoring 
and Licensing databases operated by state government environmental agencies. 
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issued a decree that established the obligation of registering all A registry 
that uses a GIS to determine the borders of each farm, as well as the legal 
reserve and preservation districts in each part of owned land. Upon the 
request of a farm, expert contractors prepare digitized drawings of the 
land usage status inside each farm area. These electronic data are 
incorporated into Integrated Environmental Monitoring and Licensing 
databases operated by state agricultural land in Brazil in accordance with 
CAR within a year (or in two years if authorized by the President). As of 
July 2013, 25 states and the Federal District (DF) had agreed to participate 
with CAR.16 The National System of CAR (SiCAR; Sistema National de 
Cadastro Ambiental Rural, in Portuguese) was established by Presidential 
Directive in October 2012. Moreover, Brazil’s environment conservation 
policy was further strengthened by Law 12651 and Law 12727 
(amendment to Law 12651), enforced in 2012. 
In spite of the impressive increase of agricultural production in Cerrado 
in the last 3 to 4 decades, land used by “Cerrado agriculture” has not 
increased as fast as the rate of production growth. This is due to the 
remarkable improvement of yield per hectare. According to the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) farm census, 
61.36% of the growth of agricultural production (soybeans, rice, edible 
beans, corn, cotton and coffee) in the Cerrado during the period 
between 1970 and 2006 was provided by yield growth, while the rest, 
38.64%, was due to expansion of the planted area.
As a result of the development of Cerrado agriculture, the areas used for 
crops amounted to 21.6 million hectares in 2002, occupying 10.5% of the 
total Cerrado biome, which is estimated at 204.7 million hectares, 
according to an analysis based on LANDSAT satellite images.17 The 
same analysis showed that about 26% of Cerrado, 54.2 million hectares, 
was occupied by “improved pasture” (or cultivated pasture) in 2002. 
Hence, the sum of cropland and improved pasture, which could be 
considered as total “farm land” for agriculture and livestock production, 
amounted to 75.7 million hectares, equivalent to 37% of the total of 
16. According to the announcement of the Minister of the Environment on July 4th, 2013.
17. This is the result of research to map land use in Cerrado at a scale of 1:250,000 using the 
methodology of Landsat image segmentation. The research was supported by the Project of 
Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Brazilian Biological Diversity of the Ministry 
of Environment, World Bank Global Environment Facility and IBGE, among others. The 
results were published in 2008. (Sano et al. 2008) 
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Cerrado.18 
In the case of Chilean salmon farming, it was crucial to establish a 
regulatory framework for many aspects of the salmon industry, 
especially environment and quality standards for the aquaculture 
industry. In other words, what was needed was so-called “institutional 
infrastructure,” including laws, regulations, and environment and 
quality standards. Mr. Mitsuo Sakai, who participated in the Japan Chile 
Technical Cooperation (PTTC) for salmon farming in 1980s noted that, 
“by starting technology transfer activities concerning feed development 
and fish disease control early, the PTTC project forestalled the problems 
the farming industry faced later, including concerns about the spread of 
salmonid bacterial kidney disease (BKD), and the paucity of feed for the 
feeding culture business that had traditionally used living feed rather 
than fish meal.” He concluded by saying, “These technology transfer 
activities anticipated technical problems that would arise in the early 
stages of the development of the Chilean salmon industry, and thus 
devised precautionary measures, including the development of 
necessary technologies” (Sakai and Ishida 2002).
However, the Chilean salmon industry experienced a sanitary crisis 
caused by Infectious Salmon Anemia (ISA) in 2007. This experience 
demonstrated how natural resource-based activities such as salmon sea 
farming need to be supported not only by advanced production 
technology, but also by scientific knowledge on the local environment so 
that appropriate local regulatory institutions to manage the use of 
common resources can be established. This case also demonstrates that 
progress in production capabilities may not be sufficient to ensure long-
term sustainability in natural resource-based industries in which 
natural capital plays an important role. Institutional change took place 
as a reaction to the sanitary crisis in 2007 in Chile: the Aquaculture Law 
to modify the existing General Law of Fishery and Aquaculture enacted 
in 2010 was an important milestone. This modification granted more 
authority to the government to ensure sustainable management of 
aquaculture.
18. As there are urban areas in the Cerrado, which amount to 0.4%, and reforested areas 
corresponding to 1.5%, the total areas with some kind of land use were equivalent to 39% of 
Cerrado’s total land. The remainder, 61%, had no changes caused by human activities, and 
were considered to be “natural Cerrado”. 
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As discussed above, the quality of growth extends to green growth 
concepts. UN-ESCAP (2013, 27) argues that, “Policies and investments 
that promote green growth seek to improve the “eco-efficiency” of 
growth, which involves minimizing resources use and negative 
environment impacts per unit of benefit generated by the economy…. 
Green growth is a pre-requisite for building a green economy 
characterized by substantially increased investments in economic 
activities that build on and enhance the earth’s natural capital or reduce 
ecological scarcities and environmental risks...” The above-mentioned 
cases are examples of the efforts to promote green growth defined as 
above.
 
6� Transformation and the “innovative aspect” of 
    quality of growth
Key issues and analytical perspective
Noman and Stiglitz (2012, 7) emphasize that “long-term success rests on 
societies’ “learning” – new technologies, new ways of doing business, 
new ways of managing the economy, new ways of dealing with other 
countries.” Related to this notion of a “learning society” is the view of 
Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2009, 2) that great industrial transformation 
“entails a major process of accumulation of knowledge and capabilities, 
at the level of both individuals and organizations.” A learning society 
and learning economy are featured in Stiglitz and Greewald (2014). They 
contend that, “most of the increases in standard of living are, as Solow 
suggested, a result of increases in productivity—learning how to do 
things better. And if it is true that productivity is the result of learning 
and that productivity increases (learning) are endogenous, then a focal 
point of policy ought to be increasing learning within the economy; that 
is, increase the ability and the incentives to learn, and learning to 
learn...” (5-6). The innovative aspect of quality of growth precisely deals 
with learning and accumulation of knowledge and capabilities. From 
this point of view, quality of growth is improved if growth is 
accompanied by an endogenous process of learning and innovation that 
would produce further growth with transformation. 
As was cited above, the ADB report (2013a, 5) argues that when 
structural transformation creates a virtuous circle, it leads to higher 
growth and higher income per capita, and these induce further changes 
in the structure of the economy. In this virtuous circle, capabilities and 
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learning matter. The report explains that countries’ structural 
transformation patterns differ in both direction and pace due to, along 
with demand and supply factors and demographic and geographic 
variables, such factors as (1) good organizational capabilities that 
encompass all the tacit knowledge necessary to produce a good or 
deliver a service; and (2) specific policies and actions (e.g. those that 
pertain to education and the technological learning needed to compete 
internationally); institutions (that have developed historically and 
facilitate or retard structural transformation); and politics, which often 
work jointly to determine the direction and pace of structural 
transformation.
The APEC leaders’ Beijing Agenda for an Integrated, Innovative and 
Interconnected Asia-Pacific (APEC 2014, 7) not only emphasizes the 
importance of innovative growth but also its intrinsic relationship with 
transformation. The Beijing Agenda affirms that, “We realize that the 
prospects for the shared prosperity of APEC will depend on innovative 
development, economic reform and growth in the region, which are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. We recognize that the Asia-
Pacific region is at a crucial stage of economic transformation. We are 
committed to accelerating the pace of reform and innovation, and 
exploring new growth areas with the goal of bolstering the position of 
the Asia-Pacific as an engine of world economic growth.” (7) 19
Currently, in terms of innovative growth, industries of which main 
resource is natural capital have much more difficulty investing in 
knowledge and technological breakthrough than other productive 
sectors such as manufacturing and services due to the high degree of 
site specificity caused by the biological nature of this type of production 
and due to the normally large number of stakeholders (farmers and 
fishers) involved. In addition to the above, there is the general difficulty 
appropriating the benefits from knowledge generation. These conditions 
create higher barriers to investment in knowledge and technology under 
the market mechanism in general, and especially for activities based on 
natural capital such as agriculture and fishery. The case of the Cerrado 
19. Regarding this aspect, the APEC Growth Strategy stated four years ago: “The adoption 
of policies that foster an enabling environment of innovative growth will be increasingly 
crucial for future prosperity. Technology breakthrough and information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) play a significant role as a primary driver of economic 
growth, and innovation in new products and services can enhance progress on critical 
global issues...” (APEC 2010, 6-7).
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agriculture and agro-industry value chain discussed below could be 
relevant from this perspective of the innovative aspects of quality of 
growth. 
Findings from the case study on the Cerrado agriculture and agro-
industrial value chain
The importance of the innovative aspect of quality of growth could be 
understood most clearly through the contribution of the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) to the continuous 
development of Cerrado agriculture and its value chain. This solid and 
highly effective institution was essential to continuously achieve the 
technological innovations required for Cerrado agriculture. A strong 
“national innovation system (NIS)” in the area of agriculture has been 
developed around the institution of Embrapa in the case of Brazil.20 
From the perspective of the innovation system, Embrapa could be 
considered one of the most important hubs or coordinators of the 
agricultural sector innovation system and a part of NIS. Embrapa 
established and led the “National System of Agricultural Research” 
(Brazil. Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply and JICA 2002, 26 
of Part 4). This system has “an excellent structure and aims at the 
technological development and its diffusion in an efficient and effective 
manner.” The system was designed for collaboration and exchange of 
technical information among more than 400 organizations over the 
whole country, with the participation of state research companies, 
university research organizations, agricultural research departments in 
private companies, and others.
7�  Transformation and “secure growth”, including 
     “human security”, and resilience aspects of quality of growth
Key issues
It is unnecessary to say that, in the transformation process, efforts 
should be made to minimize natural and human risks to growth. 
Preparedness or resilience for emergencies, natural disasters, infectious 
diseases need to be enhanced. Nutrition, food security and food safety 
should be essential. In other words, human security should be realized. 
The APEC Growth Strategy included secure growth as an attribute of 
20. Regarding the concept of the national system of innovation, see Malerba and Nelson 
(2012). 
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the quality of growth and stated: “We seek to protect the region’s 
citizens’ economic and physical well-being and to provide the secure 
environment necessary for economic activity.” This strategy refers to 
resilience in relation to preparedness for emergencies and natural 
disasters: “APEC will identify gaps in disaster risk reduction approaches 
in the region and develop practical mechanisms to maximize business 
and community resilience...” (APEC 2010, 9). Japan’s Development 
Cooperation Charter explicitly includes resilience as one of the 
attributes of high quality growth. It emphasizes that, in the concept of 
high quality growth, inclusiveness, sustainability should be combined 
with resilience enabling people to cope with and recover from diverse 
types of shocks including economic crisis and natural disasters. 
Findings from case studies
Secure growth and resilience are the most recent foci of discussion 
related to quality of growth and are closely related to other attributes 
such as inclusiveness and sustainability. Further discussion is needed to 
see if secure growth and resilience can be sufficiently addressed by 
inclusiveness and sustainability. From the perspective of industrial 
transformation, the cases of Bangladesh garment industry and Chile’s 
salmon farming appear to be relevant. The case studies could provide 
some insight into the above-mentioned question.
The case of the Bangladesh apparel industry elucidates the secure aspect 
of industrial transformation. An apparel factory fire in November 2011 
that killed 117 workers and the collapse of a building housing several 
factories located in the outskirts of Dhaka in April 2012, causing the tragic 
death of 1,129 workers and injuries to about 2,500 workers, brought the 
occupational security issue to the world’s attention. A new study by the 
International Labour Organization Research Department (ILO 2013) 
warns that unless a comprehensive set of labor market and social policies 
are introduced, Bangladesh will be unable to maintain its economic 
momentum and improve living standards in a sustainable way. 
In the case of the Chilean salmon industry, the development of this new 
industry might have succeeded in creating ‘productive employment’, or 
employment that yields sufficient returns to labor to permit workers and 
their dependents to live at the level of consumption above the poverty 
line (ILO 2009). However, a part of this ‘productive employment’ might 
not be always considered as ‘decent work,’ or work that provides 
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security (health, pensions, security against job loss), equity (equity of 
conditions and opportunities for all the workers) and adequacies 
(appropriate working hours, absence of coercion) (ILO 2012). This is 
largely due to the lack of well-established labor legislation, including a 
labor code capable of adequately regulating labor relations at the 
company level in Chile. For instance, employment without contract and 
social security for employees was the standard practice in some small-
scale salmon farming firms in Chile. 
These cases show the necessity of providing the secure environment for 
economic activity, which is an attribute of quality of growth not fully 
addressed by inclusiveness and sustainability of growth.
8� Synergy, trade-offs and other relationships 
    among attributes of quality of growth and transformation
Both APEC and Summer Davos documents refer to balanced growth. 
The APEC Growth Strategy states: “We seek growth across and within 
our economies through macroeconomic policies and structural reforms 
that will gradually unwind imbalances and raise potential output” 
(APEC 2010, 2). The Summer Davos 2011 document affirms that, 
“Imbalances in national economies and the global economy are 
ingredients of crisis and have to be addressed to mitigate the risks from 
volatility and uncertainty” (World Economic Forum 2011, 3).
As fiscal balance is an important part of balanced growth, this obviously 
would limit the capacity of government to increase expenditure to 
improve quality of growth in terms of some of the attributes. For 
example, conditional cash transfer (CCT), which effectively contributes 
to the access of poor people to education and health, has to be carefully 
carried out within fiscal constraints. The cost of Bolsa Familia, which 
has been a successful CCT in Brazil that resulted in significant 
improvement in education and in the decrease of the mortality rate of 
children under five years of age, was around 0.5% of GDP. Brazil, as a 
middle-income country, has been able to afford this cost. The benefits of 
Bolsa Familia have been really remarkable compared with its cost. 
However, some low-income countries with serious budget constraints 
could not afford CCT on the same scale as Brazil.
In this regard, the analysis of Lopez et al. (2008) on fiscal policies for 
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better results in terms of quality of growth seems highly relevant. 
“Fiscal policy is important for allocating resources to maintain a balance 
between the three key assets of society: human capital, physical capital, 
and natural capital, which are critical for the quantity and quality of 
growth....Fiscal policy is therefore a powerful instrument, capable of 
affecting the orientation of asset accumulation and economic growth in 
a dramatic way” (p. 17).
From this perspective, a holistic approach to quality of growth while 
bearing in mind its different attributes together appears to be essential, 
because there are instances in which transformation and quality of 
growth could be achieved together and could produce synergies, for 
example, between inclusiveness, sustainability, and innovative virtuous 
process, as mentioned in Sections 4, 5 and 6, especially from a long-term 
perspective. Furthermore, while in the short term, inclusive growth could 
need external resources to assure people of equal access to opportunities 
through, among other things, education and health, the necessary 
resources could be endogenously generated in the medium and long 
terms by transformation with inclusive growth, due to increases in tax 
and other revenues derived from expansion of industrial activities or 
economic transformation. On the other hand, as the investment in three 
types of capital, human, natural and manufactured capital, is the key for 
transformation and quality of growth (UN-ESCAP 2013, 7), quality of 
such investment could be crucial for quality of growth. Japan’s 
Development Cooperation Charter considers it important to catalyze 
private sector investments to contribute to inclusiveness, sustainability, 
resilience, and capacity development in order that such investments 
facilitate “high quality growth.”
Not all attributes and transformations can be achieved simultaneously 
or in the short term. Synergies, trade-offs, priorities and sequences could 
be important for both transformation and quality of growth agendas. 
Not only financial resources, but also effective institutions for 
achievement of high-quality growth are essential. Therefore, a 
comprehensive and holistic approach could be necessary for “quality of 
growth” and “transformation” discussion. In this regard, both the 
APEC Growth Strategy and UN-ESCAP document (2013) provided such 
approach. The former document states that APEC members cannot 
continue with “growth as usual” and “the quality of growth” needs to 
be improved in terms of the five attributes (APEC 2010, 1-2). The latter 
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provided a “framework for quality of growth by building a virtuous 
cycle of investment in people and nature—a growth path which is more 
closely aligned with sustainable development” (UN-ESCAP 2013, 30). 
9� Concluding remarks
This paper was intended to discuss and gain insights into the 
interrelationship between transformation and attributes of quality of 
growth. Based on this discussion, the following points should be 
highlighted.
First, transformation and quality of growth need to be considered in a 
holistic manner as a comprehensive target to be achieved. The APEC 
Growth Strategy could be regarded as a pioneering initiative with a 
holistic framework to attain such target. For the transformation agenda, 
the quality of growth with attributes such as being balanced, inclusive, 
sustainable, innovative and secure, should be fully taken into account, 
bearing in mind the interrelationship, synergy and trade-offs among them. 
Second, as the transformation agenda is different among countries of 
distinctive characteristics such as those with a high proportion of 
subsistence agriculture, urbanizing economies, early industrializing 
economies, those in the middle-income trap, and so on, measures to 
transform their economies and attain desired attributes of quality of 
growth could be different, and there is no standard model of growth 
strategy to address challenges of transformation with growth with 
improved quality.
 
Third, it might be more realistic to design measures to attain the desired 
attributes of growth quality alongside development of specific 
industries, with which structural transformation is taking place, 
bearing in mind the specific transformation and quality of growth 
agendas.
Fourth, on the other hand, the interrelationship among attributes of 
quality of growth and industrial transformation is complex and, 
therefore, a holistic and comprehensive approach is needed with due 
attention to macro-economic balance and stability, fiscal balance, 
synergy, trade-offs and so on. The discussion on quality of growth and 
industrial transformation deserves a further in-depth analysis.
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The Governance of Natural Resource Wealth:
Some Political Economy Considerations on 
Enhancing Social Investment1  
Andrés Mejía Acosta
1� Introduction
The presence of non-renewable natural resource revenues (oil, mineral 
and gas) represents both an opportunity and a challenge to provide the 
funds necessary to lift poor countries out of the poverty trap. When 
adequately invested, revenues accrued from taxation of the extractive 
industries (EI), royalties, contracts and licensing fees have tremendous 
potential to boost economic activity, increase employment and improve 
investment on development sensitive sectors (education, nutrition, 
health). But the extraction and allocation of natural resource revenues 
can also make countries more vulnerable to prevailing problems 
associated with resource curse, including Dutch disease, slower 
economic growth, triggering of violent conflict, corruption, rent seeking 
and political instability (Ahmad and Singh 2003; Auty 2004; Bauer 2013; 
Karl 1997; Ross 2007). 
It has been well argued that the strength and quality institutional 
arrangements can play an important role in mitigating the resource 
curse (Ross 2007). Institutions can safeguard the effectiveness and 
impact of social investments by increasing, for example, the 
accountability and transparency in the use of natural resource revenues, 
allocating revenues into high return investments, allowing for greater 
voice and participation in decision making and imposing sanctions on 
corrupt behavior (Mejía Acosta 2012). 
The governance of natural resource revenues can be improved (at least) 
at three different levels. At the extraction stage, governments make 
1. This paper builds on previous work done by the author on “Extractive Industries, revenue 
allocation and local politics” (co-authored with Javier Arellano Yanguas) (UNRISD 2014). 
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strategic decisions regarding when and how to obtain taxes and rents 
from extractive companies, whether this is done through concessions or 
negotiating licensing fees, the share of state participation in the 
extraction, production and distribution, and whether revenues are 
independently managed by state owned companies or whether they 
accrue directly to the country’s budget. Secondly, governments decide 
whether to save, spend or further invest these revenues. Revenues could 
be put into stabilization funds to protect the economy from the volatility 
of commodity prices, ensure a smooth flow of revenues and avoid 
macroeconomic mismanagement. Natural resource revenues could also 
be saved for future consumption, or redistributed according to 
budgetary allocations, specific territories where the extractive industry 
is located, transferred to local governments or devolved directly to 
citizens. Thirdly, governments can strategically decide how to spend 
these resources by prioritizing specific types of high return 
investments, infrastructure or enhancing human capital through skills 
formation. 
This paper argues that political institutions, and in particular the choice 
of fiscal rules governing the allocation of natural resource revenues, can 
have a significant impact on the quality of growth. So far, the policy and 
scholarly debates about revenue allocation have not necessarily linked 
revenues to types of investments, partly because of the availability and 
reliability of data but also due to difficulty of measuring impact at the 
expenditure level. This paper offers a contribution to that debate by 
discussing in greater detail and, with the help of some selected 
countries for which data is available, the political decisions governing 
the allocation of natural resource revenues at the subnational level. This 
paper does not venture into an evaluation or review of the development 
impact of different spending modalities. Rather, it discusses the political 
choice behind distribution modalities, between central and subnational 
governments and across subnational governments, to illustrate some of 
the inherent distributive trade-offs and some of their consequences for 
government spending. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section explores some political 
economy considerations to explain how different actors and specific 
intraregional bargains can be instrumental in the adoption of different 
allocation formulas. The next section briefly discusses the potential 
impact of allocation modalities to enhance the impact of social spending 
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and maximize the quality of growth. The last part provides a conclusion 
and develops an agenda for future research, including some of the 
remaining empirical and methodological challenges necessary to 
provide an understanding of the meaning and measurement of social 
investment and its relationship to the quality of growth.  
2� Managing natural resource revenues effectively
The commodities boom of the last decade, has given countries that are 
rich in non-renewable natural resources a windfall of revenues that has 
exceeded all fiscal expectations and has made a significant contribution 
to boosting growth. But the pressing question for governments, 
policymakers and scholars is how to turn the commodity bonanza into a 
stable source of growth that delivers on socially desirable outcomes. In 
other words, how can the commodities boom contribute to enhancing 
the quality of growth? From the perspective of managing public 
finances, it is key to establish, ex ante, what is the main expectation for 
managing natural resource revenues, whether in the creation of long 
term savings, investment or direct spending, fairness in the allocation of 
funds, macroeconomic stability, strong local ownership, or other factors. 
To that extent, there are multiple instruments that could help to smooth 
future revenues from volatile fluctuations, maximize the accrual of 
fiscal revenues, generate savings and investment mechanisms, 
guarantee the transparency and accountability of management, and the 
design of distribution or allocation mechanisms that privilege social 
investment to benefit the population. In practice, these mechanisms can 
be combined with –and sometimes contradict- one another: for example, 
accumulating revenues into a well-protected stabilization or savings 
fund may fuel citizen concerns about the need for immediate spending; 
similarly, deciding to invest current revenues in education will trigger 
debates about the long term benefits of investment on infrastructure or 
human capital.
From a political economy perspective, these critical questions represent 
dilemmas of redistribution and therefore pose more fundamental 
questions of political cooperation, feasibility and commitment towards 
adopting, implementing and sustaining one or more mechanisms. For 
example, the increased volume of investment for the provision of public 
services such as health and education may not be a sufficient condition 
for success if social investment lacks transparency in the administration 
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of such funds or there is no strategic vision that is linked with 
development objectives (Mejía Acosta 2012, Bennett 2002).
The following chart illustrates how there are three interlinked stages in 
the processes of translating natural resource wealth into long-term 
social investment. The design, implementation and sustainability of 
each mechanism will depend less on the technical features of each 
allocation formula and more on the political bargains and distribution 
agreed between the main stakeholders. 
Figure 1� Translating natural resource wealth into quality growth 
This paper will mostly focus on the intermediate stage of the process, the 
fiscal management, and will discuss some of empirical and methodological 
challenges to understanding the quality of investment. Exploring these 
stages requires addressing two related questions. The first issue is to 
determine who has a claim over ownership of the resources or, put in other 
terms, to what extent do political actors outside the central government 
have the leverage to demand a share or benefit from the wealth accruing 
from the extractives sector. In most cases, the executive at the national level 
has the primacy over decision-making, but the degree to which other actors 
have a credible claim and the distributional mechanisms can vary a great 
deal (Arellano and Mejía Acosta 2014). In some cases, the shared 
“ownership” may be embedded in specific constitutional rules, but in other 
cases, ownership and allocation is subject to a continuous and repeated 
political bargaining between different stakeholders. 
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The second question refers to the mechanisms set in place to promote a 
transparent and accountable management of extractives revenues. The 
main concern is that extracting and allocating natural resource revenues 
almost inevitably leads to enhanced opportunities for rent seeking and 
political capture (Auty 2004; Haysom and Kane 2009). In general, the 
space for mismanagement of funds is inversely proportional to the 
presence of legal frameworks, independent judiciaries and the existence 
of effective checks and balances. Transparency and accountability 
mechanisms, including the reporting, auditing and monitoring the 
management of revenues will enhance legitimacy and could contribute to 
an effective investment of natural resource rents (Bennett 2002). In 
practice however, most of the transparency and accountability initiatives 
are located and strengthened at the national level, but there is significant 
variation regarding the extend and effectiveness to which these initiatives 
can encourage better governance at the local level (Mejía Acosta 2013).
In this section we examine four different instruments used to manage 
revenues from the extractive industries (to spend, save or invest): 
stabilization funds, saving funds, revenue sharing formulas and direct 
cash transfers. We explore how these instruments work, what the main 
arguments for the adoption of such mechanisms are, who the main 
stakeholders supporting such instruments are, and what are the main 
expectations in terms of performance.
Stabilization funds
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are government-owned resources 
accrued from pensions, privatization income, investment revenue of 
state owned enterprises, natural resource revenues, and so on. A 
common feature in the case of the extractives sector is that revenues 
tend to fluctuate widely depending on international commodity prices 
thus creating the potential to destabilize the country’s macroeconomic 
goals. Stabilization funds are one of the instruments designed to 
manage these fiscal flows. Stabilization SWFs are created to build up 
fiscal reserves when commodity prices are high and draw reserves 
down when prices are low. The adoption of stabilization funds is the 
most classic mechanism adopted by resource rich countries to dampen 
the fiscal and economic impact of boom and bust cycles while restoring 
countercyclical spending. Stabilization funds can effectively contribute 
to long term fiscal planning if there are clear and enforceable rules to 
ensure contributions into the fund during boom times and constraint 
306
Chapter 11
over the conditions under which these funds can be withdrawn or used 
during bust periods. Stabilization funds such as Chile’s Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) are usually considered most effective 
for managing mining revenues (Havro and Santiso 2011).2 
The case of Chile illustrates that the effective adoption and management 
of a stabilization fund needs to be developed in the context of a sound 
fiscal policy with an overall budget strategy and clear fund targets. The 
formulation can be aided by a MTEF to help limit the expenditure of 
short run expenditure responses to rapidly changing resource revenue 
(Davis et al. 2003). From a political perspective, a well-managed 
stabilization fund tends to work better in a context of consolidated state 
institutions, preferably where there are greater constrains on the 
discretionary use of executive power (Bagattini 2011). Greater political 
party competition, an independent civil service and a well-educated 
civil society are other factors contributing to the success of such 
stabilization funds. Citizens can be actively involved in the monitoring 
and enforcement of transparency and accountability mechanisms 
including regular reporting, auditing and press releases. Conversely, 
stabilization funds are most likely to be undermined in a context of 
increased fiscal uncertainty, in a context where the executive power 
concentrates discretionary decision-making power, or when existing 
rules may change depending on political circumstances.
Savings funds
Savings funds constitute an alternative mechanism for dampening the 
fiscal and economic impact of volatile commodity prices, with a focus on 
saving those revenues for future generations. According to Dumas 
(2011), there are three factors that are critical for the success of saving 
funds: a) to disassociate the decision on how much should be saved from 
what to be saved, b) to create a separate account to directly deposit all 
natural resources revenues and to ensure proper transparency and 
governance principles to account for those deposits, c) to control and 
minimize the discretion for determining the level of transfers and 
disbursements out of the fund. 
2. The ESSF receives fiscal surpluses, which are above 1% of GDP. Its investment strategy is 
intended to diversify assets in the fund, putting 15% of the portfolio into variable income 
assets, 20% in corporate fixed income papers and gradually adjust liquid assets (SWF 
Institute 2014). 
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The Government Pension Fund of Norway is an example of a savings 
fund. Originally created in the late sixties, it had two components: The 
Government Pension Fund - Global (formerly known as The 
Government Petroleum Fund) was established as a fiscal tool to 
encourage counter cyclical spending in the nineties. The Government 
Pension Fund - Norway was initially established as The National 
Insurance Scheme Fund in 1967. While the GPF Global derives its 
financial backing from strategic investments from the surplus wealth 
produced by Norwegian oil income, the GPF derives its income from 
pension contributions. It is calculated that the total value of the GPF 
Global is around $893bn USD, making it the biggest sovereign wealth 
fund worldwide today.3  
The GPF Global aims to smooth the path of spending out of volatile oil 
revenues whereas the GPF Norway seeks to accumulate long-term 
savings from the oil revenues to cope with rising pensions and related 
expenditures on an aging population. All revenues accrue to central 
government and the funds are integrated into the budget process that is 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Havro and Santiso). The 
centralized control of the fund allows the government to absorb fiscal 
fluctuations and ensure a better distribution of funds to minimize inter-
regional disparities. Another element of success is the well-developed 
structure of its institutions, capable of adopting and implementing good 
fiscal policies, coupled with a professionalized and independent staff to 
manage these policies. 
Despite the existence of good governance principles, the Norwegian 
government has not been exempt from considerable political pressure to 
spend. Although the Norwegian parliament has the authority to allocate 
oil revenues into the budget within an estimated 4% of the petroleum 
earnings, Norwegian MPs have been under increasing public pressure 
to increase government spending beyond the 4% action rule (Havro and 
Santiso 2011).
Revenue sharing formulas  
The adoption of revenue sharing formulas is predominantly driven by 
the need to distribute natural resource wealth between the central 
government and resource rich territories. This formula emerges as a 
convenient way to transfer fiscal resources to sub-national governments 
3. Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
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to promote a more equal redistribution of wealth. While the principle of 
redistribution is generally uncontested, the actual form of the 
distribution has been subject to intense debate. Some of the pressing 
questions regarding the allocation of intergovernmental transfers debate 
over the exact location of extraction points, the territorial ownership of 
such resources, and the merits of potential beneficiaries. At the end of the 
day, central governments centralize tax collection activities and they 
retain considerable decision-making capacity over the share of revenues, 
allocation criteria and other conditionalities imposed on potential 
beneficiaries. Thus, central governments are key actors in the rents 
allocation game. Some of the distributional criteria include:
Fairness: In this scenario, the central government ensures that resources 
are allocated according to the districts’ own levels of production. This 
criterion suggests that many non-producing districts would not receive 
allocations or may be seriously marginalized from distribution. There 
are several difficulties stemming from this direct type of distribution. 
One problem is that it highlights and deepens horizontal inequalities 
across districts and regions: those districts that generate more revenue 
will continue to receive greater transfers, potentially creating a problem 
of “regional resource curse.” An associated problem can emerge if larger 
transfers from the central government reduce the need to extract non-oil 
taxation, thus creating greater dependency from the national 
government and potentially volatile natural resource revenues. One last 
pitfall, in cases where revenues are transferred directly to autonomous 
territorial units, is that this reduces the incentives to ensure transparent 
expenditure management. If regional or local governments feel they are 
“entitled” to receiving specific allocations, they would feel less 
compelled to account for those transfers back to the central government. 
Equality: Under this distribution criterion, central governments would 
favor a compensation formula to address existing inequalities. Revenue 
sharing formulas can be adapted to allocate rents proportional to the 
existing population, to equalize and improve the provision of public 
services between provinces, to proportionally reduce poverty rates or 
any other socioeconomic indicators, or to balance expenditure patterns 
between the national and regional levels. Another potential use for 
revenue sharing formulas is to compensate provinces, districts and 
indigenous people for the exploitation of natural resources and 
associated environmental damage (Haysom and Kane 2009). An 
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immediate problem associated with this type of revenue sharing is that 
it is difficult to determine the relevant jurisdiction entitled to receive the 
resources. If a particular local district or municipality is home for a 
mine, should the neighboring districts also benefit or should the region 
in which the district is located? 
Revenue sharing formulas increase the sense of ownership for the 
recipient localities, but this does not necessarily translate into stronger 
regional and local governments. Regions are more likely to claim 
autonomy where political parties or regional movements are stronger. 
They are more likely to be accountable to the needs and demands of 
their own population rather than the conditionalities imposed by the 
central government. 
Direct Cash Transfers
The mechanism of a cash transfer involves a direct transaction of natural 
resource revenues from the central government to individual citizens in 
the form of direct regular payments. The underlying assumption is that 
natural resource wealth increases the available fiscal space to finance 
development goals, it encourages greater levels of social expenditure 
and enables new social policy initiatives (Hinojosa 2012). The 
underlying logic behind the “oil to cash” argument is that a direct 
transfer will enhance the “social contract” between individuals and oil 
rich states. The resource revenues would have a direct income benefit for 
the poorest segments of society as it increases individual purchasing 
power (Moss 2011). Direct cash transfers can also increase individuals’ 
capacity to pay taxes and thus enhance incentives for greater 
government accountability. With a personal stake in the government’s 
budget, the citizens could hold governments accountable for the 
provision of goods and services (Gillies 2010). Cash transfers it is argued, 
would also create a demand for increased budget transparency and 
accountability in the management of public finances (Tsalik 2003). 
The evidence supporting this argument is mixed. Evaluating the only 
case in which this mechanism has been adopted, Michael Ross argues 
that Alaska is a prime example of inefficient spending: “the distribution 
of petrodollars to individuals has substituted for a broad based tax 
system, a personal income tax, and even a sales tax” (Ross 2007, 273). The 
results are fairly negative, including chronic budget deficits, unfinished 
public works projects, lower productivity and spending patterns that 
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privilege consumption over investment (Ross 2007). In the context of 
dire public finances, Alaska has also threatened to abandon the 
administration of other public services like school systems or health 
care. Ross argues that the Alaska example raises additional concerns for 
the applicability or desirability of direct cash transfers in countries 
where there is less rule of law, less educated populations and less citizen 
engagement (Ross 2007). The main concern is that, in the absence of 
credible democratic institutions, direct cash transfers further fueled rent 
seeking and clientelisic behavior that existed prior to the organized 
transfer of resources.
Inevitably, any cash transfer mechanism will have to be implemented 
alongside centrally-controlled revenue smoothing mechanisms and 
significant central government investment on to improve the service 
delivery infrastructure (schools, hospitals). Other relevant factors in 
ensuring effective distribution include whether these funds are 
centrally administered or not, whether subnational districts have the 
bureaucratic and technical capacity to spend wisely, or whether local 
authorities are politically aligned with the government coalition in the 
capital city, to mention a few factors (Gonzales 2014). 
The next section offers a comparative perspective to understand 
institutional variation in the design of revenue sharing formulas across 
several countries. 
3� The politics of redistributing extractive revenues 
　across different regions
This chapter claims that the choice of distributional formulas, the actual 
share of natural resource revenues distributed and the political affinities 
between central and subnational governments are contributing factors 
that enhance (or undermine) the quality of government investment. 
Further, it is plausible to assume, although not explicitly tested, that the 
efficiency, transparency and targeting of government spending should 
have a direct impact on the quality of growth triggered by the 
extractives sector. 
The existing literature on intergovernmental transfers from center to the 
periphery identifies a basic trade-off between fairness and equity (Bird 
and Smart 2002; Schroeder and Smoke 2002). The notion of fairness 
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should tend to privilege a distribution that rewards each region’s fiscal 
efforts in generating their own revenues, financing their own 
expenditure and responsibly managing their own debt commitments. 
This principle however, may go against a (re)distributive logic, that 
demands greater government investment in more depressed areas 
where revenue collection is insufficient, spending needs are high and 
growth rates are stagnating. Thus, the key challenge for policymakers is 
to ensure a basic level of subsidiarity while minimizing rewards for 
poor performers or fiscal laziness. 
Following the work by Arellano and Mejia Acosta (2014), the next section 
discusses some of the existing criteria used to transfer natural resource 
revenues from the central to subnational governments (vertical 
distribution) as well as the formulas used to redistribute wealth 
between producing and non producing territories (horizontal 
distribution). 
 
3�1 Vertical distribution of revenues from the EI
From a technical perspective, the purpose of (vertical) fiscal transfers is 
to ensure that the revenues and expenditures assigned to each territorial 
level are approximately balanced and match their administrative 
responsibilities (Bird and Smart 2002, 900). According to this criterion, 
the share of fiscal transfers plus local level revenues should match the 
revenue needed by subnational governments to fund the public services 
they are responsible for (Schoeder and Smoke 2002). 
From a political perspective, national executives (presidents or prime 
ministers) are likely to prefer to centralize revenues to maintain fiscal 
discipline, to centralize policy planning and to minimize liabilities 
(such as the growth of subnational debt). National executives are likely 
to agree to decentralize if they need to secure the support of regional/
local elites in their governing coalition, if they need to build up 
legislative majorities, and/or if they need to build a broader base of 
electoral support with citizens (Gonzalez 2014). 
The presence of a commodities bonanza is likely to exacerbate this 
distributive dilemma. Voters and local governments are likely to 
demand a larger share of fiscal transfers from the national government, 
especially if the government benefits from windfall rents without the 
corresponding fiscal effort to generate those revenues. The rents 
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obtained from the extraction of mineral or oil exports, may also generate 
a sense of entitlement among the population if citizens feel this is part of 
their national wealth, and in some cases, this “right” has been enshrined 
in the constitutions of the countries (Ahmad and Mottu 2003; Ross 2007)
The decentralization literature acknowledges that greater fiscal 
transfers are likely to happen when the money follows pre-existing 
levels of administrative and political decentralization (Falleti 2010, 
O’Neil 2005). In other words, the relative strength of regional and local 
opposition political groups is likely to increase the pressure for effective 
fiscal decentralization. These groups in turn may choose to bargain with 
the central government regarding the “appropriate” level of public 
services as well as the “matching revenues” needed to sustain them. 
Table 1 illustrates some of the findings reported by Arellano Yanguas 
and Mejia Acosta (2014) regarding the vertical and horizontal 
distribution of revenues in ten resource rich countries (oil and mining). 
The Table summarizes the distribution of EI-revenues for countries for 
which we found reliable and comparative data. The chosen sample is by 
no means representative of regional or income distribution patterns. 
Nevertheless it offers a rich variation of institutional mechanisms, 
showing how revenues have been distributed to regional, state and local 
government levels, the type of revenue exploited and the date of the last 
reform (Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014). The selected countries are 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Papua New Guinea and Peru. The data shows significant variations 
between a) countries with low levels of decentralization if subnational 
governments receive less than 10% of state revenues (Ecuador, Ghana 
and Papua New Guinea); b) medium if subnational governments receive 
between 10% and 50% (Colombia, Mexico and Indonesia); and c) high if 
subnational governments receive more than 50% of EI-revenues (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Peru and Nigeria).4 
4. These data do not include reports on the distribution of profits from state-owned oil and 
mining companies, generally managed by national governments, which may further 
reinforce a centralist bias. 
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The data does not support the premise that greater fiscal decentralization 
follows pre-existing administrative or political decentralization. Federal 
countries, with existing administrative mandates towards 
decentralization of responsibilities, do not necessarily transfer greater 
resources. Although Brazil and Nigeria nominally allocate more EI wealth 
to their regions, other federations like Mexico transfer less than 20% of 
revenues. Conversely, unitary countries (countries with formally 
centralized governments) like Bolivia or Peru redistribute up to 55% of 
revenues to subnational units (Ahmad and Singh 2003, Miranda 2009, 
Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014). A closer look reveals that federal states 
like Brazil, Nigeria and Mexico tend to channel most transfers to the state 
level government; state governments receive more than twice the share of 
revenues than local or municipal governments (45% to 21% in Brazil and 
36%% to 18% in Nigeria). The opposite is true in unitary countries like 
Peru and Indonesia, where decentralization tends to benefit local level 
governments at the expense of state level units. In Peru, 43% goes to 
municipalities compared to 12% to regions and in Indonesia, the ratio is 
12% to 3% (Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014).
While the formal territorial organization may not be a decisive factor in 
the allocation, federal states would arguably be better equipped to 
effectively process the administrative and fiscal demands of managing 
natural resource revenues at the local level. These ratios suggest that “if 
confronted with the need to decentralize, the national executive prefers 
to favor the local level as the targeted group, since mayors pose less of an 
electoral and financial threat than governors” (Falleti 2010, 47). Even in 
Bolivia where there was a more equitable revenue distribution across 
the three tiers (37%, 37% and 26% respectively), the government 
introduced changes to gradually shift transfers away from regional 
prefecturas and towards financing cash transfer schemes formally 
administered by municipal governments as a way to defuse the growing 
political opposition and increase their political leverage over local 
governments (Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014; Miranda 2009).
3�2 Horizontal distribution of revenues from the EI
A second relevant dimension is the nature of horizontal or interregional 
distribution of EI revenues. As discussed earlier, the main policy 
challenge from the central government is to reconcile a fair allocation of 
transfers according to regions’ own fiscal efforts and more egalitarian 
criteria to compensate those regions that need greater government 
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investment. Consequently, the design of interregional transfers could 
promote a more progressive distribution if richer districts tend to 
subsidize poor ones or they could reinforce existing income inequalities 
between districts (Rodden 2006). In the case of the distribution of 
extractive industry revenues, the main dichotomy is whether to allocate 
EI revenues solely to territories that host extractive activities or promote 
a wider redistribution. 
In a previous work, Arellano and Mejia Acosta (2014), we discussed 
three types of mechanisms depending on their potential beneficiaries: a) 
devolution b) formula-based participation, and c) direct allocation from 
the central government. In practice, countries combine two or more 
criteria when adopting reallocation formulas. 
a) Devolution 
The purpose of devolution is to transfer revenue, or a proportion of it, to 
jurisdictions associated with the extractive activity, either because these 
are producing regions where the extractive income is generated in the 
first place or because they host some infrastructure for exploitation 
(mainly ports).5  
This mechanism aims to compensate the producing regions for the 
extracted benefit or the negative externalities (e.g. environmental) linked to 
the extractive activity. The criterion of origin compensates for the mineral 
extraction per se, and fiscal transfers seek to develop in principle other 
types of capital (human, physical, etc.) to enhance the developmental 
potential of those territories. The second criterion seeks to compensate the 
negative externalities associated with extraction in the producing or 
neighboring districts. In this sense, transfers take into account 
environmental damage as well as the need to improve physical 
infrastructure (roads, the electrical grid, etc.) and to increase public services 
in order to respond to the likely increase in population (Brosio 2003). 
The allocation of transfers to producing regions may further increase 
the inequality between producing and non-producing regions, may 
translate problems of revenue volatility to producing regions, and could 
undermine the region’s own fiscal efforts to collect taxes given the 
abundance of central transfers.
5. According to Ahmad and Mottu (2003, 228), this mechanism is known as “derivation” but 
we prefer to use the term “devolution”. 
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b) Allocation from the central government
This is an intermediate scenario where central governments consolidate 
the management to promote a more strategic investment of resources 
and to minimize the fiscal liability of uncontrolled subnational 
expenditure. These transfers could take the form of research and 
development or regional investment funds that are allocated on an 
annual basis from a central budgetary account, or revenues could be 
allocated through competitive investment grants aimed at supporting 
specific types of projects. 
There are two potential problems with centrally managed allocations. 
First, competitive grants have the potential of reinforcing pre-existing 
economic inequalities and power asymmetries between subnational 
governments, especially if districts with greater technical or 
bureaucratic capabilities have a better chance to apply for and win 
competitive grants. The other problem is that they may allow space for 
discretionary spending and protracted negotiations around the 
allocation and adequate purpose of such transfers (Arellano and Mejia 
Acosta 2014).
c) Formula-based participation  
The use of a pre-determined formula to distribute the revenue raised 
nationally can bring certainty and equality in the redistribution of natural 
resource revenues between producing and non-producing jurisdictions. The 
adopted formulas can take into account the different needs and 
characteristics of each jurisdiction, the size of the population and territory, 
pre-existing social and economic inequalities, and in some cases fiscal effort.
The adoption of distribution formulas underlines a basic paradox of fiscal 
decentralization and interregional transfers. A redistribution of revenues 
that compensates territories for the lack of infrastructure, weak tax 
collection or high indebtedness levels may in fact reward poor fiscal 
management and further undermine fiscal efforts. Conversely, the formula 
may compromise central government transfers to relatively affluent and 
fiscally prudent districts (Bird and Smart 2002). Finally, formula based 
redistributions tend to generate entitlements, which are fairly difficult to 
reverse or amend in the long run once a practice has been set in motion. 
Elsewhere, we have shown significant variation in the existing 
modalities for horizontal or interregional distribution (Arellano and 
317
The Governance of Natural Resource Wealth
Some Political Economy Considerations on Enhancing Social Investment 
Mejia Acosta 2014). Table 1 illustrates that highly decentralized countries 
like Bolivia and Nigeria tend to benefit both producing and non-
producing districts through devolution and formula based mechanisms. 
Nigeria prioritizes the participation of all the subnational governments 
through formula-based participation (41% of revenues) and devolves a 
smaller proportion (13%) to the producing states (Kâ Diongue, Giraud, 
and Renouard 2011). Bolivia by contrast, has privileged devolution to 
producing districts (41% of revenues) but has also allowed redistribution 
to non producing states (22%) (Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014).
In contrast, Brazil and Peru tend to only privilege devolution of revenues 
to the producing region or states and localities in producing regions 
(66% and 55% of revenues respectively). In more recent times, Brazil has 
moved towards the provision of essential infrastructure to support 
extractive activities in neighboring jurisdictions: the ports from where 
oil, gas and minerals are exported, and the territories crossed by roads, 
pipelines, and railways. The Brazilian Congress even adopted 
legislation in 2013 to redistribute oil revenues among all federal states 
and has initiated legislation to allow the use of oil-related revenues for 
the education sector. The initiative however has been blocked through 
an appeal to the constitutional court by the three producing states that 
would benefit most from direct devolution of such revenues.
 
Colombia, a moderately decentralized country, has also adopted a 
combination of devolution and formula-based mechanisms to distribute 
oil royalties (and some mining revenue) across all subnational 
jurisdictions (Rausch 2009). In Indonesia, oil-related transfers go 
exclusively to the producing areas (provinces and districts), although 
the central government discounts 50% of the value of these transfers 
from ordinary fiscal transfers (Morgandi 2008, 23-24) as an indirect way 
to reallocate revenues to other needs. More recently, a percentage of the 
EI-revenue has been given to the jurisdictions adjacent to the producing 
ones but such transfers remain highly controversial because the benefits 
and negative externalities do not always coincide with official legal and 
political boundaries. In Mexico, EI-revenues are proportionally 
distributed across the entire country through an allocation formula 
(Arellano and Mejia Acosta 2014). Finally, countries that are highly 
centralized like Ecuador, Ghana and Papua New Guinea, tend to 
devolve the small share of transfers to producing regions only. 
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4� The politics of distributing EI revenues and their development
    consequences
The distribution of EI revenues across subnational governments needs 
to address two policy challenges. The first challenge is to determine the 
optimal level of subnational transfers that allows sufficient subnational 
autonomy to manage revenues without undermining centralized 
planning. The second dilemma is to identify who benefits from those 
transfers so that not only the producers of EI wealth are properly 
compensated but so are their neighboring and less wealthy 
jurisdictions. The previous sections discussing existing vertical and 
horizontal distribution formulas illustrate great variation in the choice 
of distribution formulas. The sections suggest that variation is not 
always consistent with the amount or nature of resources but they rather 
reflect the outcomes of specific political negotiations between national 
and subnational actors over time. This section explores the factors 
influencing these political bargains.
4�1 Vertical distribution of EI revenues  
From a political economy perspective, one of the main determinants of 
variation is the degree of political organization and mobilization that 
subnational governments have had vis-à-vis the central governments 
over time. In countries where local elites have been traditionally strong 
(Bolivia, Brazil) and have achieved considerable political and 
administrative autonomy, the central government has had to 
compromise and allow for greater distribution of rents with subnational 
governments. In Bolivia, the local exporting and mining elites organized 
along regional lines have played a significant role in the export economy 
(Laserna 2009). With the advent of the commodities boom, local demands 
have put pressure on the central government to adopt a direct 
hydrocarbons tax (IDH) in 2005 that distributes over 50% of mining rents 
to subnational governments. In Brazil, state governors have long been a 
critical part of the governing coalition in the center, and even after the 
1998 constitution reduced the direct influence of state governors a good 
level of decentralization was maintained. In both cases, the strong 
presence of subnational politics explains a high degree of fiscal 
decentralization that also included the distribution of EI revenues during 
the commodities boom.
By contrast, the absence of an active political pressure from subnational 
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governments explains why dissimilar countries like federal Mexico and 
Unitary Ecuador are not very decentralized. In the case of Mexico, the 
subnational pressures have been traditionally contained or managed by 
the party in government for many decades. This is particularly true for 
the management of EI rents that were maintained by the centrally-
controlled oil company PEMEX. The more recent political liberalization 
of Mexican democracy since the late nineties has not been sufficient to 
push for greater decentralization in the management of oil revenues most 
of which remain under control of the central government. In Ecuador, 
subnational governments (provinces and municipalities) demanded 
greater fiscal decentralization in the mid-nineties, but without a solid 
base of political support, they obtained a mild response from the central 
government allowing a transfer of 15% of central government spending 
to be invested in regional governments (Mejia Acosta and Albornoz 
2010). Furthermore, this mild allocation did not include the specific 
transfer of EI revenues, so local governments could not benefit from the 
advent of the commodities after 2004. Instead, the Correa administration, 
inaugurated in 2006, found mechanisms to further centralize the 
management of fiscal and EI revenues (Basabe et al. 2010). 
 
4�2 Horizontal distribution of EI revenues 
The puzzle of distributing revenues across different jurisdictions is 
usually addressed through political bargaining between resource rich 
districts, resource poor and central governments. All things being 
equal, resource rich elites would have a preference to maximize direct 
devolution of EI revenues to compensate for the value of resources 
extracted or the negative externalities associated with extraction. A 
greater share of revenues would also allow local elites greater 
independence from central government influence on spending policies. 
Resource poor districts however, would have a preference and demand 
for greater (re)distribution of EI revenues considering that these districts 
indirectly support extractive activities (and need better ports and road 
infrastructure for example) or making a claim for improved 
redistribution to address pre-existing socio economic inequalities 
(Arellano Yanguas and Mejia Acosta 2014). From the perspective of the 
central government however, a broader redistribution (across all 
districts) would be preferred if that contributes to consolidating its bases 
of electoral support (Gonzalez 2014). Likewise, a more targeted 
devolution to producing districts only would be preferred if this helps to 
consolidate the governing coalition at the center. 
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The cases of Colombia, Peru and Brazil illustrate different scenarios of 
political bargaining. In the case of Peru, the local elite with the support 
of mining companies has strongly bargained for a direct devolution of 
revenues from the central government in the form of a mining canon. 
These transfers are distributed to producing regions, provinces and 
municipalities but not outside extractive jurisdictions (Orihuela 2012). 
Benefiting regions have also resisted further government attempts to 
generate saving funds or compensation funds that are transferred to 
other regions (Arellano Yanguas and Mejia Acosta 2014). Brazil provides 
a similar illustrative case, where producing regions have resisted 
further attempts by the central government to distribute the extractive 
wealth to non-producing regions. As discussed, the government passed 
legislation to distribute potential oil revenues to benefit education but 
the redistribution has been challenged through a constitutional appeal 
by three resource rich states.
Colombia provides an interesting example where the central government 
defused some potential opposition of resource rich departments. It 
launched a legislative proposal aimed at “spreading the jam across the 
whole toast” when it came to distributing the wealth from the EI sector 
(Garcia Tapia 2011; Garcia Villegas and Espinosa Restrepo 2011). The 
government obtained support from the majority of legislators who in turn, 
sought greater government investment on projects that would further 
their chances of re-election. Not only were the representatives from 
producing districts in a relative minority but they were also interested in 
direct government investment, so the new legislation was approved in 
July 2011 (Arellano Yanguas and Mejia Acosta 2014). The reform 
dramatically reduced the share of royalties received by subnational 
governments (from 80% to 10%) but it also centralized the governments’ 
decision-making ability, thereby giving the central government greater 
say in the way Regional Compensation and Development funds were 
invested (Arellano Yanguas and Mejia Acosta 2014).
4�3 Distributional consequences for enhancing the quality of growth 
One of the key arguments advanced by this chapter is that the different 
mechanisms of intergovernmental transfers and the underlying political 
bargains that sustain them are key to understanding the effectiveness of 
government spending. It is through these institutional configurations that 
any windfall of natural resource revenues will have a positive impact on 
the quality of growth. While the link between the choice of distributional 
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mechanisms and the underlying shape of the political bargain was 
illustrated in the previous section, there is insufficient or inconsistent 
empirical evidence to test the second claim. Little is known about the 
actual impact of those transfers on fostering sustainable development 
outcomes such as social spending or developing human capital. 
This section will offer a brief discussion of pathways and factors that 
may contribute to enhancing the positive impact of government 
spending on social outcomes. While the empirical discussion here 
features some Latin American cases for which there is detailed 
knowledge on the quality of expenditure, generalizations to other 
contexts must be made with caution. The selected countries all are not 
low-income countries; they all display established democratic 
institutions and fiscal rules, and allow for an active participation of 
political parties and organized civil society.
All things being equal, the allocation of EI revenues should promote 
quality investments of funds when these are: a) fairly distributed across 
different constituents without privileging a particularly powerful or 
well organized group; b) allocated in consistent and predictable patterns 
without being excessively vulnerable to economic or political cycles; c) 
efficiently allocated so that they prioritize investment in high return 
sectors or have a demonstrable long term impact; and d) are managed in 
a transparent and accountable manner (Hallerberg et al. 2009).
The scarce existing evidence seems to suggest that the promise of 
decentralized social spending does not necessarily ensure improved 
outcomes; rather, it is the centralized planning, management and 
administration of these funds that is more likely to create coordination, 
monitoring and strategic investment. Empirical studies suggest that 
despite the extraordinary amount of transfers to mining regions over 
the last decade, social indicators have not improved by a comparable 
proportion (Arellano Yanguas 2011, 2012, Loayza, Mier y Teran and 
Rigolini 2013). This is partly due to the lack of managerial capacity at the 
subnational level, the reduced political horizons that encourage short-
term investments and the lack of effective checks and balances that 
allow for widespread rent seeking (Arellano Yanguas 2011, 2012). 
At the other end of the spectrum we find a country like Ecuador that has 
centralized the planning, management and allocation of EI rents in the 
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hands of the executive and has produced visible improvement in the 
range of social indicators (Mejia Acosta and Albornoz 2010). The 
improvements are most likely associated with the centralized 
management of revenues from the commodities bonanza. Paradoxically, 
this increased fiscal (re)centralization has come at the price of reducing 
the political and administrative autonomy of local governments as well, 
in a way that local mayors would only increase their ability to gain re-
election if and when they can show a clear association to the executive 
branch. Further analysis is also needed to evaluate the transparency and 
sustainability of this type of investment when it is heavily centralized in 
the hands of the executive branch. Far from making sweeping 
generalizations, this paper argues that the formation of stable, 
transparent and inclusive coalitions should contribute to improving the 
quality of spending of natural resource revenues. 
5� Conclusions
 
This chapter has offered a partial explanation and a testable claim about 
the link between natural resource revenues and the quality of growth. 
The partial explanation looks at the different nature of existing revenue 
allocation mechanisms and the underlying political and institutional 
configurations that sustain these policy choices. The chapter relies on 
evidence from a selected range of cases to illustrate some of the policy 
dilemmas and political trade-offs for allocating windfall revenues 
between central and subnational governments. The testable claim is that 
these distributional mechanisms and the political bargains sustaining 
them, should have an impact on the type and quality of government 
investments over time. The preliminary and incomplete evidence in this 
regard suggests that this is a promising agenda for future research.
The section below summarizes the most salient conclusions and 
pending themes.
1. The sole presence of political institutions or fiscal rules is not a 
sufficient predictor of actual distribution patterns. The review 
confirms the notion that fiscal decentralization alone is not a good 
predictor of increased devolution. Some of the countries with 
formally centralized (unitary) governments may actually concede 
equal or greater fiscal autonomy to subnational territories than to 
those with formal decentralized or federal structures. However, the 
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review suggests that the existing strength and political leverage of 
local elites is a stronger predictor of greater decentralization. In 
contrast, where local elites have limited political or economic 
influence, the central government is more likely to recentralize the 
allocation of funds regardless of the fiscal formula.
2. The allocation of rents across producing and non-producing districts 
(horizontal association) is mildly associated with levels of 
decentralization. Highly centralized systems tend to adopt 
devolution formulas benefiting producing districts only, whereas 
formally decentralized systems tend to benefit both producing and 
non-producing territories. Central governments are able to promote 
a more distributive (inclusive) allocation of natural resource 
revenues when they can effectively mobilize non-producing districts 
and/or defuse the power of producing districts (as illustrated in 
Colombia). When elites in producing districts are strong and 
mobilized, it is likely that distribution formulas will continue to 
block a broader distribution of wealth (as in the case of Peru).
3. In both cases of vertical and horizontal distribution, the chapter 
shows a consistent pattern of path dependency that is consistent 
with the existing literature: once distributional reforms have been 
adopted, these become very hard to change over time unless there 
is a dramatic realignment of the relevant political actors. These 
major political shifts can be produced after elections or as a 
response to nationwide mobilizations for greater redistribution. 
4. There is inconclusive evidence to claim which allocation formula is 
more likely to enhance the efficiency of government investments. 
Preliminary evidence discussed in this paper suggests that it is the 
centralized management and allocation of funds that appears to be 
associated with improved social outcome indicators and 
conversely, an extreme devolution to weak subnational units may 
in fact reinforce rent seeking practices. In principle, this idea 
should challenge the proposed benefits of fiscal decentralization 
established in the literature. Looking ahead, more work is needed 
to explore the mediating variables through which a more (de)
centralized allocation and revenue management is likely to 
improve government investment. Some pending themes include 
the analysis of discretionary management of funds, the 
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effectiveness of transparency and accountability initiatives, and 
the capacity of local governments to effectively administer central 
government funding.
5. Finally, much more work is needed to systematically measure, 
analyze and compare the impact of natural resource revenues on 
social spending and how this links to quality of growth. One way 
of approaching the question is to compare multiple cases based on 
the funding modalities adopted at sector level (education, health, 
nutrition) and measure these against specific social indicators (e.g. 
improved school enrolment or reduced stunting rates) over time. 
This would be an empirical way to assess the contribution of the 
commodity revenues on enhancing the quality of growth across 
the developing world. 
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